David! Please put a copy of the excised documents from this case in the "old" rending room.

Ref: 91-F-2088 (A) 900611DOD092

Ms. Kate Doyle The National Security Archive Gelman Library, Suite 701 2130 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20037

Dear Ms. Doyle:

This is in response to your October 28, 1991 Freedom of Information Act Appeal questioning the USSOUTHCOM decision to deny two documents in their entirety.

I have reviewed the documents, USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90, and USCINCSO Counternarcotics Campaign Plan, and have determined that excised versions of the documents may be released. The deleted information is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Section 1.5(a), which concerns military plans or operations, and Section 1.5(c), which concerns intelligence activities or intelligence sources or methods. Accordingly, this information is withheld pursuant to 5 USC § 552(b)(1). Additionally, the deleted information is exempt from declassification in accordance with Sections 1.6(d)(1) and 1.6(d)(4) of Executive Order 12958.

Your are advised that you have a right to judicial review of this decision in a United States Court in accordance with 5 USC § 552(a)(4)(B).

Sincerely,

SIGNED

D. O. Cooke Director

Enclosures: As stated

Prepared by kammer:wtk:4/26/99:DFOI:gr_pk_yl_

#954

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND



USCINCSO COUNTERNARCOTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN

CLASSIFIED BY USCINCSO DECLASSIFY ON OADR REVIEW ON: 31 DEC 1999

REASON: 2-301.C.6

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003



SCJ5-PL

SUBJECT: USCINCSO DRAFT COUNTERNARCOTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN (U)

DISTRIBUTION: TBD

1. (SANF) Forwarded herewith is USCINCSO COUNTERNARCOTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN, which provides for support to host nations, including detection, monitoring, and interdiction in furtherance of the counternarcotics mission within the Andean Ridge countries.

- 2. (U) This campaign plan responds to specific taskings from the President-and the Department of Defense.
- 3. (U) This campaign plan is effective for planning purposes only until approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: . .

BENARD W. GANN Brigadier General, USAF Director, J-5

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

USCINCSO COUNTERNARCOTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN (U) SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U)

- 1. (S/NF) The long title of this plan is USCINCSO COUNTERNARCOTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN for Counternarcotics Operations in the Andean Ridge Countries. The short title is USCINCSO COUNTERNARCOTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN CONPLAN 6300-90 (U).
- 2. (U) This document is classified SECRET, with portions NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, to protect information revealing plans of US government agencies. Information contained herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan, including those required to develop supporting plans.
- 3. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Sections 793 and 794, Title 18, United States Code. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
- 4. (U) Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without permission of this headquarters is prohibited, except as required for the preparation of supporting plans.

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

USCINCSO DRAFT COUNTERNARCOTICS CAMPAIGN PLAN (U)

REFERENCES:

- a. The White House National Drug Control Strategy, Sep 89.
- b. JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Dec 86 with change 1.
- c. Secret Memorandum for the SECDEF: From JCS, 14 Sep 89, Subject: DOD Support to Country Teams.
- d. Secret/NOFORN SECDEF Order: From JCS; 180946L Sep 89, Subject: Elevation of Mission Priority of Counternarcotics Operations.
- e. Confidential DOD Guidance for the Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, 18 Sep 89.
- f. Secret Message: From JCS/J-3; 181937Z Sep 89, Subject: Implementation of Andean Strategy.
- g. Secret/NOFORN Message: From CJCS; DTG 192340Z Sep 89, Subject: Planning Order--USCINSCO Enhanced Operations.
- h. Confidential Message: From CJCS; 192350Z Sep 89, Subject: Enhanced Level of Effort.
- Message: from DEA; 192018Z Sep 89, Subject: Implementation of National Drug Control Strategy; LTG Myers sends.

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. (U) Strategic Guidance. The theater is divisible into three interdependent subregions: the Circumcaribbean, the Andean Ridge and the Southern Cone plus Brazil. The Andean Ridge (A-R) both possesses and faces the greatest threats in the counternarcotics effort. Consequently, the first priority for military resources allocated for combating the narcotic.

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
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threat will be to the Andean Ridge (A-R) countries of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

Although the Andean Ridge (A-R) offers limited opportunity for direct threat against the United States in times of crisis or war, the narcotics threat to the United States and its social institutions as well as the possibilities of destabilization of adjoining nations through narcotrafficking and insurgency are significant threats to US security. The large scale introduction of US forces into the subregion could favor the political agenda of insurgents and has major risks for other policies. For these reasons, national policy currently emphasizes minimum U.S. force presence and visibility and limits application of military resources to detect, monitor and counter developing host nation capabilities to defeat insurgents and narcotraffickers.

Application of military resources must be applied in a balanced fashion to support the host nation political agenda where it is consistent with U.S. strategic objectives. While the command is actively engaged in this long-term campaign, it must guard against the possibility that political control of selected nations in the theater of operations could collapse —— prior to successful interdiction of the drug flow. Thus, firebreaks must prior to successful interdiction of the drug flow. Thus, firebreaks must also be built with the bordering nations by actively engaging their support in the containment of the threat and by insulating their institutions from the socio-political threats of the narcotics trade. Also, we must ensure that if global or regional contingencies require a redeployment of US assets from the counter narcotics mission that the threat can be at least contained for a limited period.

To counter the drug cartel threats requires a carefully integrated diplomatic and interagency strategy supported by continued access to military and political institutions of host nations (HN). Given the fragile state of the democratic institutions under siege by the drug barons in the A-R countries, the Command will pursue a bilateral development of the military forces in these nations to enhance national sovereignty. Emphasis should be placed on internal defense and security measures against insurgencies and drug cartels using at the outset the host nations' own resources. This will be supplemented by US intelligence, logistics. equipment, training and operational planning support as required and requested by the host nations and country teams. It is expected that the host nations, with US non-combat support, will be capable of combatting the narcotics threat up to a certain level of violence and instability; it will be essential to define and assess that critical level in each country within the context of our diplomatic and military strategy. The strategy must carefully consider Host Nation (HN) instability and levels of violence so that a direct application of US combat forces (in order to prop up a disintegrating nation) will not have to be necessary. Our support to nations must be balanced and measured so as not to drive up the instability





factors early in the counternarcotics effort. If US combat forces are required, the negative consequences to our own political and military institutions (internally and from LATAM nations) will be such that overall US strategy for the theater will be damaged; in essence, an emergency requirement to use combat forces would signal a setback to a successful drug strategy.

Many of the factors which contribute to the drug-induced protracted conflict in the A-R subregion and which manifest themselves as threats or opportunities for potential adversaries during times of crisis and war, cannot be addressed simply through the application of overwhelming force. These threats must be countered through the incremental adjustment of the strategic environment through the imaginative and proactive application of military resources in concert with other agencies. In the counternarcotics programs for the A-R subregion, the success of the protracted conflict strategy is measured in terms of threat reduction and regional stability as well as a reduced drug flow into the U.S. In sum, the strategy must result in enhanced warfighting capability through a secure and stable A-R subregion, a decreased drug flow into CONUS, increased US access to infrastructure and broader alliance options for the application of combined forces in crisis and war. Again, we anticipate an initial period where instability will increase as drug interdiction programs increase in Properly addressing and countering this interim period of effectiveness. instability lies at the heart of a successful counterdrug strategy.

The campaign against the drug scourge should advance all of our theater strategic objectives. These are: (1) Maintain security of the southern flank of the US by securing southern approaches through the theater AOR; (2) Support CINCLANT and CINCPAC in their defense of the circumtheater SLOCs; (3) Build alliances to support a combined defense of the AOR with minimum commitment of US forces; and (4) Advance and defend US interests in the region. The A-R subregion strategic objectives include: (1) Support HN efforts to eliminate the production, transportation and distribution of illegal drugs; (2) Initiate/sustain programs to achieve regional stability; and (3) Establish/sustain military-to-military and political balanced alliances where US and HN collective interests and objectives converge.

Basic principles underpin our counternarcotic strategy. (a) Though the narcotics problem is global, the cocaine problem is hemispheric. (b) The counternarcotics main attack is against "demand" with strong supporting attacks against "supply". (c) The campaign will involve orchestration of offensive, defensive, and preventive actions throughout the hemisphere. (d) Optimize benefits and reduce costs by using resources as far "forward" as possible. (e) Stable governments and healthy economies are favorable to the counternarcotics war. (f) Host Nations will lead counternarcotics efforts in their respective countries - U.S. will provide operational support with minimum US presence and visibility in host countries. (g) Timely and

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accurate strategic and tactical intelligence is essential. (h) Unity of inter-service, interagency, and international effort is key to counternarcotics progress. (i) National sovereignties will be enhanced and respected. (j) USG and HN's have finite resources to wage the drug war. Leveraged resourcing and capabilities will result in maximum effectiveness. (k) Laws and policies must support counternarcotics efforts. (l) Situation will require a long-term, sustained effort.

- b. (U) Enemy Forces
 - (1) (U) Composition/Disposition.
 - (a) (U) Colombia.

l (S/NF) Narcotraffickers, Strengths of gangs/militias directly supporting the drug cartels are about 2000-3000 combatants. Drug militia forces have been trained in weaponry and tactics by British and Israeli mercenaries. Forces operate primarily as terrorist/assassination gangs in major metropolitan areas and as bodyguards for cartel members. The "sicarios," or assassins, are transported by cartel ground/air transportation with several thousand vehicles available to the cartels. The drug forces are limited in their capability to seize and hold ground and are no match for government forces in sustained ground combat, although they are exceedingly violent in their actions. The drug cartels subsidize numerous corrupt government and military officials and have an extensive intelligence collection capability that provides forewarning of government moves.

2 (S/NF) FARC. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) fields about 5,000 armed combatants, with about 10,000 popular militia in support. The FARC operates 48 rural "fronts" nationwide. There is wide cooperation among guerrillas and narcotraffickers in which the former provide protection and are integrated into the whole production system for cocaine and marijuana. They are not yet receiving the major revenues that come from selling direct to wholesalers for distribution to the U.S. FARC has consolidated their control in major portions of Caqueta, Putumayo, Meta, and Huila. Guerrilla weaponry includes automatic weapons, mortars, explosives and anti-tank weapons. FARC is estimated to derive 70 percent of their revenues from the narcotics trade; if the drug trade is slowed, the movement could be crippled. FARC has proven vulnerable to combined arms operations, but has not been seriously challenged in their heartlands.

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3 (S/NF) ELN. The National Liberation Army (ELN) fields between 1500-2300 combatants in 12 rural and 4 urban fronts. Strongholds are in the Magdalena Medio, Huila, Caqueta, Meta, Guavire regions, and the central mountain range south of Nevado del Tolima mountain. At least one front is extensively involved in narcotics protection. The ELN has waged effective sabotage operations against Colombian economic targets (principally oil pipelines) and has expressed solidarity with narcotraffickers against U.S. "aggression." The GOC has been having limited success in recent offensive against ELN forces in Norte de Santander and Arauca, principally as a result of effective air mobility.


4 (S/NF) EPL. The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) fields between 850-950 armed combatants in 9 rural and 4 urban fronts. They operate mainly in the Cordoba Department, but have spread to neighboring departments and the cities of Barranquilla, Cali, and Bogota. At least one front maintains coca fields in different areas of the Uraba. EPL primarily conducts routine extortion, kidnapping, robbery, and sabotage operations. A rigidly organized, Marxist-Leninist movement, the EPL is violently anti-American. EPL is vulnerable to sustained, combined arms operations.

5 (S/MF) M-19. The Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19) is 650-700 strong and operates primarily in urban areas. M-19 currently is conducting negotiations with the GOC. for reintegration into society. M-19 provides security for narcotraffickers and occasionally contracts out for assassinations and sabotage. M-19 currently is operating at a reduced capability after the GOC focused counterinsurgency efforts on the movement after its urban terrorist assault on the Palace of Justice in Bogota.

(b) (U) Peru

1. (C/NF) Narcotraffickers. Drug trafficking organizations are increasingly evident in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), where they undermine civil authority and contribute to lawlessness and violence. An attack on a police garrison in Uchiza in March 1989 was a combined narco-Sendero operation. The narcotraffickers offer the insurgents a source of weapons, supplies, and funds to widen their operations. Moreover, the vast sums available to traffickers serves to corrupt the police, military, judiciary, and government officials. Up to several hundred small Peruvian trafficking organizations (usually extended families) operate in the UHV at any given time. Loose associations among Peruvian

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traffickers do not yet compete on the same level in the international market with the more experienced Colombian and Bolivian groups. However, they are developing their own international transportation and distribution systems.


2 (S/NF) Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path). With a strength of 5000+ combatants, SL operates throughout the country with strongholds in the Department of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Junin, and San Martin (UHV). SL conducts operations ranging from simple assassinations and urban bombings to full-scale attacks on police and military outposts launched by several hundred combatants. Its principal tactic is to foster terror among the subject populace and government forces through extremely violent tactics. SL columns rely on expropriated trucks for transport, but often operate on foot in the broken, mountainous terrain. SL forces are vulnerable to airmobile forces, and their spread-out column formations are vulnerable to ambushes. SL has considerable success in intendicting LOCs at night. A recent attack on a military base also was conducted at night, indicating an increase in SL capabilities and tactical discipline. SL employs automatic weaponry, explosives, and mortars. The SL-portray themselves as the protectors of the coca cultivators in the UHV and other areas against the GOP and U.S. eradication efforts . SL has placed a \$15,000 bounty on the head of any "DEA agent", a generic phrase for any official American involved in counternarcotics efforts. Although SL has benefited from drug revenues, the movement is not dependent on those revenues to the same extent as Colombian insurgent movements. SL will follow its own ends if they conflict with narcotraffickers aims.

3 (S/NF) MRTA. (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). 500+ combatants operating primarily in Lima, with cells in Cusco, Pucallpa, Trujillo, Huancayo, and presence in the UHV. MRTA provides security for selected narcotraffickers activities. MRTA has employed automatic weapons, explosives, and mortars. Automatic weapons attacks on residences are an MRTA specialty. MRTA has had some limited success in interdicting LOC's in the Pucallpa area, and at one point besieged the town. MRTA, like SL, is vulnerable to air attack and ambush once its forces are detected.

(c) (U) Bolivia

1 (C/NF) Narcotraffickers. Bolivian trafficking organizations have been operating primarily as suppliers to the international drug cartels, although they are well organized, principally in the Chapare region. The traffickers are employing Colombian

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
bodyguards and gangs in increasing numbers. Although not a combat force, there are at least 300,000 Bolivian campesinos organized in coca grower's federations who oppose government eradication efforts. Chapare syndicate members provoked the riots at Villa Tunari in 1988, where an UMOPAR base camp was overrun and 11 campesinos died. Drug interests in the Chapare are capable of concentrating mobs of campesinos several thousands strong to oppose military forces which have on occasion, resulted in military forces firing on police forces engaged in counternarcotics operations (as at Santa Ana recently).

- 2 Trafficking organizations would be vulnerable to sustained government interdiction operations if the government were capable of mounting such actions.
- (d) (e) Ecuador. Ecuador features primarily as a transshipment—and money-laundering venue for narcotrafficker organizations. Although traffickers provide some limited security for shipments, they are not capable of opposing government security forces in any major way.
- (2) (U) Major Objectives.
 - (a) (S/NF) Narcotics cartels. International narcotics cartels are motivated by profit. The cartels provide the entrepreneurial ability to satisfy the market for narcotics and to ensure the further development of the narcotics industry. They coordinate such operations as bribing officials, maintaining informant networks, purchasing necessary weapons, operating communications nets, and procuring aircraft and other transportation means. The major objectives of the cartels are: amass immense personal wealth for cartel members through a constantly increasing narcotics market; increase narcotics production (10-15% annually) and develop new markets in Europe and the Middle East to compensate for the increasing cocaine glut in the U.S.; diversify holdings and product lines (amassing real estate in South America and branching out into opium cultivations); and ensure personal security for cartel members.
 - (b) (U) Insurgent Forces. Although motivated by ideologies ranging from hard-line Marxist-Leninist to xenophobic Inca nationalism, the insurgent forces concentrate on overthrowing government systems through force. Insurgent forces see the narcotics traffic as a valuable adjunct to the revolution, providing both a source of financial support and a source of recruits alienated by government and US-supported efforts to, as they see it, eliminate campesinos and take advantage of domestic discord.

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- (3) (C/NF) Cartel Doctrinal Patterns. Cartels depend on their ability to neutralize civil and military authority by undermining the judiciary and counternarcotics forces. The trafficking organizations use their economic power to exert a strong influence over public and private opinion and to subvert the political, law enforcement, and judicial processes in their favor. If subversion and bribery do not yield the desired results, the cartels protect themselves through violence and narcoterrorism, targeting national-level leaders when necessary. If their operations require cooperation with insurgents, such alliances are their operations require cooperation with insurgents, such alliances are made. Cartel leaders contribute to their psychological dominance through conspicuous personal consumption and displays of their vast wealth.
- (4) (U) Operational and sustainment capabilities.
 - (a) (b) Transportation. Drug cartel assets are not fully known. Some 400-600 aircraft are estimated to conduct 1000-4000 smuggling sorties per year to the U.S. (about 5 million flights, both licit and illicit, transit to and near the U.S. annually); about 3000-5000 ship movements per year are related to narcotics smuggling (out of some 10 million vessels that transit to or near the U.S. each year). Operating sites in South America are guarded by both narcotrafficker hirelings and by insurgent forces; about 7000 unregistered airfields are estimated to support narcotics smuggling in Latin America. Extensive river networks feeding the UHV and the Amazon Basin are employed for barges and boats transporting precursor chemicals.
 - (b) (C/NF) Production.. Narcotics traffickers in the Andean Ridge produce an estimated 365 metric tons of cocaine annually, and about 30% of the marijuana transported to the U.S. Narcotics revenues produce an estimated 7% of the Andean Ridge GDP.
 - (c) (U) Sustainment.
 - l (C/NF) Insurgent Forces. The major insurgent forces are capable of sustaining operations against government forces indefinitely. Unlike Central American insurgent forces, South American movements do not depend on major, external support. Guerrillas have improved integrating command, control, communications, and intelligence. The major insurgent groups control substantial areas in Colombia and Peru and have developed a sophisticated logistical infrastructure.
 - 2 (C/NF) Narcotraffickers. At their own estimate, the Colombian cartel leaders are capable of continuing production and waging narcoterrorism at current levels against the government of Colombia for the next two years, despite full-scale government operations against the cartel. Government forces in Colombia



have concentrated on confiscating cartel leaders' visible assets and searching for the leaders themselves; production sites have not been severely affected.

- (5) (E) Drug operations vulnerabilities. The success of cocaine trafficking organizations depends upon timely delivery of coca derivatives to processors and of processed cocaine to international markets.
 - (a) (e) Precursor chemicals. Cocaine HCL productions requires large quantities of chemicals such as ether and toluene. These chemicals require bulk transport to remote processing sites. Currently, the U.S. and Western Europe supply most of the precursor chemicals. Precursor chemical shipments are vulnerable to law enforcement measures such as export and import controls. Although Brazil and other South American nations produce precursor chemicals, limits on U.S. and European sources would greatly decrease profits and production over the next several years.
 - (b) (c) Transport links. Identification, isolation, and interdiction of narcotics transport networks would directly attack the cartel's center of gravity. Some areas, such as the immensaly important UHV, are vulnerable to short-term isolation and containment. The Andean mountain barrier and Amazon jungle that isolate the UHV and encourage coca growth could just as readily become barriers to narcotics transport: There is only one all-weather road link to the Peruvian coast (passing through tunnel) and a reliable detection, monitoring, and intercept system for aircraft departing the UHV for narcotics processing sites would effectively shut down the traffic. When combined with an aggressive river patrol, shipments of precursor chemicals, supplies, and coca products would all be affected.
 - (c) (C) Processing sites. HCL labs generally are dependent on air transport into their remote sites. The supporting, unregistered airfields are signature items that can readily be identified through intelligence. The sites themselves, although occasionally defended, are vulnerable to conventional attack by military/police forces, especially surprise air assaults where the lab is destroyed and attackers then withdraw.
 - (d) (CY Cartel leaders. Cartel leaders, once captured, can be extradited to the US. Once removed from the often co-opted Colombian judicial system, leaders have few remaining weapons.
 - (e) (c) Money laundering. Financial institutions serving as conduits for cartel funds are vulnerable to law enforcement ... investigations and the judicial process.

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- (6) (U) Enemy Centers of Gravity.
 - (a) (U) At National level U.S. demand is the narcotraffickers' center of gravity.
 - (b) (U) Regional/Theater level. Narco systems depend on:
 - 1 (U) Weak theater economic infrastructures.
 - 2 (U) Ability to corrupt governments and "legitimize" illegally obtained monies.
 - 3 (U) Ability to undermine governments' stability and institutional will to effectively prosecute counternarcotics war.
 - (c) (U) Subregional. Narco systems depend on:
 - $\underline{1}$ (U) Freedom of action to produce, process, transport, and distribute illegal drugs.
 - 2 (U) Ability to conduct narcotrafficking operations with impunity.
 - 3 (U) A vast agricultural base.
 - 4 (U) Ability to penetrate sovereign borders at will.
 - $\underline{5}$ (U) Able to depend on the inability of Host Nations to effectively coordinate CN efforts or operate effective C³ systems.
 - (d) (U) Host Nations in the A-R subregion.
 - 1 (U) Colombia.
 - <u>a</u> (S/NF) Insurgent organization links with narcotrafficking cartels to provide collective security and financing.
 - \underline{b} (U) Ability to protect growth, processing, and transportation activities.
 - \underline{c} (U) Ability to undermine political will and CN momentum of the legitimate government.
 - 2 (U) Peru.
 - a (SANF) Strong SL/Narco linkage to production,

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intelligence, distribution, and access to lines of communications.

- \underline{b} (U) Operation of secure nodes in narco link system, i.e. precursor chemicals, labs, and processing centers.
- 3 (U) Bolivia.
 - a (U) Dependence on coca as a cash crop.
 - b (S) Government and military corruption.
 - c (5) Lack of institutional will to prosecute the drug war.
- 4 (U) Ecuador: Access to air and ground transportation systems through country borders.
- (7) (U) Culminating points. Enemy reassessment of his own strategy would be required when:
 - (a) (U) U.S. National level.
 - 1 (U) U.S. shows a sustained demand reduction.
 - 2 (U) Drug substitutes for cocaine increase sufficiently to impact on narco-financing infrastructure.
 - (b) (U) Regional/theater level.
 - 1 (U) Stability of Host Nation governments increase.
 - 2 (U) Economic infrastructure improved within international economic system.
 - (c) (U) Subregional level.
 - 1 (U) Stability of Host Nation governments increase.
 - $\underline{2}$ (U) Economic infrastructure improved within theater economic system.
 - (d) (U) Host Nation level. When the narcotrafficker leaders fear for their assets, lives, or the threat of imprisonment, they will have to reassess or modify their strategies.
 - 1 (U) · Colombia.

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- a (U) Increased difficulty to export drugs.
- b (U) Increased difficulty to import precursor chemicals.
- 1 When Narco-intelligence systems are compromised and cannot consistently protect processing and transportation nodes.
- 2 (U) Peru.
 - <u>a</u> (U) Links severed between narcotraffickers and insurgents.
 - <u>b</u> (U) When Narco-intelligence systems are compromised and cannot consistently protect processing and transportation nodes.
- 3 (U) Bolivia.
 - a (U) Alternate crops and employment rising.
 - b (U) Legitimate economic infrastructure growing stronger.
- 4 (U) Ecuador Increased, effective border security.
- c. (U) Friendly forces. To counter the drug threat will require a coordinated, multi-agency and multi-service focus. Only by leveraging our limited resources and capabilities along with the HN's can we be successful. The following organizations and agencies will be key in this synergistic effort, and will provide operational support, command and control, intelligence, logistical support and training within their capabilities.
 - (1) (U) DOS
 - (2) (U) Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
 - (3) (U) US Customs.
 - (4) (U) US Coast Guard (USCG).
 - (5) (U) DOD.
 - (6) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
 - (7) (U) National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS).
 - (8) (U) CJCS.

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- (9) (U) Defense Communications Agency (DCA).
- (10) (U) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
- (11) (U) Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).
- (12) (U) Military Services.
- (13) (U) US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM).
- (14) (U) US Pacific Command (USPACOM).
- (15) (U) US Forces Command (USFORSCOM).
- (16) (U) US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).
- (17) (U) US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
 - (a) (U) Military Airlift Command (MAC).
 - (b) (U) Military Sealift Command (MSC).
 - (c) (U) Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).
- (18) (U) Strategic Air Command (SAC).
- (19) (U) Tactical Air Command (TAC).
- (20) (U) Friendly Centers of Gravity.
 - (a) (U) U.S. National level. National will focused on drugs.
 - (b) (U) Regional/Theater level.
 - 1 (U) Ability to efficiently coordinate and prosecute.
 - 2 (U) Ability to access HN's and conduct a combined/interagency attack on drug supplies without compromising HN sovereignty.
- (c) (U) Subregional level. A C^3I architecture that effectively supports the surveillance, monitoring, hand-off and interdiction of narcotrafficking activities.
 - (d) (U) Host Nation level.
 - 1 (U) Colombia.



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- <u>a</u> (U) Weak capability to prosecute the counternarcotics war.
- \underline{b} (U) Political sovereignty and will to prosecute the CN war.
- 2 (U) Peru.
 - $\underline{\underline{a}}$ (U) Capability of Host Nation forces to prosecute the SL/drug war connection.
 - \underline{b} (U) Political sovereignty and will to prosecute the CN war.
- 3 (U) Bolivia.
 - <u>a</u> (U) Weak political will to prosecute counternarcotics war.
 - b (U) Weak capability to prosecute the counternarcotics war.
- 4 (U) Ecuador.
 - a (U) Capability to control borders.
 - b (U) Political will and economic stability.
- (21) (U) Friendly Culminating points.
 - (a) (U) U.S. National level.
 - 1 (U) Increasing demand for illegal drugs.
 - 2 (U) Willingness to sustain political and economic costs.
 - (b) (U) Regional/Theater level.
 - 1 (U) US counternarcotics efforts strain friendly nation relationships and compromise alliances.
 - 2 (U) U.S. forces required to preserve nation sovereignty.
 - (c) (U) Subregional level.
 - 1 (U) U.S. forces take lead to attack counternarcotics war.
 - 2 (U) U.S. forces required to preserve nation sovereignty.

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- (d) (U) Host Nation level.
 - 1 (U) Colombia.
 - a (U) Requests U.S. combat troops.
 - <u>b</u> (U) Unable to sustain national will to attack counternarcotics.
 - 2 (U) Peru.
 - a (U) Additional narco/insurgent coalitions.
 - b (U) Government instability increases to crisis level.
 - 3 (U) Bolivia Emergence of active insurgent element.
 - 4 (U) Ecuador Increased political instability.
- d. (U) Assumptions.
- (3) (U) The Panama Canal will remain open.
 - (7) (U) Legal and legislative constraints that limit USG support will be modified or waived.
 - (8) (U) US national commitment to fight drugs will support an expanded US military involvement in Latin America will be maintained for a 10-20 year period.


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- (9) (U) A national multi-service, multi-agency strategy will be developed that assigns priorities, objectives, relationships and roles.
- (10) (U) Substantial increase in resources will be provided.
- (11) (U) Regional governments and militaries will have the will to attack the drug problem within their boundaries.
- (12) (U) War Powers Resolution issues will be addressed and resolved that favors the US support to HN's.
- (13) (U) Neither early relocation of Panama based organizations nor restricted access to GOP will adversely effect mission accomplishment.
- 2. (U) MISSION: When directed by the National Command Authority, USCINCSO, in conjunction with USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, CINCNORAD, DIA, Country Teams, cooperating host nations, and other US agencies, advances US interests by: aggressively executing long term programs to combat illicit drug trafficking through increased support in detection, monitoring, and interdiction; combating production and trafficking within his AOR through operational support to --- cooperating host nation forces; strengthening the internal security, political will, and institutional capabilities of cooperating host nations; and increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in reducing/eliminating the flow of illicit drugs.

3. (U) OPERATIONS:



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- (1) (U) Operational Objectives.
 - (a) (U) Reduce/eradicate crop.
 - (b) (U) Reduce/limit leaf shipment.
 - (c) (U) Stop/reduce illegal precursor chemicals into host nation.
 - (d) (U) Identify and destroy illegal processing sites.
 - (e) (U) Identify and interdict shipments.
 - (f) (U) Stop/reduce illegal precursor chemicals into host nation.
 - (g) (U) Identify and destroy all base and HCL labs.
 - (h) (U) Stop/reduce cocaine shipment.
 - (i) (U) Eliminate/disrupt infrastructure.
 - (j) (U) Stop movement of drug dollars.

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- (3) (U) Phases of Operations.
 - (a) (U) Phase I OPTEMPO increased, multiservice and multiagency efforts coordinated and focused, and resources redirected as required.
 - (b) (U) Phase II Increased resources, decreased constraints, and broadening efforts throughout the theater. As the US brings resources to bear in support of HN efforts, we anticipate a decentralization of not only Cartel and insurgent C³I, but also the decentralization of production and smuggling efforts. Therefore peripheral countries such as Ecuador, Paraguay and Brazil may experience increased drug cartel presence and influence. We may eventually have to reprioritize our efforts by country as HN's become more effective in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.

- b. (U) Phase I OPTEMPO increased, interservice and interagency efforts coordinated, and resources shifted as appropriate.
 - (1) Tasks to COMCNTF, COMUSARSO, COMUSNAVSO, COMUSSOUTHAF, COMSOCSO, MILGROUPS, COMUSASAALA as directed by USSOUTHCOM.

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- (f) (U) Program and budget for a multi-year campaign.
- (2) (U) Operational Concept. Andean-Ridge Subregion.
 - (a) (U) Strategic and Operational Requirements.

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(e) (U) Measures of merit. (Results that define degrees of success

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or failure of the strategy, generally require operational redirection, and must be an integral part of the commander's estimate in the future application of specific programs.)

- 1 (U) U.S. National level.
 - <u>a</u> (U) Congress passes laws to support counternarcotics efforts.
 - b (U) Tighter international banking laws.
 - \underline{c} (U) Increasing price and decreasing quality of drugs on street.
 - d (U) National will and appropriate funds to fight war effort.
 - e (U) Stable economies and institutions.
 - \underline{f} (U) National sovereignties and alliances enhanced/degraded.
- 2 (U) Regional/Theater/Subregion levels.
 - $\underline{\underline{a}}$ (U) _Method. Attack production/processing nodes of the illicit drug system.

Measures of Merit. Processing labs and distribution timetables are disrupted or not; Production, processing nodes shift to new locations within A-R or to adjacent countries or they do not; crop substitutions for Coca increasing/decreasing; precursor chemical supplies increasing/decreasing.

Requires: Reprioritizing efforts to new locations, increasing resources, or continuity of current operations.

b (U) Method. Attack Cartel C³I infrastructure.

Measures of Merit. Significant counternarcotics timetable disruptions reflected in cocaine prices, drug lord retirements, and leadership shifts. Border/air space violations increased/decreased. Attacks on narcotrafficker nodes increased/decreased.

Requires: Continue current programs, target new leaders attack technology of C², sustain, increase or redirect resources.

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C (U) Method. Support/assist HN efforts to attack narcotraffickers/insurgents.

Measures of Merit. Narco/insurgent linkages changed, narco power and insurgent ideology in accord or conflict. Terrorism activities increased/decreased.

Requires: Proper application of capability resources.

 \underline{d} (U) Method. Attack the economic structure of the narcotraffickers.

Measures of Merit. Drug lord diversification of wealth, shifting of Cartel leadership, flight of drug lords or relocations to other nations to legitimize and enjoy their wealth. Economic value of coca leaf increased/decreased. Crop substitutions increased/decreased. Alternate employment increased/decreased.

Requires: National and international programs to target and imprison international fugitives, impede flow of illegal—dollars into the international financial system, and setze drug lord assets/property.

e (U) Method. Attack the technical support structure that is conducive to narcotrafficking.

Measures and Merit. Narcotraffickers' freedom of civil action and mobility. HN public awareness and acceptance/ nonacceptance of narcotraffickers. Judicial effectiveness in prosecuting narcotraffickers. Laws enforced that prevent new coca cultivation.

Requires: Continuity or change in PAO, CA, training support programs, and support for internal defense and development.


- (3) (U) Forces required. Assigned USSOUTHCOM DOD forces, supported and supporting CINC's, DOS, US agencies, and HN forces as appropriate to counter the drug production, processing, transportation, and distribution system.
- c. (U) Phase II Increased resources, decreased constraints.
 - (1) (U) Tasks to subordinate units. Tasks are consistent with Phase I tasks; however, priority of effort is situational dependent.



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(2) (U) Operational objectives and operational concept for phase II will be consistent with those in phase I under increased resources and decreased constraints; however, priority of effort and resources will be adjusted to counter the threat wherever it manifests itself in the subregion. In that effort, our programs should continue to advance the following goals:



4. (U) LOGISTICS. Concept of a logistics operation in support of this Campaign Plan will have two basic aspects: deployment and sustainment of US forces and other US non-DOD agencies and support provided to the host nations. The relatively small number of US forces involved and the nature of their activities will minimize service O&M-funded support requirements. Support requirements for US non-DOD agencies will be somewhat greater. By far the largest consumer will be the host nations whose support will take the form of Security Assistance (SA).

Additionally, a non-traditional aspect of support in this theater will be logistics training. US non-DOD agencies will require training in planning and executing logistics support for their operations. It is envisioned that these will be battalion and below equivalent operations. Training will include, but not be limited to commodity requirements determination, acquisition and distribution, support techniques, and extension of battlefield mobility.

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Support requirements for the HN will take the form of review of logistics force structure and procedures, sustainment, provision of major end items and training. It may require the deployment of US CSS forces for management and distribution and maintenance of supplies and equipment. The extent of support provided will be based on results of an initial assessment of HN capability to support their proposed operations. These assessments must be lead by COMUSMILGP of the HN involved and performed in conjunction with SCJ3 and SCJ5. Augmentation of the MILGP's will be provided by appropriate service personnel provided by or through USSOUTHCOM components.

a. (U) Responsibilities:

(1) (U) <u>COMUSMILGP</u>: Determine logistics training, force structure equipment and supply requirements; determine support requirements and recommendations for phased introduction of that support; determine USMILGP personnel and equipment augmentation requirements; determine increased budget requirements.

(2) (U) COMUSARSO/COMUSSOUTHAF/COMUSNAVSO:

- (a) (U) Determine logistics personnel requirements for MILGP augmentation, HN assessments and training for both US non-DOD agencies and HN.
- (b) (U) Capture all SA associated costs for later reimbursement.
- (c) (U) Provide training in logistics planning and operations.
 - (d) (U) Provide supply support to US non-DOD agencies.
 - (e) (U) COMUSARSO act as single service manager for CLI and common items in CLV supply.
 - (f) (U) COMUSSOUTHAF assist in determination of intratheater lift requirements. Provide intratheater lift operations in support of this plan.

b. (U) SUPPLY:

(a) (U) Supply support will be divided into two categories; supply support to US agencies and supply support to HN. Service computation factors will be used in estimating requirements for US agencies. Services, in conjunction with DSAA, DLA and COMUSMILGPs will determine consumption/ equipment requirements for the HN. Capture associated SA costs for future reimbursement.

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(b) (U) Fiscal/reimbursement procedures for support to US non-DOD agencies will be coordinated at the Service Department/Agency level. DSAA will determine fiscal procedures and inform Service Department, this HQ, and USMILGPs.

c. (U) MAINTENANCE:

- (1) (U) Maintenance procedures for US forces will be IAW Service Department policy and any restrictive guidance provided in specific plans.
- (2) (U) Maintenance requirements for HN will be IAW resultant requirements from MILGP assessments and in compliance with SA procedures.

d. (U) MEDICAL SERVICES:

- (1) (U) Medical care for all US service members is a US responsibility. The in country support team will assist the USSOUTHCOM surgeon in expeditiously moving US service members from HN hospitals as soon as medically practical.
- (2) (U) Non-DOD personnel requiring medical treatment will receive same at their expense. This policy does not apply to HN personnel.

.. (U) TRANSPORTATION:

- (1) .(U) Strategic mobility assets available will be IAW.Annex J, Mobility to JSCP (Regional Scenario).
- (2) (U) PODs will be established as required to support specific plans.

f. (U) BASE DEVELOPMENT:

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- (1) (U) In the near term, engineers can influence and contribute to countering narcotics primarily through the development of transportation infrastructure to enhance movement (e.g., roads, bridges, and airfields) as well as specialized transportation facility projects associated with ports and railroads. Training of HN engineers for the performance of tactical engineer support operations is a possibility (e.g., teach combat engineer tactics like construction of LZ/PZ/LAPES, demo, tactical bridging, counter mines and boobytraps, field fortification).
- (2) (U) In the long term more permanent infrastructure development lends itself to democratization through regional stability and also aids as an economic alternative to producing drugs. Such large scale projects as flood control, hydroelectric dams, and hospitals provide job alternatives and national development. These projects must be resourced



and therefore necessitate a USG commitment. Interagency cooperation/coordination is needed (e.g., USAID funding with Corps of Engineer management of a long-term, large scale projects). International agreements must be signed and support from nations outside the region (Europe/Japan) solicited. Security Assistance in the form of foreign military sales (FMS) construction has great potential. MILCON, although without Congressional support elsewhere in LATAM, may have propensity for counterdrug operations.

(3) (U) CFE may offer the opportunity to revitalize the construction engineers force structure to assist in the nation building operations.

5. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

a. (U) Scope


- (1) (S/NF) The command relationships outlined in this-Gampaign Plan apply to counternarcotics operations conducted in the USCINCSO's theater when in a supported role for detection and monitoring; when supporting other CINCs in detection, monitoring and interdiction; and when supporting ANDEAN RIDGE country-teams within the USSOUTHCOM AQR.
- (2) (5/NF) USCINCSO will coordinate detection and monitoring operations conducted within his AOR except as otherwise directed by Secretary of Defense and CJCS. Supporting CINCs and component, MILGP (SAO) commanders will prepare supporting plans and provide information as required.

b. (U) COMMAND LINES

(1) (U) <u>USCINCSO Service Components</u>

- (a) (COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH (COMUSARSO), with headquarters at FORT CLAYTON, PM provides support to USCINCSO as required.
- (b) ACT COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN AIR FORCES (COMUSSOUTHAF), with headquarters located at BERGSTROM AFB, TX provides support to USCINCSO as required. Upon direction of USCINCSO, COMUSSOUTHAF will assume the role of Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Air Space Control Authority as outlined in Basic Plan.
- (c) (C) COMMANDER, US NAVAL FORCES SOUTHERN COMMAND (COMUSNAVSO). Focated at FORT AMADOR, PM provides support to USCINCSO as required.
- (2) (U) Other Subordinate Commands

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- (a) (S/NF) COMMANDER, COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK FORCE. USCINCSO designates the Commander, Counternarcotics Task Force (COMCNTF) with delegated authority for all counternarcotics tasking purposes. COMCNTF will assume Operational Control (OPCON) of designated DOD forces tasked to support counternarcotics activities within the theater. Upon arrival in Host Nation, DOD counternarcotics forces will chop OPCON to respective MILGP (SAO) Commanders. COMCNTF has direct tasking authority to Andean-Ridge MILGP Commanders, theater components, and USSOUTHCOM staff on all counternarcotics matters. COMCNTF is delegated coordinating authority with all DOD/USG forces and agencies for counternarcotics purposes.
- (b) (S/NF) COMMANDER, SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOUTH (COMSOCSO). COMSOCSO exercises OPCON of all theater assigned Army SOF. CONUS SOF and CA/PSYOP Forces OPCON to COMSOCSO when forward deployed to USSOUTHCOM.
- (c) (S/NF) MILGP (SAO) Commanders in the Andean-Ridge countries are delegated OPCON of DOD forces within their respective countries in support of counternarcotics activities. MILGP (SAO) Commanders are delegated coordination authority with non-DOD counternarcotic agencies.
- (d) (U) Augmentation Forces. CONUS based forces deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR for counternarcotics activities will be assigned to USCINCSO and OPCON to COMCNTF. Special Operations forces will be OPCON TO COMSOCSO until arrival in HN. Upon HN entry, SOF will chop OPCON to the MILGP (SAO) Commanders.

(3) (U) SUPPORT AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS

(a) (U) Supporting Military Forces

- 1 (U) USLANTCOM. USLANTCOM forces will remain OPCON to USCINCLANT, except in the circumstances described below.
 - <u>a</u> (U) USCINCLANT forces conducting detection and monitoring activities and operating from a LANTCOM base will remain OPCON to USCINCLANT.
 - b (U) Air forces deployed to and operating from a USCINCSO base for five (5) days or greater will be transferred OPCON to USCINCSO. USCINCSO will have tasking authority of those LANTCOM air forces which remain OPCON to LANTCOM but operate within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Operations involving LANTCOM forces which do not meet the five (5) day rule are considered to be cross boundary operations.

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- <u>c</u> (U) USLANTCOM will have tasking authority of USCINCSO CBRN assets during an ongoing detection, monitoring, or interdiction operation.
- <u>d</u> (U) Cross boundary operations will be closely coordinated between both CINCS.
- e (U) Blue water surface and all subsurface forces will remain OPCON to USCINCLANT.
- 2 (U) USPACOM. USPACOM forces will remain OPCON to USCINCPAC, except in the circumstances described below.
 - <u>a</u> (U) USCINCPAC forces conducting detection and monitoring activities and operating from a PACOM base will remain OPCON to USCINCPAC.
 - <u>b</u> (U) Air forces deployed to and operating from a USCINCSO base for five (5) days or greater will be transferred OPCON to USCINCSO. USCINCSO will have tasking authority of those PACOM air forces which remain OPCON to PACOM but operate——within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Operations involving PACOM Forces which do not meet the five (5) day rule are considered to be cross-boundary operations.
 - c (U) Surface or subsurface cross boundary operations in the eastern Pacific Ocean will be closely coordinated between USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT. USCINCSO will be kept informed of these operations.
 - <u>d</u> (U) OPCON of surface and subsurface forces will be as agreed upon by USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT.
 - 3 (U) USCINCTRANS. Airlift, sealift, or land transportation assets supporting intertheater deployment, resupply, evacuation, and redeployment will remain under USCINCTRANS operational control, but will be fully responsive to USCINCSO.
 - 4 (U) FORCES COMMAND. Forces deployed from FORSCOM will be OPCON to USCINCSO upon arrival at the first APOD and SPOD and, upon redeployment, will be OPCON to CINCFOR upon departure from the APOE and SPOE.
- (b) (U) Supporting Agencies
 - 1 (U) US COAST GUARD. BASIC PLAN.

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- (c) (U) Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies
 - 1 (U) USCINCSO will coordinate policy guidance with the US ambassadors to the Andean Ridge countries as required based upon NCA guidance, host nation needs, and operational requirements.
 - 2 (U) Each Deputy Chief of Mission for Counternarcotics (DCM-CN) will coordinate host nation support between DOD and non-DOD assets. The DCM-CN will coordinate directly with non DOD assets and through the MILGP (SAO) Commanders for DOD assets.
- (d) (U) <u>Relationships with International and Foreign Commands and Organizations</u>.
 - l (U) USCINCSO through MILGP Commanders will assist and advise cooperating host nations on counternarcotics issues and operational techniques and will be responsive to the HN's needs as determined by the US Ambassador to that country.
 - 2 (U) US military forces will not be placed under operational command of commanders of forces from foreign nations.
 - 3 (U) US forces will not be placed under the operational command of commanders of forces from other nations.

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
(e) (U) Planning Relationships.

- 1 (e) The NCA through the JCS, monitors, coordinates and controls counternarcotic support activities conducted under this plan. USCINCSO is the theater military commander.
- 2. (S/NF) USCINCLANT and USCINCPAC, in coordination with USCINCSO, will plan for counternarcotic detection and monitoring activities regarding the Andean Ridge countries and narcotics trafficking routes to the United States. Interdiction activities will also be planned with Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA's) on routes within US national air and sea space.
- 3 (C) USCINCTRANS, USCINCLANT, USCINCSOC, USCINCPAC, CINCFOR, COMNORAD, Department of the Air Force, and Department of the Navy will plan for and coordinate deployment of forces in support of counternarcotics activities..
- 4 (8) Defense agencies will plan to provide support in accordance with current directives. When authorized during emergencies uscincso will assume operational control of defense agency elements operating in the USSOUTHCOM theater.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

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USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND ARO MIAMI 34003

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SCJ5-PLP

SUBJECT: USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION (ANNEX Z)

- 1. (S/NF) Forwarded herewith is USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90, which provides for support to host nations, including detection, monitoring, and interdiction in furtherance of the counternarcotics mission within the Andean Ridge countries.
- 2. (U) This plan responds to specific taskings from the President and the Department of Defense.
- 3. (U) This plan is effective for planning purposes only until approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 4. (U) The supporting plans listed in subprogram 3e, Plan Summary, will be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters, Attn: SCJ5-PLP, for review within 14 days after approval of this plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, US Army Director, J-3

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U)

- 1. (S/NF) The long title of this plan is USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90, Counternarcotics Operations in the Andean Ridge Countries. The short title is USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U).
- 2. (U) This document is classified SECRET, with portions NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, to protect information revealing plans of US government agencies. Information contained herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan, including those required to develop supporting plans.
- 3. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Sections 793 and 794, Title 18, United States Code. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
- 4. (U) Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without permission of this headquarters is prohibited, except as required for the preparation of supporting plans.

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
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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

USCÍNCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) PLAN SUMMARY (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE

a. (E) This plan provides for detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations and support of host nations in counternarcotics activities within the Andean Ridge countries by assisting the host nations to:



- b. (8) In order to focus on the above, the following will be required:
 - (1) (C) Provide assistance to Andean Ridge governments by providing counternarcotics operational support and strengthening internal security.
 - (2) (S) Increase effectiveness of host nation law enforcement agencies (LEA) in counternarcotics activities.
 - (3) (U) Support host nation counternarcotics detection, monitoring and interdiction activities.
 - · (4) (5) Provide support to other CINCs and USG agencies conducting counternarcotics operations.
- c. (U) This plan has been prepared in response to the tasking set forth in the President's National Drug Control Strategy and Secretary of Defense guidance.

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2. (U) CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

- a. (U) Execution of this plan could occur under any of the following conditions.
 - (1) (C) When the Secretary of Defense through CJCS directs and authorizes the assistance or support of requesting Andean Ridge countries and U.S. government agencies engaged in counternarcotics operations.
 - (2) (8) When the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS directs that assistance be provided to cooperating Andean Ridge countries in combatting illicit drug trafficking and strengthening internal security, political_will and institutional capabilities of host_nations.
- b. (U) This summary provides military and civilian decision makers a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency. The information contained herein should be reviewed and updated as necessary prior to the formulation or adoption of courses of action in a particular situation.
- c. (U) Legal considerations that may impact on plan implementation include:
 - (1) (U) Provisions in Title 10 and Title 22 of the U.S. Code as they apply to military assistance to host nations (see the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in particular).
 - (2) (U) International Law as it applies to acquiring host nation consent to U.S. military personnel presence, freedom of movement, and security for U.S. assets. U.S. host nation agreements are necessary but may be difficult to negotiate given the host nation political climate.
 - (3) (U) Security assistance limitations (Title 22) which require extensive Presidential determinations and findings may impede full implementation of this plan. Similar limitations may affect proposed assistance to host nation law enforcement personnel.
 - (4) (U) Coordinating agreements between U.S. Federal Agencies may require detailed negotiations and thereby slow implementation of this plan.
 - (5) (U) Although restriction of activities to operations short of accompanying host nation forces on field operations should avoid War Powers Resolution issues, US domestic political concerns may cause different results.


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(U) OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED

a. (U) Force Requirements

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
(b) (1) Inc 1-5 (e)




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b. (U) $\underline{\text{Deterrent Measures}}$. This plan is designed to produce the following desired deterrents.

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
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other supporting commanders for the deployment of augmentation and supporting forces. These forces may be air or sea lifted to final staging bases in the USCINCSO area of responsibility (AOR) for further deployment to Andean Ridge countries.

e. (U) Supporting Plans. Theater Component and MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders will submit supporting plans within 14 days after notification of approval of this CONPLAN by JCS. Upon notification by USCINCSO, USCINCPAC, USCINCLANT, USINCSOC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCNORAD, CINCFOR, CINCSAC and COMTAC will submit supporting plans.

f. (U) Collateral Plans. USCINCSO CONPLAN 6103-90 for NEC purposes.



(U) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

(U) USCINCSO will require augmentation forces and equipment of a specialized nature in order to successfully support cooperating Andean Ridge countries in counternarcotics activities.

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- 6. (S) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCSO will exercise operational control of DOD counternarcotics support operations conducted within USSOUTHCOM. When directed, operational control of augmentation forces will pass to USCINCSO with JCS guidance. Supporting air forces of another unified/specified command will normally remain under the operational control of their respective command. See Annex J.
- 7. (3) LOGISTIC APPRAISAL. This CONPLAN is feasible and supportable. Air and sea ports are adequate dependent on type of airframe or surface shipping utilized. Additional surveys of selected Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APOD's) and Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPOD's) will be required prior to use and may restrict type of aircraft or tonnage of surface shipping accordingly. The lack of negotiated Host Nation Support Agreements may impact expanded logistics operations under Phase II of the CONPLAN, depending on the specific scope and intent of the operational plan undertaken. However, it is expected that HN contractors and facilities will be available to enhance in-country logistics support. Based on the likelihood that personnel present in country will continue to be minimal, engineer operations may be limited to provision of equipment and advisory/supervisory personnel while relying on deployed assets for self-help and contractor services. No limitations on the availability of supplies are envisioned for this CONPLAN, provided U.S. national priority remains committed to support of this effort.
- 8. (U) <u>PERSONNEL APPRAISAL</u>. This CONPLAN is feasible and supportable from a personnel perspective. However, increases to MILGROUP (SAO) permanently assigned strengths require U.S. Ambassador, Host Nation concurrence and Congressional approval.
- 9. (U) <u>CONSOLIDATED LISTING AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF SHORTFALLS AND LIMITING FACTORS</u>. Augmentation of forces possessing special skills and equipment is required to accomplish the counternarcotics mission in USCINCSO AOR.

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)

(U) Although each item below is UNCLASSIFIED standing alone, the overall classification of this compilation of information is CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION	PROTECTION REQUIRE
The term "USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300".	U
OPLAN Long Title.	SANF
Circumstances under which this CONPLAN would be executed.	S/HF
The mission of the CONPLAN	_S/NF
Concept of Operations.	SINF
Redeployment of forces from outside the theater.	
Deployment of forces from outside the theater.	S
Supporting MAC and theater air transport operations.	8
Sea transportation support for deployment and operations.	8
Air rescue support.	J.
Target area weather information.	8
Supporting intelligence, counterintelligence, covert action, cover and	<i>U</i> .
deception, psychological operations and unconventional warfare operations.	

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SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION

PROTECTION REQUIRED:

Long-haul communications support unique to the operation.

Locations, techniques, capabilities and limitations, and effectiveness of supporting SIGINT programs.

SANF

Identity, strength and readiness of US forces available for employment.

.

Employment of riot control agents.

Characteristics, capabilities and limitations of US offensive and defensive weapons and systems.

Follow guidance for weapon concerned.

Specific themes to be exploited for psychological operations.

US and allied plans and operations for reducing enemy military capabilities through espionage, sabotage and subversion. SINE

S/NF

Status of US alliances with nations in the USSOUTHCOM area.

Effects of enemy military activities and operations on US allied forces, command and control systems and logistics.

C/NF

Locations, travel itineraries and modes of key US and allied military and civilian leaders.

Locations, defenses and vulnerability of key US and allied headquarters, communication centers, logistic depots and troop concentrations.

-C-

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SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION	PROTECTION REQUIRED:
US and allied operations for apprehending enemy agents.	_E/NF
US and allied counterintelligence operations for identifying, exploiting, penetrating, monitoring and neutralizing enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activities.	C/NF
Structure, location, capabilities and limitations of US and allied intelligence collection resources.	S/NF .
Announcement of DEFCONs/CIDREPs for US forces in the theater and combat area.	S
Vulnerability of US forces in the theater and combat area to air and missile attack.	SANF
Days and times to commence effective operations.	s/nf
Key Facilities List and specific information on each site.	C/NF

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

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<u>USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U)</u> COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN THE ANDEAN RIDGE COUNTRIES (S/NF)

(S/NF) References: a. JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Dec 1986 with Change 1. (U)

b. Memorandum for SECDEF: From JCS; 9-14-89 Subject: DOD Support to Country Teams. (S).

c. SECDEF Order; From JCS: 180946L SEP 89
Subject: Elevation of Mission Priority of
Counternarcotics Operations. (S/NF)

d. Message: From JCS//J-3; 181937Z SEP 89 Subject: Implementation of Andean Strategy. (S).

e. Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy; 9-18-89. (C).

9-18-89. (C).
f. Message: From DEA; 192018Z Sep 89
Subject: Implementation of National Drug Control Strategy; LTG Myers Sends. (U).
g. Message: From CJCS; 192340Z SEP 89

g. Message: From CJCS; 192340Z SEP 89 Subject: Planning Order- USCINCSO Enhanced Operations. (S/NF)

h. Message: From CJCS; 192350Z SEP 89 Subject: Enhanced Level of Effort. (C)

i. USCINCSO Counternarcotics Campaign Plan (S/NF)


(U) Task Organization: Annex A

1. (U) Situation


- a. (U) <u>General</u>. The supply of illegal drugs from abroad for consumption in the U.S. has bred violence and international instability, and poses a direct threat to U.S. security. Of particular concern is drug trafficking from Andean Ridge countries through the Caribbean Sea and across the southern border. Success in stemming the flow of illegal drugs in this area will require joint operations by U.S. Armed Forces, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs), to include cooperating Andean Ridge countries. The severity of the problem necessitates the increased coordinated use of all the resources the DOD and LEAs have to offer.
- b. (U) <u>Preconflict Actions</u>. Completion of the following is desired to enable effective and responsive plan execution.

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
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
c. (U) Enemy. The drug trafficker is a unique "enemy." Motivated by greed rather than ideology, narcotraffickers have shown themselves totally ruthless in their attempts to intimidate lawful governments and subvert political, legal and military organizations. They are as dangerous and unpredictable as international terrorist organizations and possess the ability to conduct operations against nations and individuals involved in counternarcotics efforts both within and outside the USSOUTHCOM AOR. See Annex B.

d. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) Operations of Unassigned Forces



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(2) (U) Specific Tasks of Friendly Forces

(a) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USCINCSOC)

- 1 (U) Designates US Army, U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force SOF Commanders to plan for special operations in support of USCINCSO counternarcotics activities.
- 2 (U) Provides Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF and CA/PSYOP in support of host nation counternarcotics requirements as requested by USCINCSO, through the Joint Staff. Anticipated support includes, but is not limited to; SOF aircraft and aircrews, Special Forces/SEAL/SBU personnel to train and advise host nation counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces, and CA/PSYOP staff assistance and trainers.
- 3 (U) Provides communications support as required.
- 4 (U) Augments Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) as required to support C2, training, and advisor requirements.

(b) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US FORCES COMMAND (CINCFOR)

- 1 (U) Provides U.S. Army forces as requested by USCINCSO through the Joint Staff.
- $\underline{2}$ (U) Provides technical support assets with command, control and support elements as directed.
- 3 (U) Provides headquarters elements in support of USCINCSO, as directed.

(c) (U) JOINT STAFF

1 (U) Directs supporting U.S. Commands and Services to provide resources in accordance with this plan when directed by the NCA.

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- $\underline{\mathbf{2}}$ (U) Provides national counternarcotics guidance as developed by the NCA.
- $\underline{3}$ (U) Arranges support from non-DOD agencies through the Secretary of Defense.

(d) (U) DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

- 1 (U) Provides flowed augmentation of Naval Reserve Units.
- 2 (U) Provides naval logistics support as required.
- $\underline{3}$ (U) Provides personnel replacements and administrative support as required.
- $\underline{4}$ (U) Coordinates and provides interface with Joint, DCA, and other service communications-electronics (C-E) systems as required.

(e) (U) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (DA)

- 1 (U) Provides logistics support to Army forces.
- $\underline{2}$ (U) Provides personnel replacements and administrative support as required.
- 3 (U) Coordinates and provides interface with Joint, DCA, and other service C-E systems as required.
- 4 (U) Provides flowed augmentation of Army Reserve Units.

(f) (U) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (DAF)

- $\underline{1}$ (U) Provides logistics support to Air Force forces.
- $\underline{2}$ (U) Provides personnel replacements and administrative support as required.
- 3 (U) Coordinates and provides interface with Joint, DCA, and other service C-E systems as required.
- 4 (U) Provides flowed augmentation of Air Force Reserve Units.

(g) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US PACIFIC COMMAND (USCINCPAC)

1 (U) Provides personnel and equipment support as required.

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- 2 (U) Coordinates aerial and maritime surveillance and intelligence activities as required, to include deployments of airborne and surface assets, and the exchange of information on narcotrafficking trends, routes, and methods.
- 3 (U) Coordinates and establishes Command Arrangement Agreements (CAAs) with USSOUTHCOM delineating C3I responsibilities for assets conducting detection and monitoring activities in areas of mutual
- f 4 (U) Provides access to CINCPACFLT Fleet Teletype Conference Net (FTCN).

(h) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND (USCINCLANT)

- (U) Provides personnel and equipment support as required.
 - 2 (U) Coordinates aerial and maritime surveillance and intelligence activities as required, to include deployment of airborne and surface assets, and the exchange of information on narcotrafficking trends, routes, and methods.
 - 3 (U) Provides liaison and access to CINCLANTFLT FTCN.
 - 4 (U) Coordinates and establishes CAAs with USSOUTHCOM delineating C3I responsibilities for assets conducting detection and monitoring activities in areas of mutual interest.

(i) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND (CINCSAC)

- 1 (U) Provides air refueling support as required to support airborne surveillance aircraft and/or fighters used for visual identification of suspected aerial narcotrafficking in the USSOUTHCOM AOR or in areas contiguous to the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- 2 (S/NF) Provides intelligence collection platforms as required to support counternarcotics detection and monitoring and host nation counternarcotics interdiction activities.

(j) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USCINCTRANS)

- 1 (U) Coordinates and directs plans and execution of the transportation of personnel and equipment in support of USCINCSO counternarcotics activities.
- $\underline{2}$ (U) Through the Director of Deployment (TCJD) serves as the

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coordinating authority for deployment planning and execution. Acts as focal point for coordinating TPFDD refinement and maintenance of the current/accurate data base in the Joint Deployment System (JDS). During execution, monitors, analyzes, and advises the Joint Deployment Community (JDC) on matters involving deployments utilizing common user lift and monitors forces deploying by organic lift.

- 3 (U) Provides strategic airlift with supporting elements as required.
- $\underline{\underline{4}}$ (U) Provides, deploys, and supports theater airlift elements as required.
- 5 (U) Provides environmental services, aeromedical evacuation, search and rescue, and audiovisual support as required.
- 6 (U) Provides or arranges for surface transportation and terminal services for movement of forces and non-unit cargo within CONUS from designated origins to POEs.
- $\frac{7}{\text{directed}}$. (U) Operates ocean terminal within the area of operations as
- $\underline{8}$ (U) Provides strategic sealift for deployment of forces as required.

(k) (U) COMMANDER, TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (COMTAC)

- 1 (U) Provides US Air Force personnel and equipment as directed.
- 2 (U) Provides fighter interceptor, reconnaissance, command and control, and airborne surveillance aircraft as requested to support counternarcotics activities in/or near the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- 3 (U) Provides tactical mobile radars (Forward Air Control Parties "FACPs") as required to provide training and operational capabilities to selected host nations in the USCINCSO AOR.
- $\underline{4}$ (U) Provides combat support group and airbase security elements as required.

(1) (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

1 (U) Provides intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination support as required.


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- 2 (U) Supports the counternarcotics mission of USCINCSO's Central American Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) as required.
- 3 (S/NF) Coordinates USDAO support of deployed USCINCSO Tactical Assessment Teams (TAT's) as appropriate.

(m) (U) <u>DIRECTOR</u>, <u>NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (DIRNSA)/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE (CSS)</u>

- 1 (U) Develops the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Support Plan (SSP).
- 2 (C) Provides SIGINT service, advice and assistance to USCINCSO and component commanders through the NSA/CSS representative to USSOUTHCOM (NCR SOUTH).
- $\underline{3}$ (C) Provides communications security (COMSEC) advice and assistance to USCINCSO and component commanders.
- 4 (C) Coordinates with SIGINT users to ensure appropriate action to fulfill SIGINT and COMSEC requirements.



(o) (U) DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (DCA)

- 1 (U) Provides communication support as required.
- 2 (U) Manages the acquisition and implementation of an interoperable Drug Enforcement Telecommunications (DET) network in support of federal, state, and local LEA's.

(p) (U) DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA)

- 1 (U) Provides logistics support as required.
- 2 (U) Supports material requests from US country teams.

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(q) (U) <u>DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY</u> (DMA)

- 1 (U) Provides mapping, charting and geodesic support as required.
- 2 (C) Provides improved tactical chart coverage of Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador and mensurable reference points throughout the Andean Region.
- (r) (U) <u>COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SPACE COMMAND (USCINCSPACE)</u>. Provides management and control of space operations to include the management and control of satellites and satellite support systems that may support USCINCSO/host nation counternarcotics requirements.

(s) (U) <u>COMMANDER IN CHIEF</u>, <u>NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND</u>_(CINCNORAD)

- 1 (C) Interfaces with USSOUTHCOM on counternarcotics air surveillance and intelligence issues, to include the exchange of data and the cueing of collection platforms.
- 2 (U) Coordinates with USSOUTHCOM to schedule USAF AWACS support for USCINCSO counternarcotics requirements.
- $\underline{3}$ (U) Coordinates with USSOUTHCOM to develop improved early warning capabilities to detect and monitor the aerial and maritime transport of narcotics into the US.

(t) (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS)

- 1 (U) Through interagency effort, coordinates a prioritized list of regional counternarcotics training requirements.
- 2 (U) Through interagency effort, provides theater, regional, and country specific counternarcotics campaign strategy to include; objectives, goals, implementation tactics and timetables, and host nation training and equipment requirements.
- 3 (U) Through US Ambassadors and Narcotics Assistance Units (NAUs), provides guidance and direction on counternarcotics efforts and adjudicates funding issues for non-DOD agencies.
- $\underline{4}$ (U) Determines, with coordination from USSOUTHCOM and DOD, host nation training and equipment requirements and the disbursement of US military assistance (MAP and IMET).

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- $\underline{5}$ (U) Administers and provides representation to the OAS and the South American Liaison Group (SALG).
- 6 (U) Provides emergency communications and assessments on facility and personal security, as required.
- Z (U) Coordinates counternarcotics support with host nation government and military officials, to include; basing rights, diplomatic clearances for overflight, status of forces agreements for deployed DOD personnel, US training and advisory support, etc.
- 8 (S/NF) Develops strategies and schedules the employment of civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, security assistance, and economic assistance to encourage political and economic stability in areas that have been affected by narcotrafficking.
- $\underline{9}$ (U) Coordinates and implements diplomatic initiatives, education and treatment programs, public information campaigns and economic assistance that contribute to the overall USG counternarcotics strategy.

(u) (U) DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEA)

- 1 (S/NF) Provides intelligence collection and analysis support for detection and monitoring operations and host nation ground interdiction operations. Interfaces with CAJIT in Washington, D.C., USSOUTHCOM/J2, and deployed TATs as appropriate.
- 2 (U) Provides law enforcement-specific training and advisory support to HN forces, and whenever possible, coordinates this support with tactical operations training and advisory support provided by USCINCSO.
- $\underline{3}$ (U) Provides airlift and ground transportation, communications and intelligence support to deployed USCINCSO forces as requested.
- 4 (C) Solicits appropriate tactical employment and intelligence support from deployed USSOUTHCOM forces whenever possible. In coordination with these USSOUTHCOM forces, develops target lists and operational plans that can be used by HN units.
- $\underline{\mathbf{5}}$ (U) Coordinates HN equipment and training requirements with USCINCSO and other Federal agencies.
- $\underline{6}$ (U) Develops and maintains a continual dialogue with USCINCSO on Narcotrafficker vulnerabilities and HN capabilities in order to refine employment strategies and training programs.
- $\underline{7}$ (U) Provides operations and intelligence liaison support upon request.

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- (e) (E) Deployments of communications and intelligence training teams to develop host nation training programs.
- 2 (U) Provides operations and intelligence liaison support upon request.

(v) (U) COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD (COMCOGARD)

- 1 (U) Provides Port Security and Safety (PSS) training to host nation authorities to develop indigenous capabilities to detect, monitor, and report illegal inbound shipments of precursor chemicals and outbound cocaine shipments concealed in commercial vessels or containerized cargo.
- 2 (U) Provides Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) training to host nation police and military forces in order to build/enhance indigenous coastal and riverine patrolling and interdiction capabilities.
- 3 (U) Coordinates Mobile Training Team (MTT) deployment with USSOUTHCOM to ensure unity of effort.
- $\underline{4}$ (U) Conducts combined USCG/USN riverine and coastal MTT's whenever possible to maximize training benefits derived from the inherent expertise of the two services.
- 5 (U) Provides operation and intelligence liaison upon request.

(w) (U) U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

- \underline{l} (C) Provides P-3 radar and interceptor aircraft upon request to conduct detection and monitoring efforts.
- 2 (U) Exchanges surveillance and intelligence data on narcotrafficking activities, trends, methods, and routes with USSOUTHCOM.
- $\underline{3}$ (U) Provides liaison and command and control support upon request.
- (x) (U) <u>DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY (DSAA)</u>. Administers Security Assistance Program for DOD/DOS.

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(U) The PANAMA CANAL will remain open.

f. (U) Legal Considerations.

(U) Assumptions.


- (1) (2) The detection and monitoring of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission. In support of that mission, this plan provides for detailed military assistance and law enforcement programs based on Title 10 and Title 22 of the US Code. Other important domestic and international laws apply, including those which establish host nation consent and proper legal status for US military personnel. Portions of the underlying domestic law are in flux and should be reviewed with reference to National Security Decisions, e.g., NSD 18, "International Counternarcotics Strategy" (C), 21 Aug 89. Domestic law authorizing security assistance support to host nation law enforcement personnel is experiencing similar flux.
- (2) (U) Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of military assistance to the host nations to the end that such assistance is effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby. This Military assistance includes training for host government personnel and operational support activities anywhere in the Andean region, consistent with Presidential directives. The Department of Defense provides the military assistance in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. The Department of Defense role is increasing, and this plan addresses areas

where changes to US domestic law are likely to appear in pending Authorization and Appropriations Acts and other law.

- (3) (U) Execution of this plan requires extensive coordination and agreement with other US agencies and host nations.
- (4) (U) Tab A to Annex C, Appendix 8, contains a detailed summary of pertinent domestic and international laws.
- 2. (S/NF) Mission. When directed by the National Command Authority, USCINCSO, in conjunction with USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, CINCNORAD, DIA, Country Teams, cooperating host nations, and other US agencies, advances US interest by: aggressively executing long term programs to combat il·licit drug trafficking through increased support in detection, monitoring, and interdiction; combatting production and trafficking within his AOR through operational support to cooperating host nation forces; strengthening the internal security, political will, and institutional capabilities of cooperating host nations; and increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in reducing/eliminating the flow of illicit drugs.


3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) <u>Concept of Operations</u>. This is a two-phased operation. Phase I allows execution under current restrictions and statutory authority. Phase II allows execution under reduced restrictions and additional statutory authority to increase the costs and risks of drug smuggling activities. Both phases incorporate the following elements.



USCINCSO assists cooperating host nations (HNs) to strengthen their - political will and institutional capabilities to combat illegal drug trafficking and production and other related internal security threats;

establishes/retains secure southern GLOCs and ALOCs in support of Counternarcotics (CN) operations; disrupts or severs connectivities that exist or may exist among narcotrafficking organizations and insurgents; detects and monitors critical drug production, processing, transportation, and distribution nodes in the AOR to augment host nation effectiveness and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) interdiction capabilities; supports the detection, monitoring, and interdiction of the flow of drugs conducted by other commands and USG agencies outside the AOR to maximize real time intelligence and provide effective targeting. This effort is accomplished through enhanced detection and monitoring, intelligence, assistance to HNs, training, and C⁵.



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


(§) (E) Command, Control and Communications (C^3). USCINCSO enhances C^3 in support of the CN objectives within HNs by enhancing MILGROUP(SAO) internal communications and coordinating activities of US agencies involved in detection and monitoring. Within the theater, USCINCSO enhances secure communications to satisfy CN objectives; ensures CN programming/prioritization is included in CINCs Integrated Priority List (IPL); and assesses additional CN resource requirements. Regionally, USCINCSO interfaces communications with both higher and lateral commands.

(U) <u>Tasks</u>

- (U) Commander, Counter Narcotics Task Force (COMCNTF).
 - (S/NF) Serve as the single point of contact for all coordination of U.S. Southern Command Counternarcotics activities.
 - (b) (S/NF) Interface with supporting and supported CINCs.
 - (S/NF) Interface with HNs through MILGROUP(SAO) Commanders. (c)
 - (d) (U) Interface and coordinate with USG CN agencies.

- (2) (U) Commander, U.S. Army South (COMUSARSO)
 - (a) (S/NF) Provide personnel, intelligence, and logistical support to USSOUTHCOM and MILGROUP(SAO) as required.
 - (b) (S/NF) Be prepared to provide communication teams to augment MILGROUP(SAO) staffs.
 - (c) (S/NF) Provide MTT, DFT and other deployments to support HNs as required.
 - (d) (S/NF) Program and budget sufficient resources to support this CONPLAN on a multi-year basis.
 - (e) (S/NF) Identify mapping and charting requirements and forward request to Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).
 - (f) (S/NF) Identify MTT and logistical requirements that can not be resourced in theater and request support from service channels..
 - (g) (U) Supports Army Units/forces CS/CSS when deployed in USSOUTHCOM \overline{AOR} .
 - (h) (5) Assist the Columbian Air Force to increase the optempo of helicopter operations.




- (3) (U) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO)
 - (a) (S/NF) Provide Navy or Marine MTTs, DFTs and other deployments to HNs as required.
 - (b) (S/NF) Expand training of HN counternarcotics police and/or navy in riverine/coastal operations.
 - (c) (S/NF) Train the navies of HNs to detect and intercept smugglers.
 - (d) (S/NF) Coordinate all requests to provide communications equipment and naval craft to equip the navies of HNs as required.
 - (e) (S/NF) Support in-theater beddown of supporting naval assets.

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- (f) (S/NF) When directed, employ surveillance aircraft for airborne detection and monitoring of Caribbean and South American drug smuggling routes; tie in all data acquired with CBRN SROC at HOWARD AFB, PANAMA.
- (g) (S/NF) Program and budget sufficient resources to support this CONPLAN on a multi-year basis.
- (h) (S/NF) Identify MTT and logistical requirements that can not be resourced in theater and request support from appropriate command or theater.
- (i) (5) Coordinate to establish a link for real-time intelligence data from JTF-4 to Columbian forces.
- (4) (U) Commander, U.S. Southern Air Force (COMUSSOUTHAF)
 - (a) (S/NF) Assist in expanding Southern Regional Operations Center (SROC) capabilities to include:
 - 1. Automated data transfer to Northern Regional Operations Center (NROC), USLANTCOM, and USPACOM.
 - 2. Automated data/communications linkage with air/sea surveillance assets.
 - 3. Capability to display all CBRN radar surveillance data on SROC/NROC monitors.
 - (b) (S/Nf) Train forces of HNs to receive air advisories/intercept data from their in-country and regional CBRN/ARRN radars.
 - (c) (S/NF) When directed, employ surveillance aircraft for airborne detection and monitoring of Caribbean and South American drug smuggling routes; and tie in all data acquired with CBRN SROC.
 - (d) (S/NF) Assist the enhancement of HN aerial surveillance and intercept capability through conducting appropriate surveys, programming additional equipment (radar and aircraft), and conducting training.
 - (e) (S/NF) Provide personnel and logistical support to USSOUTHCOM and MILGROUP(SAO) as required.
 - (f) (S/NF) Provide in theater beddown of supporting air assets.
 - (g) (S/NF) Program and budget sufficient resources to support this CONPLAN on a multi-year basis.

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- (h) (S/NF) Identify MTT and logistical requirements that can not be resourced in theater and request support from appropriate command or theater.
- (i) (U) Support USAF forces/units in USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- (j) (U) When directed, assume the duties of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) with responsibilities of planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on USCINCSO apportionment decision.



- (5) (U) Commander, Special Operations Command South (COMSOCSOUTH)
 - (a) (S/NF) When requested, and as part of an inter-agency survey team assist MILGROUP(SAO) in assessing HN training requirements.
 - (b) (S/NF) Provide SOF augmentation to Regional Survey Teams (RST) as required.
 - (c) (S/NF) Provide MTTs, DFTs, and other training deployments to HNs as determined by assessments.
 - (d) (S/NF) Provide intelligence, PSYOP, CA, and counterinsurgency training as determined by assessments, to HN military and police forces in counternarcotics or counterinsurgency role.
 - (e) (S/NF) Be prepared to provide personnel to augment MILGROUP(SAO) staffs.
 - (f) (S/NF) Program and budget sufficient resources to support this CONPLAN on a multi-year basis.
 - (g) (S/NF) Identify MTT and logistical requirements that can not be resourced in-theater and request support from appropriate command or theater.
- (6) (U) Commanders, Military Groups (MILGROUP) Security Assistance Organizations (SAO))

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- (a) (S) Identify training and material requirements of HN military and CN police forces and request from USSOUTHCOM.
- (b) (8) Be prepared to accept and utilize augmentation personnel from USSOUTHCOM.
- (c) (5) Be prepared to assume OPCON and provide administrative and logistical support to an increasing number of CN deployments.
- (d) (S/NF) Coordinate DOD and other USG support requirements.
- (7) (U) Commander, US Army Security Assistance Agency Latin America (COMUSASAALA)
 - (a) (S/NF) Coordinate for and_process MTTs and material as required.
 - (b) (S/NF) Program and budget resources necessary to support this CONPLÂN on a multi-year basis.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) (U) HQ USSOUTHCOM SCJ3-DDN, SCJ5-PL and SCJ5-S will be information addressees on all correspondence related to this CONPLAN.
- (2) (U) This CONPLAN is effective for planning upon receipt, and execution when directed by the NCA through the JCS.
- (3) (S/NF) Provide MTT, DFT, and other deployments to support HNs as required.
- (4) (S/NF) Program and budget sufficient resources to support this CONPLAN on a multi-year basis.
- (5) (S/NF) Identify MTT and logistical requirements that cannot be resourced in theater and request support from appropriate command or theater.
- (6) (U) Direct liaison among USSOUTHCOM components is authorized and encouraged.
- (7) (U) Supporting CONPLANS will be developed by USARSO, USNAVSO, USSOUTHAF, and SOCSOUTH.
- (8) (U) Coordination, release, and distribution of CONPLAN information must be IAW JCS MOP 39, "Release Procedures for JCS Paper", 7 December 1987.

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4. (U) Administration and Logistics.

a. (U) Concept of Support

- (1) (3) Logistics. The service support afforded this plan is provided in both Phase I and Phase II by supporting commands identified in Annex A and Annex J and organic assets within USSOUTHCOM. Broadly, under both Phases, logistics support will include air and surface transport of materiel, resupply of in-country teams, and logistics personnel augmentation of the MILGROUP(SAO) Commander. Care will be exercised in execution of support requirements to MILGROUP(SAO) Commanders, in-country teams, and the host nations to distinguish between issues of normal DOD sponsored logistics support and that provided under DOS sponsored (DSAA executed) Security Assistance programs. Infringement on non-DOD authorized directives under U.S. law must be avoided and identification of appropriate funding made for reimbursement to DOD when executing Security Assistance programs.
- (2) (U) <u>Personnel</u>. The USSOUTHCOM J1 will provide guidance on personnel policies and procedures as required. Each Service, through appropriate component commanders, is responsible for personnel support of their respective personnel assigned or deployed in support of this plan. USSOUTHCOM J1 will coordinate personnel support to MILGROUPs(SAOs) and the CNTF.
- b. (U) Logistics. Annex D.
- c. (U) <u>Personnel</u>. Annex E.
- d. (U) <u>Public Affairs</u>. Annex F.
- e. (U) <u>Civil Affairs</u>. Annex G.
- f. (U) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. Annex M.

5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL

- a. (U) Command Relationships. Annex J.
- b. (U) <u>Command Post</u>. It is envisioned that current command post locations will be used and that there will be no requirement for the command post to deploy or relocate. All supporting plans to this CONPLAN will include the communication capability/systems to include telephone numbers of subordinate or supporting headquarters and agencies.
- c. (U) <u>COMMAND and CONTROL SYSTEMS</u>. The USSOUTHCOM C3 system will employ existing channels and facilities to the maximum extent feasible. A tactical

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joint C3 system will be established and appropriate additional equipment purchased to supplement existing systems (Annex K).

> MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Annexes:

A Task Organization

B Intelligence

C Operations D Logistics

E Personnel

F Public Affairs

G Civil Affairs

H Environmental Services

J Command Relationships

K Command and Control Systems

L Operations Security

M Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

N Space

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG. Brigadier General, USA Director, SCJ3

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ANNEX A TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

Mak allahitzhitan (a)	
ORGANIZATION	COMMANDER
US SOUTHERN COMMAND	USCINCSO
US Army South US Naval Forces Southern Command US Southern Command Air Force Special Operations Command South	COMUSARSO COMUSNAVSO COMUSSOUTHA COMSOCSOUTH
COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH	COMUSARSO
US ARMY FORCES	COMARFOR
In-place (USSOUTHCOM) Infantry Brigade (two infantry One Combat Aviation Battalion One Signal Battalion One Military Intelligence Briga	·
Augmentation (CINCFOR) Two Military Police Battalions One Civil Affairs Brigade One Psychological Operations Ba One Combat Engineer Battalion ((HVY)

US AIR FORCE FORCES

COMAFFOR

In-place (USSOUTHCOM)
USAFSO
61st Military Airlift Group (MAC)
CORONET COVE (A-7D)
24 Composite Wing
24 TASS (OA-37)
630 ACWS

One Intelligence Element
One Communications Element

One Medical Element

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SAR Wing Weather Detachment

Augmentation (COMTAC)
One Base Internal Defense Flight
Two Air Base Ground Defense Flights
Four Patrol Dog Squads
One Element CES Heavy Repair
One Tactical Fighter Element 8 F-15 (on call)
One TCS Tactical Control Squadron (on call)
One Element (2) KC-10s (on call)
One Element (2) EC-130E (Volant Solo)
One (Compass Call) EC-130H
One Rivet Joint (RC-135)
Four Forward Air Control Parties (RADAR)

US MARINE CORPS FORCES

COMMARFOR :

Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) from a MEF

US NAVY FORCES

COMNAVFOR

In-place (USSOUTHCOM)
US Naval Station Panama Canal
Marine Forces Security Company
One Special Boat Unit (SBU)
One Navy Special Warfare Unit
One SEAL Platoon (increase to two MAR 90)
NAVSCIATTS (Navy Small Craft Instruction and Training School)
NSGA Galeta
CTG168.6
CB Detachment

Augmentation (USCINCLANT)
One Squadron (E-2)
One Mobile Support Element
One Naval Mobile Construction Detachment

Augmentation (USCINCSOC)
Special Boat Unit
Four SEAL Platoons

Augmentation (COGARD)

Five Port Security and Safety Teams (MTT)

Five Maritime Law Enforcement Teams (MIT)

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ARMY

In-place (USSOUTHCOM)
One Special Forces Battalion
One MH60 Detachment

Augmentation (USCINCSOC)
One Special Forces Group (-)
(Two Battalion with support)
One Civil Affairs (CA) Company
One PSYOP Battalion
One Signal Battalion (-)
One Support Battalion (-)

AIR FORCE

Augmentation (USCINCSOC)
One Element AC-130
One Element MC-130
One Element MH-53J PAVE LOW
One Element MH-60
One Element MH-47
One Special Operations CBT Control Team
One Special Operations Weather Team

US MILITARY GROUP, (SAOS)

COMUSMILGP

USCINCSO CONTROL

Detachment, US Army Information Systems Command (USAISC)
Defense Mapping Agency District Office, LATAM (DMAL)

US ATLANTIC COMMAND (Support)

USCINCLANT

US PACIFIC COMMAND (Support)

USCINCPAC

US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (Support)

USCINCSOC

US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (Support)

USCINCTRANS

MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND (Strategic airlift)

COMAC

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND (Support)

COMSC

MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND (Support)

CDR MTMC

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US FORCES COMMAND (Support)
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND (Support)

CINCFOR

CINCSAC

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, USA Director, J-3

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ANNEX B TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) INTELLIGENCE (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS PUB 6, Joint Reporting Structure.
 - b. DDC-2600-6142-89-SAO, Counternarcotics Essential Elements of Information Observables Project (U).
 - c. SM-375-82, Concept of SIGINT Support of Military Commanders.
 - d. SM-401-87, Peacetime Reconnaissance and Certain Sensitive Operations.
 - e. DIAM 58-2, Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Manual.
 - f. DIAM 58-13, The Department of Defense HUMINT Management System.
 - g. Defense Intelligence Production Schedule.
 - h. USSOUTHCOM Intelligence Plan (USSCIP), 15 April 1989.

1. (U) MISSION AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

a. (U) Mission


- (1) (U) Insure that adequate, all-source intelligence planning is accomplished to support the operations conducted under this CONPLAN.
- (2) (S/NF) Provide intelligence to Country Teams/Host Nation military and police units through dedicated USSOUTHCOM personnel as required.
- (3) (U) Exercise command and control over the intelligence activities of subordinate and component commands.
- (4) (U) Insure that the intelligence requirements of higher authority are satisfied.

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- (5) (C/NF) Insure intelligence connectivity with subordinate, component, and supported commands through shared databases and compatable hard/software.
- (6) (U) Insure that counterintelligence (CI) and security plans are adequate to protect US forces within HNs.





(2) (U) Specifics of Concept. Appendix 8.

2. (U) SITUATION

- a. (U) <u>Characteristics of the Area.</u> The area of operations ranges from the US border to cultivation, production, and processing areas and transportation routes in SOUTH and CENTRAL AMERICA.
 - b. (U) Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic, and Weather.
 - (1) (C/NF) Climate and Weather. The following summaries are provided to support the initial Operations/Intelligence Team deployment phase.

 Additional information can be found at Annex H.
 - (a) (C) BOLIVIA. Summer months (Dec-May) experience heavy rain and morning fog making observation difficult while easing waterborne transport -- there is a high incidence of cloud cover. Winter months are the most favorable for air operations -- cloud cover ranges from light over the south to heavy over the north and tends to increase in the afternoon hours.
 - (b) (C) COLOMBIA. Weather for reconnaissance is poor on the Pacific slopes of the ANDES and fair to poor for the remainder of COLOMBIA. The Andean Ridges are frequently cloud covered with resultant poor visibility.

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Lowlands are cloudy except for a brief winter dry season on the Caribbean Coast. Coastal areas are affected by the Caribbean hurricane/tropical storm season from 1 Jun - 30 Nov.


- (c) (c) PERU. Weather conditions are generally favorable for flight operations with poorer conditions existing on the eastern Andean slopes. The winter months (Jun-Nov) present the worst period for flight operations when the ceiling is less than 5000 feet 70-100% to the time. Cloud cover is heaviest over jungle areas. Flying over the UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY (UHV) is difficult year-round.
- (2) (U) Terrain. The Andean Ridge countries, as well as the CENTRAL AMERICAN-transit countries, are a mixture of flat coastal lowlands, plains, rugged mountains, and tropical jungles. These characteristics provide isolated locations ideal for drug cultivation, clandestine airstrips, and drug processing laboratories. They also present formidable slow/no-go terrain obstacles for CN ground operations.


c. (U) Estimate of Enemy Capabilities

- (1) (C/NF) General. Drug cartel assets are not fully known. Some 400-600 aircraft are estimated to conduct 1000-4000 smuggling sorties per year to the US (about 5 million flights, both legitimate and illegal, transit to and near the US annually); about 3000-5000 ship movements per year are related to narcotics smuggling (out of some 10 million vessels that transit to or near the US each year). Operating sites in SOUTH AMERICA are guarded by both narcotrafficker employed guards and/or insurgent forces; about 7000 unregistered airfields are estimated to support narcotics smuggling in LATIN AMERICA.
 - (2) (U) Specific Capabilities. See appendix 9.

3. (U) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

a. (U) <u>Essential Elements of Information</u>. Appendix 1. EEI are also articulated in reference b. Additional EEI will be developed as required; EEI established by subordinate and component commands will be validated and coordinated by USSOUTHCOM.





- c. (U) Reporting. Reference h.
- d. (U) Processing. Reference h.
- e. (U) Production. Reference h.
- f. (U) <u>Dissemination</u>. Intelligence products will be disseminated to DoD organizations IAW existing guidance. Dissemination to non-DoD agencies will be based on guidance to be developed. Dissemination to HN will be IAW existing and developing guidance. Reference h.
- g. (U) <u>Training</u>. Intelligence related training deployments (e.g. MTTs, SMEEs, DTF, etc.) which support the USSOUTHCOM CN Mission will be identified by the country team and HN. Requests for intelligence training support will be coordinated through USSOUTHCOM. Reference h.
 - h. (U) Counterintelligence. See Appendix 3.
- 4. (U) ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS
 - a. (U) Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Reference h.
 - b. (U) Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units
 - (1) (U) Reference h.
 - (2) (U) Supporting Commands will.
 - (a) (C/NF) Coordinate military intelligence and CI plans, policies, and procedures for use by assigned and supporting units within the AOR with USSOUTHCOM.

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- (b) (U) Coordinate US military intelligence activities within the AOR with USSOUTHCOM.
- (c) (U) Forward requests for intelligence to USSOUTHCOM for coordination and validation.
- c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Reference h.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Annex K.
- 6. (U) MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS
- a. (U) Enemy Detainees, Civilian Internees, and other Detained Personnel. Reference h and Annex E.
 - b. (U) Captured Documents. Reference h.
 - c. (U) Captured Material. Reference h.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Appendices:

- 1 Essential Elements of Information
- 2 Signals Intelligence
- 3 Counterintelligence
- 4 Targeting
- 5 Human Resources Intelligence Not Used
- 6 Intelligence Support to EW and C3CM Not Used
- 7 Imagery Intelligence Not Used
- 8 Intelligence Concept of Operations
- 9 Enemy Capabilities

OFFICIAL:

MICHAEL M. SCHNEIDER Brigadier General, USA Director of Intelligence

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) (U)

1. (U) GENERAL. The following EEI do not constitute an exhaustive listing. A more complete listing can be found in reference b. Submit recommended changes to USSOUTHCOM for coordination and validation.

2. (U) EEI

- a. (U) Where are the drugs grown? Is cultivation spreading beyond known growing areas?
- b. (U) Where does the processing take place? What are the primary characteristics of processing areas/labs?
- c. (U) What are the transshipment routes/patterns for illegal drugs into the US (maritime, air, and ground)?
 - (1) (e) What are the Tocations, operations, and support structures of ports and harbors involved in supporting maritime smuggling activities?
 - (2) (e) What are the Tocations, operations, and support structures of airfields involved in supporting air smuggling activities?
 - (3) (3) What are the locations, operations, and support sturctures of collection and transhipping (change of transportation mode) points.
 - (4) (C) What is the ratio/percentage of drugs moved by road, inland waterway, and air within/between drug producing nations?
 - (5) (C) What are the indications of impending movement of illegal drugs and precursor chemicals (maritime, air, and ground)?
 - (6) Are there bottlenecks in the production and transshipment pipelines? Where are drugs and precursor chemicals stored prior to movement?
- d. (E) What air, maritime, and ground vehicles are used in moving drugs and chemicals?

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- (1) (C) What are their distinguishing features, if any (e.g. additional fuel tanks of aircraft, painted out identification numbers or names, etc.)?
- e. (C) What is the stucture of drug organizations?
 - (1) (C) Where are they located? Do they have a headquarters structure?
 - (2) (e) Who are the primary members of the drug organizations?
 - (3) (C) Is there a hierarchy among the drug organizations?
 - (4) (C) Are there exploitable conflicts between the drug organizations?
- f. (U) To what extent are insurgency groups involved with illegal drug production/shipment? Are there exploitable differences between the traffickers and the insurgents? By country?
- g. (U) What is the level of effort being expended by drug organizations to procure weaponry. What is the latest inventory of weapons held?
- h. (8) To what extent do traffickers rely on communications? Do they use encryption/codes?
- i. (U) What is the likely reaction of HN law enforcement agencies, military forces, and populace to US CN activities? To unilateral US CN activities?
- j. (S/NF) For each nation: To what extent are national, regional, and local politicians coopted by drug organizations? Police forces? Military officials?
 - k. (c) What is the conception of the drug problem in each nation?
- 1. (C) What are the most likely targets for retaliation by drug organizations?
- m. (c) What is the threat and the threat level to US personnel engaged in CN activities?

1. (U) GENERAL

- 2. (U) EXECUTION
 - a. (U) Concept of Operations

- b. (U) Responsibilities
- (1) (U) DIRNSA/CHCSS
 - (a) (U) Insures that optimum SIGINT support is provided from available resources.
 - (b) (U) Prepares the NSA/CSS SSP.

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- (2) (U) NCR SOUTH
- (a) (U) Maintains liaison with USCINCSO and his component commanders and provides SIGINT advice and assistance.
 - (b) (U) Arranges for responses to SIGINT information requests.
- (3) (U) CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT GROUP

(4) (U) Commanders of the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCEs), Commander, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (CDRUSAINSCOM), Commander, Naval Security Group (COMNAVSECGRU), and Commander, US Air Force Electronic Security Command (CDRUSAFESC)

- (c) (U) As required, provide SIGINT advice and assistance to USCINCSO and component commanders.
- c. (U) Tasks for Component Commanders. Provide, in support of this CONPLAN:

3. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. (U) SIGINT units will receive routine logistic support through established supply channels.

4. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL

b. (U) Communications

(2) (U) Detailed tasks and requirements are contained in the Telecommunications Annex to SIGINT Support Plan 6100, dated 281416Z, March 81.

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) (U)

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) This Appendix outlines counterintelligence and security support requirements, procedures, and tasks to assist US and Host Nation military and government personnel employed in counternarcotics activities.
 - b. (U) CI and security operations will support operations by:
 - (1) (\mathcal{C}) Detection, prevention, and neutralization of espionage and sabotage;
 - (2) (2) Detection of subversion and disaffection of both US and HN personnel;
 - (3) (2) Direction of the efforts of security elements assigned to, or in support of, USCINCSO and subordinate elements during the conduct of operations under this CONPLAN.
 - (4) (C) Discharge of special CI requirements.
- c. (e) CI agencies will conduct operations IAW established Service policies, procedires, and directives.
- d. (E) Component commanders will insure that USCINCSO is apprised of ongoing CI activities within the SOUTHCOM AOR. Any suspected or attempted sabotage, subversion, disaffection, or incidents of unusual nature will be reported, regardless of investigative jurisdiction. Copies of initial, interim, progress, and final reports of CI investigations which pertain will be made available to USSOUTHCOM.
- e. (C) USSOUTHCOM will request that DIA coordinate with all CI-capable agencies, US and foreign, to insure receipt of all available CI and security information.
- 2. (U) $\underline{\text{HOSTILE THREAT}}$. Enemy sabotage and subversion capabilities are addressed in Appendix 9.
- 3. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANS, ACTIVITIES, AND FUNCTIONS

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U)
TARGETING (U)

2. (U) TARGET-CONCEPT

3. (U) TARGETING GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION

- 1 (U) Storage facilities (i.e., precursor chemicals, narcotics).
- 2 (U) Production plants.
- 3 (U) Airfields, airstrips supporting drug transport.
- 4 (U) Air, maritime, and overland transshipment facilities, points, and routes.

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- 5 (U) Cultivation areas.
- 6 (U) Facilities associated with drug organizations.
- (b) (U) Maintenance.

- (4) (U) Initiate Field/AIF (F/AIF) actions derived from intelligence analysis.
- b. (U) <u>Tactical Analysis Teams.</u>

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) INTELLIGENCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 3. (U) COUNTRY TEAM SUPPORT

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(b) (1) Sec 1.5 (e), (c)

- c. (U) <u>Force Protection</u>. As DOD involvement in CN activities increases, there will be a concomitant increase in the requirement for counterintelligence support, solid OPSEC procedures, and force protection measures for deployed US tactical training and operational elements.
- 4. (U) ANALYTICAL AND ADP SUPPORT

5. (U) RESOURCES

- a. (U) <u>Personnel</u>. Personnel enhancements in support of the CN effort for USSOUTHCOM have been approved. Funding requirements: figure B-8-3, page B-8-5.
 - b. (U) ADP. SIMS-D Funding requirements: figure B-8-4, page B-8-6.

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FIGURE B-8-1

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RESOURCING PROFILE

CN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FUNDING (U)

	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95
1 RDT&E					•		•
2 TOT PROC	87	404					
5 OTH PROC	87	404	•				
6 MILCON						•	
7 O&M	31	120	122	124	126	129	133
8 CIVPAY	25	208	212	220	224	232	236
9 OTH O&M	151	887	914	941	962	984	1007
901 TRAVEL	151	887	914	941	962	984	1007
10 TOT MILPAY	120	888	924	947	960	996	1022
11 ARMY PAY	37	329	342	351	355	368	377
12 NAVY PAY	23	121	126	129	131	136	139
13 NAVY RES PAY					,		•
14 MARINE PAY	37	242	252	258	262	272	278
15 AIR FORCE PAY	23	196	204	209	212	220	228
16 TOA	414	2507	2172	2232	2272	2341	2398

FIGURE B-8-3

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RESOURCING PROFILE

SOUTHCOM INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SIMS) (U)

(S/NF) REQUIREMENT (\$M)

	FY89	FY90	FY91	7Y92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
Service: Army						•			
RDT&E		3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8
PROC - OPA	1.5	11.8				12.9			
CONSTR									*
O&M - OMA	3.3	5.5	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.0	6.2	6.3	6.5
PERS (MIL)									
ARMY USAF USN									
TOTAL \$:	4.8	20.5	8.9	9.2	9.3	22.4	9.8	10.0	10.3
TOTAL MPR:									•
(S/NF) PROGRAMMED	(\$M)					•		•	
	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
SERVICE: ARMY			•						
TOTAL \$:	3.3	0.0	0.0					•	
TOTAL MPR:					•	•			
(S/NF) RESOURCING	SHORT	FALL (\$N	1)					-	- 0.
	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
TOTAL \$:	1.5	20.5	8.9						
TOTAL MPR:		·			2016			•	•

FIGURE B-8-4

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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX B TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 ENEMY CAPABILITIES

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) This Appendix provides a more detailed review of Enemy Capabilities than that addressed in the basic Annex.
- b. (C/NF) Enemy Situation. Drug traffickers in LATIN and CENTRAL AMERICA have developed the production, transporting, and distribution of illegal drugs into an extremely well organized business. Despite all counternarcotics efforts to date, they have managed to saturate the US market and are expanding into EUROPE. Profits from their enterprises have corrupted public officials, police, and military leaders; thereby simplifying the movement of large quantities of illegal drugs through ports of exit and entry. Traffickers have made alliances with insurgent and terrorist groups to provide security to clandestine processing labs, in return for weapons and financial backing. The major illegal drug cartels are entrenched. Profits of the trade insure loyalty from the grower, processing chemists, and transporters and have also allowed the drug cartels to arm their personnel with the latest in small arms weaponry. Current counterinsurgent and counternarcotics efforts, particularly in COLOMBIA, have threatened the major cartels and have resulted in increased violence on the part of the cartels. This pattern of increasing violence in the face of enhanced US/HN anti-drug efforts can be expected to continue.

2. (U) ENEMY FORCES

a. (S/NF) Narcotrafficker Forces. Narcotics cartels in COLOMBIA employ about 2000-3000 gang/militia members to safeguard facilities and carry out terrorist acts in support of trafficker operations. In addition, although not specifically targeted against government/US forces, at least 500,000 campesinos (peasant farmers) in the Andean Ridge countries rely on coca and marijuana for their livelihood and can be expected to oppose eradication and interdiction efforts. Marijuana and, to some extent, opium cultivation is increasingly important to the economies of GUATEMALA and BELIZE. The cartel members are armed with automatic weapons, explosive devices, and M-72 LAW's. Although well within the price range of narcotrafficker forces, no SAM's have been noted in their possession. In PERU, drug trafficking organizations are increasingly evident in the UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY (UHV), where they undermine civil authority and contribute to lawlessness and violence. The narcotraffickers offer the insurgents a source of weapons, supplies, and funds to widen

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their operations. Moreover, the vast sums available to traffickers serves to corrupt the police, military, judiciary, and government officials. Up to several hundred small Peruvian trafficking organizations (usually extended families) operate in the UHV at any given time. Loose associations among Peruvian traffickers do not yet compete on the same level in the international market with the more experienced Colombian and Bolivian groups, however, they are developing their own international transportation and distribution systems. Bolivian trafficking organizations have been operating primarily as suppliers to the international drug cartels, although they are well organized, principally in the CHAPARE region. The traffickers are employing Colombian bodyguards and gangs in increasing numbers. Although not a combat force, there are at least 300,000 Bolivian campesinos organized in Coca Grower's Federations who oppose government eradication efforts. Drug interests in the CHAPARE area capable of concentrating mobs of campesinos several thousand strong to oppose government drug forces. In addition, widespread corruption in the military forces has, on occasion, resulted in military forces firing on police forces engaged in counternarcotics operations. Trafficking organizations would be vulnerable to sustained government interdiction operations, if the government were capable of mounting such actions.

b. (S/NF) Colombian Insurgent Forces. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) fields about 5,000 armed combatants, with about 10,000 popular militia in support. The FARC operates 48 rural "fronts" nationwide. There is wide cooperation among guerrillas and narcotraffickers in which the former provide protection and the latter money. FARC is the only guerrilla movement vertically integrated into the whole production system for cocaine and marijuana. They are not yet receiving the major revenues that come from selling direct to wholesalers for distribution to the U.S. FARC has consolidated their control in major portions of CAQUETA, PUTUMAYO, META, and HUILA. Guerrilla weaponry includes automatic weapons, mortars, explosives and anti-tank weapons. FARC is estimated to derive 70 percent of their revenues from the narcotics trade; if the drug trade is slowed, the movement could be crippled. FARC has proven vulnerable to combined arms operations, but has not been seriously challenged in their heartlands. The National Liberation Army (ELN) fields between 1500-2300 combatants in twelve rural and four urban fronts. Strongholds are in the MAGDALENA MEDIO, HUILA, CAQUETA, META, GUAVIARE regions, and the central mountain range south of NEVADO DEL TOLIMA mountain. At least one front is extensively involved in narcotics protection. The ELN has waged effective sabotage operations against Colombian economic targets (principally oil pipelines) and has expressed solidarity with narcotraffickers against U.S. "aggression". The GOC has been having limited success in a recent offensive against ELN forces in NORTE DE SANTANDER and ARAUCA, principally as a result of effective air mobility. The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) fields between 850-950 armed combatants in nine rural and four urban fronts. They operate mainly in the CORDOBA DEPARTMENT, but have spread to neighboring departments and the cities of BARRANQUILLA, CALI, and BOGOTA. At least one front maintains coca fields in different areas of the URABA. EPL primarily

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conducts routine extortion, kidnapping, robbery, and sabotage operations. A rigidly organized, Marxist-Leninist movement, the EPL is violently anti-American. EPL is vulnerable to sustained, combined arms operation. The Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19) is 650-700 strong and operates primarily in urban areas. M-19 currently is conducting negotiations with the GOC for reintegration into society. M-19 currently is operating at a reduced capability after the GOC focussed counterinsurgency efforts on the movement after its urban terrorist assault on the Palace of Justice in BOGOTA.

- c. (S/NF) Peruvian Insurgent Forces. Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path). With a strength of 5000+ combatants, SL operates throughout the country with strongholds in the departments of AYACUCHO, HUANCAVELICA, JUNIN, and SAN MARTIN (UHV). SL conducts operations-ranging from simple assassinations and urban bombings to full-scale attacks on police and military outposts launched by several hundred combatants. Its principal tactic is to foster terror among the subject populace and government forces through extremely violent tactics. SL columns rely on expropriated trucks for transport, but often operate on foot in the broken, mountainous terrain. SL forces are vulnerable to airmobile forces, and their spread-out column formations are vulnerable to ambushes. has had considerable success in interdicting LOC's at night. SL employs automatic weaponry, explosives, and mortars. The SL portray themselves as the protectors of the coca cultivators in the UHV and other areas against the GOP and US eradication efforts. SL has placed a \$15,000 bounty on the head of any "DEA agent", a generic phrase for any official American involved in counternarcotics efforts. Although SL has benefited from drug revenues, the movement is not dependent on those revenues to the same extent as Colombian insurgent movements, and SL will follow its own ends if they conflict with narcotrafficker aims. MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) has 500+ combatants operating primarily in LIMA, with cells in CUSCO, PUCALLPA, TRUJILLO, HUANCAYO, and a presence in the UHV. MRTA has employed automatic weapons, explosives, and mortars. Automatic weapons attacks on residences are an MRTA specialty. MRTA has had some limited success in interdicting LOC's in the PUCALLPA area, and at one point besieged the town. MRTA, like SL, is vulnerable to air attack and ambush once its forces are detected.
- 3. (C/NF) THIRD COUNTRY INTERFERENCE OR OPPOSITION. Cuban and Nicaraguan support to narcotics traffickers cannot be ruled out, even if such support is merely inhibiting US forces operations against narcotraffickers in their ADIZ's. Raul Castro, Minister of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, may have personnally authorized the use of Cuban territory and airspace by narcotraffickers in the past.
- 4. (S/NF) POTENTIAL FOR INTERFERENCE DURING DEPLOYMENT OR REDEPLOYMENT. US forces and equipment deploying to Andean Ridge countries in support of counternarcotics efforts are at risk. Cartels depend on their ability to

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neutralize civil and military authority by undermining the judiciary and counternarcotics forces. The trafficking organizations use their economic power to exert a strong influence over public and private opinion and to subvert the political, law enforcement, and judicial processes in their favor. If subversion and bribery do not yield the desired results; the cartels protect themselves through violence and narcoterrorism, targeting national level leaders when necessary. If their operations require cooperation with insurgents, such alliances are made. Drug cartels and insurgent forces have displayed both the capability and will to attack military installations that would support deployment or redeployment. In some cases in PERU, military/police bases have been subject to full scale assaults by several hundred insurgents.

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCE: Basic Plan.

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (S/NF) <u>Purpose</u>. This annex provides guidance for the conduct of counternarcotics operations.
- b. (U) Mission. Basic Plan.
- c. (S/NF) <u>Alliance Plans</u>. Operations envisioned in this plan will be conducted in accordance with or supported by other CINC's and Embassy's country plans.
- d. (U) Area of Operations.
 - (1) (S/NF) The area of operations encompassed by this plan includes the land, airspace, and internal and contiguous waters of USCINCSO's area of responsibility (AOR) and USCINCSO's area of interest. USCINCSO's AOR includes the land mass of South America and Central America south of the Mexico-Guatemala border. USCINCSO's area of interest includes the water and airspace adjacent to the AOR.
 - (2) (S/NF) USCINCSO's area of interest overlaps the AOR of USCINCPAC in the waters and airspace west of 092-00 W longitude, and overlaps the AOR of USCINCLANT in the waters and airspace east of 092-00 W longitude, excluding the land mass of Central and South America.
- 2. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Basic Plan.
- 3. (U) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
 - a. (U) <u>Readiness, Alert, and Marshalling</u>. Not used.
 - b. (S/NF) <u>Air Operations</u>. The conduct of counternarcotics support air operations will be the responsibility of USSOUTHAF JFACC. MILGP (SAO) commanders will coordinate through Counternarcotics Task Force (CNTF), air support to HNs in the form of MTTs, DFTs, and other deployments.

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- c. (U) <u>Aerospace or Air Defense Operations</u>. Not used.
- d. (U) Amphibious Operations. Not used.
- e. (U) Maritime Pre-positioning Ships. Not used.
- f. (U) Antisubmarine Warfare Operations. Not used.
- g. (U) Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures. Appendix 10.
- h. (S/NF) <u>Counterinsurgency</u>. When directed, COMSOCSO, in conjunction with MILGP (SAO) Commanders, will support through military assistance the HNs counterinsurgency efforts in accordance with applicable U.S. laws, authorized activities, and Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- i. (U) Nuclear Operations. Not used.
- j. (S/NF) <u>Chemical Warfare</u>. The only contemplated use of chemical munitions or agents is the possible employment of riot control agents (RCA). This is contemplated only in a situation involving threat to the lives of U.S. personnel and only with approval of the NCA. See Appendix 2.
- k. (U) Electronic Warfare Operations. Appendix 3.
- (U) <u>Psychological Operations</u>. Appendix 4.
- m. (U) <u>Special Operations</u>. Appendix 5.
- n. (U) <u>Search and Rescue Operations</u>. Appendix 6.
- o. (U) Military Deception. Not used.
- p. (U) Rules of Engagement. Appendix 8.
- q. (U) <u>Reconnaissance</u>. Appendix 9.
- r. (U) <u>Counter-C3</u>. Appendix 10.
- s. (U) Air Base Operability. Appendix 11.
- t. (U) Audio-Visual or Visual Information Documentation. Appendix 12.
- u. (U) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Appendix 13.
- v. (U) Antiterrorism and Counterterrorism Operations. Appendix 14.

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4. (S/NF) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. All U.S. Forces and personnel will operate within the ROE (Appendix 8), all applicable U.S. laws and regulations, host nation laws, MILGP SOPs; authorized activities, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Additionally, U.S. Forces and personnel will only operate in areas in which the HN has provided adequate security.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Appendices:

1--Nuclear Operations (Not used)

2--Chemical Warfare and NBC Defense Operations

3--Electronic Warfare Operations

4--Psychological Operations

5--Special Operations

6--Search and Rescue Operations

7--Military Deception (Not used)

8--Rules of Engagement

9--Reconnaissance

10--Counter-C3

11--Air Base Operability

12--Audiovisual or Visual Information Documentation

13--Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

14--Antiterrorism and Counterterrorism Operations

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WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, USA Director, J3

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6300-90 (U) CHEMICAL WARFARE AND NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JSCP, Annex F (Chemical Warfare; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents; and Herbicides).
 - FM 21-40, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense, Oct 77.
- 1. (U) SITUATION. Basic Plan.
- 2. (U) <u>ALTERNATE MISSIONS</u>. Not used.
- 3. (U) EXECUTION
 - a. (S/NF) <u>Concept of Operation</u>. The only contemplated use of chemical munitions is the possible employment of Riot Control Agents (RCA). This is contemplated only in situations involving threats to the lives of U.S. personnel and only with approval of the NCA.
 - b. (U) Weapons Allocations. Not used.
 - c. (S/NF) <u>Tasks</u>. MILGP (SAO) Commanders will prepare plans for the possible employment of RCAs by U.S. personnel in HNs. These plans will be submitted to USCINCSO for approval and coordination.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Basic Plan.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Basic Plan.

Tabs:

A--Not used.

B--Not used.

C--Not used.

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
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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS MOP 95, Electronic Warfare, 14 MAR 83.
 - b. DIA Manual 55-7.
 - c. USSOUTHCOM Regulation 525-22, Joint Reporting Structure, 1 JUN 82
- 1. (U) SITUATION
 - a. (U) Enemy. Annex B.



- 3. (U) EXECUTION
 - a. (U) Concept of Operations.

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(3) (U) Phasing

- b. (U) <u>Tasks</u>
 - (1) (U) COMMANDER, COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK FORCE (COMENTE)

- (2) (U) COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN AIR FORCES (COMUSSOUTHAF)
- (3) (U) COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH (COMUSARSO)
- (4) (U) COMMANDER, US NAVAL FORCES SOUTHERN COMMAND (COMUSNAVSO)
 - (b) (C) Provide, when tasked, one member of the JCEWS.
- c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

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4. (U) GUIDING PRINCIPALS

5. (U) SPECIAL MEASURES

a. (U) Emission Control (EMCON) instructions, procedures, and level's will be included in component supporting plans. EMCON will be considered in planning and practiced, when feasible, in all operations.

c. (U) Components will identify and publish in all supporting plans a single point of contact for EW matters to ensure maximum cross-service support and use of assets in attaining EW objectives.

6. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. (U) Logistics
 - (1) (U) Annex D.
 - (2) (U) Components will review EW logistics requirements and promptly advise their respective service, information to USCINCSO, whenever logistic constraints, limitations or shortfalls adversely influence their ability to accomplish the assigned mission. It is the responsibility of each service component to establish procedures for fulfilling those requirements that are beyond the normal capabilities of the units involved.
- b. (U) Administration. Annex E.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCE: Basic Plan.

(2) (U) There is widespread social acceptance of coca as a part of peasant cultural heritage. Many peasants see government anti-coca policies as an attack on their livelihood. There have been many instances of strikes, demonstrations and protests against government coca eradication policies. Generally, the public recognizes the dangers of cocaine and crack, yet perceives no danger in coca leaves, which have been chewed traditionally in the region to alleviate hunger and pain. In some areas the public opposes drug trafficking but is unconvinced that coca cultivation itself is dangerous.


(4) (U) Nationalism and resentment against US interference are played upon by narcotraffickers, labor, and peasant organizations. New eradication laws and policies are attacked as "unacceptable pressure

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- (6) (U) The increase in HN drug use problems have great potential for use in PSYOP as a tool to convince the population of the need for stronger counter-drug efforts.
- (7) (U) Large scale social giving by drug lords has created a positive image for them in the eyes of many population segments. In some regions the largesse of the drug lords has brought the only noticeable increase ever in the standard of living.
- b. (U) <u>Task Organization</u>. All PSYOP tasks will be accomplished by the 4th PSYOP GP in conjunction with MILGP and Country Team or in CONUS.




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e. (U) Assumptions.

- 3. (U) EXECUTION
 - a. (U) Concept of Operations

(2) (U) Target Groups

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- (4) (U) Psychological Objectives. Employ persuasive communications techniques to help increase our degree of success in countering illicit cocaine trafficking by influencing the perceptions and behaviors of the general population and of individuals, groups, and organizations involved in illicit cocaine activities.
- b. (U) Themes and Actions To Be Stressed or Avoided
 - (1) (U) Themes to be stressed.
 - (a) (U) Drugs are dangerous and their use is harmful to HN society. Reinforce existing campaigns to heighten public awareness of the public health problems caused by drug trafficking.
 - (b) (U) Drugs are a threat to future generations. Tie social ills to drug producers and drug traffickers. Show cost of government programs to correct problems. Link foreign debt and limited international trade to drug lords and those they corrupt.

- (c) (U) Drugs lords are ruthless and dangerous. Highlight their increasingly indiscriminate use of violence.
- (d) (U) US/HN forces are professional, competent, and "the good guys". Promote the perception that drug producers and drug traffickers will inevitably be defeated by improved government intelligence, political effectiveness, and joint military-police operations.
- (e) (U) Narcotrafficking is immoral. Link the selling, processing, and transportation of coca leaf for drug trafficking purposes with local religious, social, cultural, and moral proscriptions.
- (f) (U) Reporting illegal drug activities is a moral and patriotic duty. Consider offering anonymity or guaranteed protection and resettlement.
- (2) (U) Themes To Be Avoided.
 - (a) (U) Attacking traditional peasant values associated with coca cultivation. Do not equate the coca leaf to cocaine by-products.

- (3) (U) Military and Personnel Actions. Military units and personnel deploying to Host Nations should receive training on cultural and political sensibilities and avoid those actions that would discredit the US image or could be exploitable for narcotrafficker propaganda goals. Conversely, they should emphasize those actions that will contribute to US goals. Details of these actions must be addressed in conjunction with PAO and unit information programs for each individual country and region within the country.
- c. (U) Tasks



- (4)—(U) Provision for developing PSYOP Campaign Control Sheet not applicable.
- d. (U) Coordinating Instructions



- (2) (U) PSYOP falls under operations (J-3/S-3).
- (3) (U) Coordination for the use of indigenous PSYOP assets, including personnel and equipment, will be effected through the MILGP PSYOP. To be developed in Country Team and Host Nation plans.
- (4) (U) Provision for developing PSYOP Campaign Control Sheet not applicable.
- 4. (U) <u>ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS</u>. Detailed administration and logistics requirements will be provided for in country-specific PSYOP plans.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Annex K.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) SPECIAL OPERATIONS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. Annex E, "JSCP, Special Operations" (S).
 - JCS PUB 3-05, "Joint Special Operations Policy, Concepts, and Procedures" (U).
 - c. JCS PUB 20, Joint Special Operations, Vol I (U), 1 January 1986.
 - d. JCS PUB 20, Joint Special Operations, Vol II (U), 30 May 1983.
- 1. (U) SITUATION. Basic Plan.
 - a. (U) Enemy. Annex B.
 - (1) (U) Information to support Special Operations (SO) planning in the designated Area of Responsibility (AOR): This information will be obtained during the interagency effort to develop country-specific and regional strategies.
 - (2) (U) Information on enemy capabilities to counter U.S. SO objectives: This information will be obtained during the interagency effort to develop country-specific and regional strategies.
 - b. (U) Friendly Forces. Basic Plan.
 - c. (U) Assumptions
 - (1) (U) A detailed country-by-country interagency requirements survey will be conducted to obtain the information required to develop long-term country and regional strategies.
 - (2) (U) Based on the regional/country long-term strategies, SO forces will be employed in roles inherent to SOF doctrinal mission-related capabilities.

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- (3) (U) SO force listing for the counternarcotics effort will initially be constrained to JSCP (Annex E) forces. Where long-range force list or operations tempo dictate, non-JSCP forces will be made available to support the strategy.
- (4) (U) Increased focus on the counternarcotics mission will not decrease other operations in support of the CINC's overall regional (USSOUTHCOM) and country strategies.
- (5) (U) Necessary logistic resources will be made available to support Special Operations.
- 2. (S/NF) MISSION. In accordance with the long-range country/regional strategies, Commander, Special Operations Command South (COMSOCSO) will coordinate for, prepare, and deploy SOF to conduct DFTs, MTTs, Exercises, and other deployment activities in support of USCINCSO counternarcotics objectives.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Concept of Operations

- (1) (S/NF) Summary of expected courses of action. TBP as part of country/regional campaign plans.
- (2) (S/NF) SO objectives. Country-specific objectives will be developed in conjunction with the overall counternarcotics objectives specified in the country counternarcotics campaign plans.
- (3) (S/NF) Control of and coordination with friendly SO forces. Where specified in regional/country campaign plans, SO forces will assist in the organization, training, equipping, and (when authorized) advising of HN SO forces oriented towards the approved CN/COIN objectives.
- (4) (S/NF) Pre-conflict measures. Basic Plan.
- (5) (S/NF) Phases of operations. It is envisioned that the employment of Special Operations Forces will consist of three phases:
 - (a) (S/NF) Phase I. Country/regional assessments. COMSOCSOUTH will participate as part of the interagency assessment effort. Previously coordinated, ongoing counternarcotics efforts (MTTs, augmentations) will continue until country/regional campaign strategies are implemented.
 - (b) (S/NF) Phase II. Development of country/regional strategies and strategy implementation (supporting) plans. COMSOCSO will participate as part of the interagency effort in the development of

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strategies, and will concurrently develop SO objectives, force lists, and requirements for implementation of the strategy.

- (c) (S/NF) Phase III. Strategy implementation. COMSOCSOUTH will coordinate SO execution of the tasks identified at paragraph 3.b.
- (6) (U) Principles and limiting factors.
 - (a) (S/NF) Principles. SO forces will be employed in roles inherent to SO doctrinal mission-related capabilities.
 - (b) (S/NF) Limiting factors. During the planning process (Phase I/II above), the current availability of regionally-oriented SO forces must be carefully considered. For the extended operations envisioned in support of USCINCSO objectives, SO forces' operational tempo must be managed to preclude degradation of committed forces' training/readiness.
- (7) (U) Military deception support required. Not used.
- (8) (U) OPSEC planning guidance. Annex L.
- (9) (S/NF) Strategic and theater PSYOP in support of SO objectives. Annex C, Appendix 4.
- b. (U) <u>Tasks</u>
 - (1) (U) COMSOCSO.
 - (a) (S/NF) Provide augmentation to country interagency survey teams (initial and periodic follow-up).
 - (b) (S/NF) Provide augmentation for the MILGP (SAO) Counternarcotics Coordinator.
 - (c) (S/NF) Provide augmentation for the Embassy intelligence collection/analysis effort.
 - (d) (S/NF) Provide Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to train appropriate HN forces to enhance their counternarcotics capabilities, and where appropriate, their counterinsurgency capabilities (see Annex C, paragraph 3.h.).
 - (e) <u>(S/NF)</u> Coordinate joint/combined exercises (JCTX/JCPX) and Deployments for Training (DFT) to enhance US/HN interoperability and assess HN operational capabilities.

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- (f) (S/NF) Coordinate Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) and other professional interaction programs supportive of the CN strategy objectives.
- (g) (S/NF) Provide CA/PSYOP assessments, planning assistance, and limited operational assistance as required to enhance AMEMB programs supporting interagency CN strategies.
- (h) (S/NF) Coordinate training of HN and US forces in Panama or CONUS in support of the CN objectives.
- (i) (S/NF) Provide staff assistance to USSOUTHCOM/COMSOCSO from CONUS SOF headquarters for projects of limited duration/scope.____
- (j) (S/NF) Provide forces to support SAR operations as tasked/appropriate.
- (k) (S/NF) Provide as approved, advisory assistance to US/HN forces in the conduct of CN operations.
- (1) (S/NF) Execute as approved, unilateral operations (direct action or strategic reconnaissance).
- (m) (S/NF) Provide air and ground forces as available for SAR as directed by COMMANDER, 830th AD.
- (n) (S/NF) Conduct EW activities as directed by JEWC (App 3 Annex C).
- (0) (S/NF) Provide forces for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) as specified in App 13 Annex C and CONPLAN 6103-90.
- (2) (U) Provisions of C2 structure.
 - (a) (S/NF) Assigned theater SO forces. ARSOF remain OPCON to COMSOCSOUTH. AFSOF/NAVSOF remain assigned to component headquarters. CNTF and COMSOCSOUTH are responsible for overall planning, tasking, and coordination of SO counternarcotics activities.
 - (b) (S/NF) CONUS SO forces. Remain under current command relationships. Upon deployment to theater, OPCON to COMSOCSOUTH.
 - (c) (S/NF) MILGP (SAO) Commander assumes OPCON of SO forces once deployed to that country.
- (3) (5/NF) Provisions for staff and liaison elements. SO forces will provide appropriate staff augmentation/liaison elements as specified in the country/theater CN campaign strategy.

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c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

- (1) (S/NF) COMSOCSO is the focal point for advising COMCNTF of SOF activities.
- (2) (S/NF) Request for CONUS SOF resources will be coordinated through USCINCSO.
- (3) (S/NF) Required coordination between deployed SO and other US DOD/non-DOD agencies will be conducted through the MILGP (SAO).
- (4) (S/NF) All coordination with HN military/governmental/civilian authorities will be conducted through the MILGP (SAO).
- (5) (U) Direct coordination between components and supporting commanders is authorized. USSOUTHCOM J3-SOCSE will be an info addressee on all SOF related messages.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. (U) Logistics

- (1) (U) Annex D.
- (2) (U) Standard items of military equipment and supplies will be used in support of SO, when practicable.
- (3) (U) Logistical support of SOF is the responsibility of parent services. Interservice and cross-service Support Agreements will be made where desirable, required and feasible.
- (4) (U) Requests for special, commercial, or nonstandard military supplies and equipment will be forwarded through normal supply channels. Requests for CIA peculiar items will be forwarded by COMSOCSO to USSOUTHCOM SCJ3-SOCSE, SOCSOUTH-J5, and the USCINCSO response cell when formed, utilizing DLA FEDSTRIP procedures as applicable.
- (5) (U) Medical support for indigenous forces will be based on use of indigenous hospital facilities. See App 3 Annex D.

b. (U) Administration

- (1) (U) SOFs deployed to HN, OPCON to MILGP (SAO), will be authorized to establish/maintain administration communications with assigned headquarters.
- (2) (U) Detainees and captured equipment are the responsibility of ${\sf HN}$ forces conducting ${\sf CN}$ operations.

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- 5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL
 - a. (U) Command Relationships. Annex J and Annex C, paragraph 3.b.(3).
 - b. (U) Command, Control, and Communications. Annex K
 - (1) (U) All SO forces deployed to HN will maintain secure communications capability with the next higher headquarters.
 - (2) (U) Recognition and identification instructions. TBP.

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) OPERATIONS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. Basic Plan.
- AFR 64-3, Wartime SAR Procedures, FEB 85.
- c. National SAR Plan, 1981.
- d. FM 20-150/NWP-37(B)/AFM 64-2/CG-308, National SAR-Manual, JUL 73.
- e. ICAO Annex 12 to the Convention on SAR, MAR 75.
- f. USSOUTHCOM Reg. 525-20, FEB 86.
- g. Appropriate 55 Series or Aircraft Employment Manuals.
- 1. (U) <u>SITUATION</u>. USCINCSO is responsible for SAR within his assigned geographic area, to include the overwater areas delineated by reference c. SAR operations will be conducted as required.
 - a. (U) Enemy. Annex B.
 - b. (U) Friendly
 - (1) (U) Basic Plan.
- (2) (U) <u>COMMANDER</u>, <u>OPERATING LOCATION ONE (OL-1)</u>, <u>AIR RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE (ARRS) (MAC)</u>. Provides liaison and augmentation as required.
 - c. (U) Definitions. Not used.
 - d. (U) Assumptions. Basic Plan.
- 2. (U) $\underline{\text{MISSION}}$. USCINCSO conducts SAR operations for downed aircraft, ships in distress, and US military personnel within and adjacent to USCINCSO AOR only with approval of HN.
- 3. (U) EXECUTION

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a. (U) Concept of SAR Operations

- (1) (U) General. USSOUTHAF FWD is designated USSOUTHCOM SAR executive agent and coordinating authority. All USSOUTHCOM forces, including supporting forces, will be responsive to requests for SAR support.
- (2) (U) Deployment. SAR forces will be deployed at the direction and under the control of the USSOUTHCOM Rescue Coordination Center (RCC), located at the 24th Composite Wing (24thCOMPW) Command Post.
- (3) (U) Employment. While USAF combat rescue assets are under the command of Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC), USCINCSO will exercise operational control of available assets through the 24th COMPW RCC.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) COMMANDER, USSOUTHAF FWD

- (a) (U) Coordinate and direct, through the RCC, all US military SAR activities in the area of operations in accordance with the National SAR Plan and 24th COMPW SAR Plan 61.
- (b) (U) May authorize United States Army South (USARSO) to plan, direct, and execute a specific SAR mission when such mission prosecution would be more efficient.
- (c) (U) Provide personnel, equipment, and aircraft capable of expeditious dispatch to support SAR operations when required and within capabilities.

(2) COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SOUTH (USARSO)

- (a) (U) Maintain air and surface craft capable of expeditious dispatch in support of SAR operations.
- (b) (U) Maintain rescue units equipped and trained for SAR operations in all types of terrain.
- (c) (U) Support SAR operations as requested by COM 830th AD and prepare to assume responsibility for directing and conducting SAR operations as requested by the RCC.
- (d) (U) Assist in communications search for overdue vessels and act as the communications link between distressed vessels, ships assigned to SAR missions, and the RCC.

- (e) (U) Assist in coordination of SAR operations and support provided to supporting naval elements.
- (3) (U) COMMANDER, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND SOUTH (COMSOCSOUTH)
 - (a) (U) Provides air and ground forces as available for SAR missions.
 - (b) (U) Coordinates with USSOUTHAF FWD in command and control of SAR missions.
- c. (U) <u>Tasks of Friendly Forces</u>. Not used.
- d. (U) Coordinating Instructions
 - (1) (U) Commander USSOUTHAF FWD will be final authority in determining the appropriate level at which to conduct SAR missions.
 - (2) (U) Report initiation and termination of SAR missions to USSOUTHCOM. Departure and return of SAR forces will be reported through Commander, USSOUTHAF FWD.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 - a. (U) Logistics. Annex D.
 - b. (U) Administration. Annex E.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL
 - a. (U) Command. Annex J.
 - b. (U) Control. Annex K.

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare, Jul 56.
- b. NWP 9, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Jul 87
- c. AFP 110-31, International Law, Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, Jul 80.
- d. SM 401-87, Reconnaissance, Sep 87.
- e. The Geneva Conventions of 12 Sep 49.
- f. USSOUTHCOM Peacetime Rules of Engagement, Dec 87.
- SM 846-88, Peacetime Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, 28 Oct 88.
- h. NSD 18, International Counternarcotics Strategy (C), 21 Aug 89.
- i. Panama Canal Treaty and Related Implementing Agreements of 7 Sep 77.

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) <u>General</u>. These rules of engagement apply to general situations and will be integrated with specific instructions on authorized activities for each deployment. In all cases, ROE and authorized activities will retain sufficient flexibility to provide freedom of action necessary to accomplish Phase I and Phase II missions, and to insure security of forces. These rules provide the basis for use of force under conditions short of accompanying host nation forces on field deployments. Best judgment must be applied in any given situation. The objective is to provide US military personnel with a solid basis for actions which will enhance security,

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consistent with law and policy. The rules do not infringe on the right of every commander or service member, under law, to employ in self-defense, reasonable, necessary and proportional force to defend against armed attack. This is particularly important in view of the nature of the mission.

b. (U) Enemy. Annex B.

c. (U) Friendly. Peacetime ROE for aviation forces contained in references f and g apply to detection and monitoring missions where visual identification of aircraft is anticipated. In Panama, while in the performance of official duties, US aircraft may move freely through Panamanian airspace, absent agreement to the contrary (see reference i). In all other countries within the USSOUTHCOM AOR, where air activities contemplate visual interception over sovereign territory, USSOUTHCOM, with the advice of his SJA, should request the US embassy to obtain host country approval as expressed in an exchange of notes granting freedom of movement and freedom from liability. Also consult appropriate air safety conventions prior to developing specific ROE in this connection. All US military forces in host country territory must follow the operational restrictions provided in any agreement between the US and the host nation and in these ROE.

d. (U) Assumptions

- (1) (C) The President will continue the operational restrictions stated in reference h, but may remove them on short notice.
- (2) (U) Authorized activities based on general standards will, vary by deployment.
- (3) (U) Because host nation security may be inadequate in emergency situations, or otherwise, US military personnel will be prepared to use force as described below.
- (4) (U) Host nations will grant freedom of movement to US military personnel and equipment in designated areas. Host nations governments may find this politically controversial. To prepare for the mission, US/Host nation agreements will be negotiated immediately, where possible.
- 2. (U) MISSION. USCINCSO provides military support as delineated in the Basic Plan and Annex C, IAW deployment specific guidance, authorized activities, policy and ROE. NOTE: This plan contemplates military support to host nation operations short of accompanying host nation forces on field operations. Consequently, legal considerations in the references which pertain to combat situations may be useful only as secondary guidance. For example, certain individuals may oppose violently US military personnel in the host nation. If it becomes necessary to detain such individuals, they will be turned over to

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host government authorities as soon as possible under the circumstances. US military personnel will treat these individuals as criminal suspects. In no event will US forces personnel grant POW status or otherwise treat these individuals as legitimate combatants.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Concept of Operation

- (1) (U) <u>General</u>. US military personnel will provide foreign forces assistance in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, medical support and civic action in connection with host nation forces' operations against the infrastructure of drug-producing criminal enterprises. Such US military support will be designed to increase the effectiveness of foreign forces' efforts to destroy drug processing laboratories, disrupt drug-producing enterprises, and control the land, river, air routes by which the enterprises exfiltrate illegal drugs from the host country. US military personnel will also counter the flow of illegal drugs in transit to the US.
- (2) (C) Antiterrorism. US military personnel will use appropriate force, consistent with their ROE to protect US forces, equipment, and the mission. Use of force will be based on the inherent right of self-defense and the defense of others.
- (3) (3) Riot Control Agents (RCA). If authorized by the President and directed by USCINCSO, RCA may be employed.

b. (U) Tasks

- (1) (C) For purposes of their self-defense, the USMILGP (SAO) Commander, or equivalent, insures US military personnel in the host country in connection with this CONPLAN are authorized to carry US Government issued organizational weapons.
- (2) (U) The MILGP (SAO) Commander, using the basic ROE listed below, will develop situation specific ROE and authorized activities which will be clear and concise and address the need for flexibility in situations where criminal elements may attempt violence against US military personnel. The SAO Commander will submit the same to USSOUTHCOM COMCNTF for consideration. Additionally, the Commander insures proper training, qualification, and readiness standards of all US military personnel in the host nation in connection with this CONPLAN.

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c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

- (1) (U) ROE described below are based on reference h, standing JCS guidance, and implementation thereof.
- (2) (U) The Commander includes proposed ROE and authorized activities, as modified, to COMCNTF and USSOUTHCOM J3/J5 in the message requesting USSOUTHCOM support.

d. (U) <u>Basic Authorized Activities</u>

- (1) Let Consistent with reference h, US military personnel are authorized to accompany host nation forces during training or administrative activities within areas designated by the USMILGP (SAO) Commander and approved by USCINCSO; however, US military personnel will not participate in any patrol, operation, or aircraft flight the mission of which is outside the scope of designated training or administrative activities.
- (2) (C) Consistent with reference h, US military personnel shall make every effort to avoid placing themselves in a situation where combat is likely, i.e., while engaged in any training or administrative activities; if they become aware hostilities are imminent, they will immediately withdraw as personal and unit safety permits.

e. (U) Rules of Engagement.

- (1) (U) Rules Regarding Use of Force in General.
 - (a) (G) Do not use force if one can achieve the same result reasonably by other means.
 - (b) {CT Use only the minimum force required under the circumstances.
 - (c) (C) The application of force will, in all cases, be directly related to the mission.
 - (d) (U) The use of force will be discontinued when its immediate purpose has been achieved.
- (2) LEY Rules for Use of Deadly Force: Deadly force may be used only in the following circumstances:
 - (a) (4) In self-defense: US military personnel may use deadly force to defend themselves against attack or the imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death.

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- (b) Let In defense of other personnel: US military personnel may use deadly force to protect the lives of other personnel or to protect such personnel from an imminent threat of serious bodily injury.
- (c) Let In defense of US national security assets, including US Embassy, US military aircraft, and other such assets as may be designated by the USMILGP (SAO) Commander.
- (d) Let To prevent sabotage, espionage, and or theft of US national security assets described in (c) above.

(3) (U) Miscellaneous:

- (a) LET NOTHING IN THESE RULES NEGATES THE UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED RIGHT TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE.
- (b) (b) These rules apply to all situations involving any attack or threat of attack against US personnel or property as described above by any hostile group, including terrorists, insurgents, and narcotrafficantes, regardless of label used.
- (c) (c) Here Because the presence of US military personnel in the host country may be politically sensitive for that country's government, it is imperative the USMILGP (SAO) Commander instruct US military personnel thoroughly on the importance of proper conduct and regard for the indigenous population, their customs, religions, property, and the rules governing the application of force.
- (d) (F) The above general guidelines serve as the basis for the application of force but require the best judgment of the commander in any given situation.
- 4. (U) <u>ADMINISTRATION</u>. Any violations of the ROE outlined herein will be reported immediately to USCINCSO.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Annexes J and K.

Tab:

A--Legal Considerations.

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 1. (U) Consider the following laws codified under Title 10:
 - a. (U) 10 USC 113 note. DOD is the lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Responsibility for establishing detection and monitoring requirements for a drug interdiction program remain with civilian—law enforcement authorities. Beware of legislative changes to clarify DOD mission.
 - b. (U) 10 USC 371, et. seq. Detail the extent of military support for US civilian law enforcement agencies. 10 USC 375 and DOD Directive 5525.5 proscribe provision of support to any US civilian law enforcement official if it includes or permits direct participation by military members in a search or seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity unless otherwise permitted by law. Note: 18 USC 1385 requires that whoever uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus shall be subject to criminal penalties. Debatable whether this provision applies overseas. Exceptions exist when military purpose is paramount. A posse comitatus is a force which law enforcement authorities may summon for assistance in keeping the peace and pursuing and arresting felons. Beware of legislative changes to the law in this area.
- 2. (U) Consider the following laws codified under Title 22:
 - a. (U) 22 USC 2291; Sec. 481(c), FAA*. No officer or employee of the US may directly effect an arrest in any foreign country as a part of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control efforts, notwithstanding any other provision of the law. (Mansfield Amendment).
 - b. (U) 22 USC 2291: Sec. 481(h), FAA. Suspension or termination of assistance to any country that is engaged in illicit drug production and has failed to take adequate steps to prevent such drugs from being sold to USG personnel or their dependents or from being smuggled into the US.
 - c. (U) 22 USC 2291; Sec. 481(h), FAA. The President must make annual certifications to Congress to avoid withholding of FAA assistance to major drug producing or transit countries. The certification must show among other things that the country has satisfied goals of an applicable bilateral agreement to reduce drug production, increase drug interdiction, and increase participation in extradition treaties.

- Waivers are possible, depending on the situation under 22 USC 2364; Sec. 614, FAA, and 22 USC 2291(a)(4); Sec. 481, FAA (latter a very useful provision).
- d. (U) <u>22 USC 2304</u>; <u>Sec. 502B</u>, <u>FAA</u>. Under certain conditions, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
- e. (U) <u>22 USC 2314</u>; <u>Sec. 505</u>, <u>FAA</u>. No defense article or defense service (including training) shall be furnished to any country on a grant basis absent certain promises which guarantee security.
- f. (U) 22 USC 2318(a); Sec. 506(a), FAA. President has special drawdown (not procurement) authority to provide "military assistance" in certain emergencies. Basis for Operation Pour Over in Colombia. Time limits, however, see P.L. 100-461, Sec. 553.
- g. (U) <u>22 USC 2321i; Sec. 515(b), FAA</u>. Advisory and training assistance conducted by military personnel assigned to overseas security assistance management duties shall be kept to an absolute minimum.
- h. (U) <u>22 USC 2420</u>; <u>Sec. 660</u>, <u>FAA</u>. None of the funds of the FAA shall be used to provide training or advice, or to provide financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces of any foreign government.
- i. (U) <u>22 USC 2753; Sec. 3, AECA**</u>. No defense article or service shall be sold by the USG to any country or international organization unless certain guarantees are obtained.
- j. (U) <u>22 USC 2761; Sec. 21c, AECA</u>. Personnel performing defense services may not perform any duties of a combatant nature. Forty-eight hour notice requirement to Congress tied to security situation.
- k. (U) <u>22 USC 3927</u>. Deals with the Chief of Mission's authority versus the CINC. Note the first part of the law states, "Under the direction of the President..." This may make the law somewhat open ended.
- 3. (U) Except where the President finds national security to require otherwise, assistance may not be provided to countries that:
 - a. (U) Grant sanctuary to international terrorists (22 USC 2371; Sec. 620(A), FAA).
 - b. (U) Are indebted to any US citizen for goods and services (where legal remedies are exhausted, the debt is not denied or contested, etc.) (22 USC 2370; Sec. 620(c), FAA).

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- c. (U) Nationalize, seize, or expropriate (without proper compensation) property owned or controlled by US citizens, corporations, etc. (22 USC 2370; Sec. 620(e), FAA).
- d. (U) Are in default on any loan to the US in excess of six months (22 USC 2370, Sec. 620(q), FAA).
- 4. (U) Consider the following miscellaneous US domestic laws/regulations:
 - a. (U) 31 USC 1535. The Economy Act. Support may not be provided to other US agencies without reimbursement under the Act under certain circumstances, see also 10 USC 371, et. seq.
 - b. (U) Executive—Order (EO) 12333. "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."
 - c. (U) 49 USC App 1515a. Unless otherwise determined, assistance may not be provided to a country that contains an insecure airport and which has been determined by SECSTATE to be a high terrorist threat country.
 - d. (U) 50 USC 1541, et seq. The War Powers Resolution. Provides for the President's consultation and reporting to Congress in certain cases where US forces are introduced into hostilities or where imminent involvement of hostilities is indicated by the circumstances. Other criteria apply. Should not effect execution of this plan.
 - e. (U) <u>P.L. 94-329</u>, <u>Sec. 302(a)</u>; <u>505(q)</u>, <u>FAA</u>. No FAA assistance to any country that prevents any US person from participating in the provision of defense articles/services on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex.
 - f. (U) <u>DODD 5240.1-R</u>. DOD intelligence components may collect, retain, and disseminate information that identifies a US person overseas only if it is necessary to conduct a function assigned to the collecting component and only if the information is publicly available or the US person is reasonably believed to be engaged in international narcotics activities. Further intel restrictions.
- 5. (U) Consider the following international law: Generally, the US may not act within a foreign country without its consent. Similarly, as a general principle, vessels in international waters and aircraft in international airspace are immune from the jurisdiction of any nation other than the flag nation. In international waters, foreign flag vessels may be boarded and, if warranted, seized for drug interdiction purposes, only under one or more of the

following circumstances: with flag state consent, in hot pursuit originating in the U.S. territorial sea or contiguous zone, or if the vessel is the mother ship of one or more craft operating in the U.S. territorial sea or contiguous zone. In addition, a vessel may be boarded with the consent of the master, but seizure may only occur under one of the foregoing circumstances.

NOTE: This is not an exhaustive list of pertinent laws.

*FAA is the Foreign Assistance Act.

**AECA is the Arms Export Control Act.

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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) RECONNAISSANCE (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS SM 401-FY, Vol I and II.
 - b. JCS Pub I (Dictionary of Terms).
 - c. JCS Pub 2.
 - d. JCS Pub 6-
 - e. USSID 55-11.
 - f. USCINCSO OPORD 6800-FY.

1. (U) SITUATION

- a. (S/NF) GENERAL. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO) is concerned with all peacetime reconnaissance operations and other sensitive operations conducted by U.S. and friendly military forces within the USCINCSO AOR. No directive can provide for all contingencies. Accordingly, personnel engaged in reconnaissance planning and execution must accept the principle that higher authority must, to the maximum extent feasible, be aware of and approve in advance any reconnaissance or similar activity which has the potential for generating a political or military reaction. To this end, OPORD 6800-FY establishes policy and limitations on peacetime reconnaissance and certain sensitive operations in the USCINCSO AOR.
- b. (S) ENEMY. Nicaragua is the only government within the AOR considered to be hostile to U.S. forces. However, other target nations have varied capabilities to determine positions of reconnaissance aircraft and could initiate hostile action against a mission platform. There is a real possibility that guerrilla and narcotrafficking groups could easily acquire an AA capability which could pose a threat to any U.S. platform flying over a host nation.

c. (U) FRIENDLY

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(3) (U) <u>USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC)</u>:

(a) (U) Conducts aerial SIGINT and PHOTINT reconnaissance missions within the USCINCSO AOR as directed by higher headquarters and/or in support_of USCINCSO.

- (c) (U) Includes USCINCSO as information addressee on monthly scheduling messages to JCS.
- (d) (U) Forwards track data to USCINCSO to facilitate maintenance of USCINCSO RECON 2 Track Library.
- (e) (U) Ensures PRCSO Reconnaissance/Operation Reports are furnished to USCINCSO for missions operating within the USCINCSO AOR.
- (f) (U) Schedules, executes, monitors and maintains operational control over all SAC PRCSO missions conducted in the USCINCSO AOR. SAC will conduct PRCSO operations, tactics and reporting IAW current SAC directives.
- (g) (U) Provides tanker aircraft, as feasible, in emergency support of fighter support of PRCSO platforms, or platforms engaged in Search and Rescue (SAR) operations in connection with a PRCSO incident.
- (4) (U) (USAF) Military Airlift Command (MAC): Provides weather support services and airlift support for reconnaissance operations as required.
 - (5) (U) U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM):
 - (a) (U) Conducts aerial reconnaissance and certain sensitive operations as directed by higher headquarters and/or in support of USCINCSO.

- (6) (U) United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM):
 - (a) (U) Conducts aerial SIGINT and IMINT reconnaissance within the USCINCSO AOR as directed by higher headquarters and/or in support of USSOUTHCOM.
- (7) (U) (USA) Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM):

(8) (U) (USAF) Tactical Air Command (TAC):

(9) (U) (USAF) Electronic Security Command (ESC):


(10) (U) (USAF) Air Force Communications Command (AFCC): Provides, maintains and controls certain communications nets referred to in OPORD 6800-FY.

d. Assumptions

- (1) (U) Sufficient forces will be made available to conduct reconnaissance operations.
- (2) (U) Necessary logistics resources will be made available to support reconnaissance operations.

3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) Concept of Operations
 - (1) (U) General



(g) (U) Plans for any new Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program (PRCSO) shall be developed and forwarded to USCINCSO for review IAW the following guidelines:

1 (U) Programs should be submitted to SCJ3-JRC in a textual format. The initial proposal will not be addressed to JCS or commands outside USSOUTHCOM unless specific approval has been obtained from USCINCSO. This restriction should not be misinterpreted to prohibit necessary coordination with

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non-USSOUTHCOM commands. It is intended to ensure programs are approved by USCINCSO before formally submitted to JCS and the National Command Authority (NCA).


- 2 (U) Proposals will consist of the following mandatory elements:
 - <u>a</u> (U) Background information which establishes the requirement for the program. Justification may be based on newly acquired capabilities, a desire to use existing capabilities differently, or changing collection requirements.
 - b (U) A detailed statement of how the new program will permit more effective and efficient use of existing capabilities, and/or allow greater satisfaction of collection requirements. This statement should include comments on how the program can best be integrated into existing collection efforts.
 - C (U) A proposed structure for collection and operational tasking to include the lowest echelons permitted to task the asset, to validate collection tasking, and to authorize deviations from the published schedule and/or to authorize execution of Quick Reaction Capability (QRC)/Contingency missions.
 - e (U) The program proposal will include:
 - (1) (U) Vehicle and equipment.
 - (2) (U) Proposed operating area(s) and base(s).
 - (3) (U) Unusual support requirements (i.e., aircraft escorts, logistic support, C2 communications/downlink, personnel, etc.) and/or tasking arrangements.
 - (4) (U) For contingency programs, a concise contingency operations (CONOPS), setting forth circumstances which would justify activation and post-activation activities.
 - (5) (U) Cover/contingency statements. It should be noted that service-peculiar requirements are not to be included in program proposal.
 - (6) (U) Anticipated frequency of operations.

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- (7) (U) Details on supporting documentation, to include operational plans (OPLANS), operations orders (OPORDS), etc. If supporting documents have not yet been developed, the proposal should so state with comments on anticipated documentation.
- (8) (U) Proposed track(s) in RECON 2 format, per SM 401-87, to include operating base, proposed assessment, closest points of approach, proposed track points, exceptions desired, etc.
- 3 (U) Following approval of the program proposal, USCINCSO will submit the proposal to JCS and the National Command Authorities (NCA).
- $\underline{4}$ (U) Following JCS/NCS program approval, normal RECON 1, RECON 2 and RECON 3 submissions will be made by SCJ3-JRC. Once the program has been approved and activated, it will be conducted in the same manner as any other approved program.
- (2) (U) Commitment of Forces. Not used.
- b. (U) <u>Tasks</u>
 - (1) (U) <u>COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND</u>. In order to maintain awareness of and control over peacetime reconnaissance and certain sensitive operations (PRCSO) conducted in the USCINCSO AOR, USCINCSO through the USSOUTHCOM Joint Reconnaissance Center (SCJ3-JRC) will:





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(2) (U) <u>U.S. Southern Air Forces (USSOUTHAF)</u>: The USAF component of USSOUTHCOM. COMUSSOUTHAF FWD also serves as representative of USSOUTHAF in the theater. USOUTHAF FWD will:



- c. (U) Operating Authorities. IAW OPORD 6800-FY and applicable RECON 2 Track.
- d. (U) <u>Processing</u>. Refer to Annex B for details.
- f. (U) Reporting. IAW with OPORD 6800-FY and JCS directed requirements.
- g. (U) Coordinating Instructions
 - (2) (U) For peacetime reconnaissance, OPORD 6800-FY takes precedence over all USCINCSO supporting documents and directives, and in the event of conflict, OPORD 6800-FY shall govern. All directives prepared in support of reconnaissance operations in support of this CONPLAN, questions of interpretation and/or recommendations shall be directed to USSOUTHCOM JRC (SCJ3-JRC) via the applicable chain of command.

- (5) (U) The monthly USSOUTHCOM PRCSO Scheduling and Requirements Conference is the primary tool for the coordination of PRCSO mission/schedules and the resolution of conflicts/policy issues in USSOUTHCOM. Units and organizations participating in or contributing to USSOUTHCOM PRCSO operations shall send representatives to each conference, if possible. Representatives shall be knowledgeable and able to address respective command positions.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 - a. (U) Supply
 - (1) (U) Unless otherwise directed, component commanders are responsible for providing logistic support for their forces. Component commanders

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will promptly advise USSOUTHCOM when logistic deficiencies develop which would degrade operations under this manual.

- (2) (U) Component commanders will maintain liaison with appropriate service staffs to ensure an interchange of information relative to the support of this OPORD.
- b. (U) <u>Reports</u>. Unless otherwise directed, administration will be IAW approved applicable service doctrine.
- c. (U) Operations Security (OPSEC). Reconnaissance operations conducted under PRCSO closely parallel those conducted under wartime conditions; therefore, it is essential that friendly intentions, capabilities, plans and related supporting information regarding PRCSO operations be protected by the application of OPSEC techniques. All commands participating in PRCSO operations will ensure that OPSEC is considered during the planning, preparation, execution and post-execution phases of these operations.
- 5. (U) <u>COMMAND AND CONTROL</u>. Unless otherwise directed, basic principles, concepts and definitions of "Unified Armed Forces" (JCS Pub 2) apply. See OPORD 6800-FY for specific OPCON requirements of reconnaissance forces.

6. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS

- a. (U) Press releases concerning reconnaissance operations will not be issued unless a specific problem arises requiring an official DOD statement.
- b. (U) Public affairs are the responsibility of USSOUTHCOM OASD (PA) who in coordination with USSOUTHCOM will approve release of any information.
- c. (U) There will be no public comment on this or other operations. All inquiries concerning reconnaissance operations will be referred to OASD (PA) AV 227-5131 or COMM 202-697-5131.

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO OPLAN 6300-90 (U) COUNTER C3 (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS MOP 185, Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (U).
 - b. JSCP, FY87/88, 11 JUN 86, Annex O, Counter C3 (U).


1. (U) SITUATION

- a. (U) <u>General</u>. Counter C3 measures are taken by U.S. forces in support of this CONPLAN to deny narcotraffickers (narco) the ability to effectively command and control elements of the cocaine production, processing, and transportation industry.
- b. (U) Enemy
 - (1) (U) Annex B.
- c. (U) Friendly. Basic Plan and Annex A.
- d. (U) Assumptions
 - (1) (U) Basic Plan.

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- - b. (U) Tasks. Component and supporting commanders will:
 - (1) (U) Identify organic intelligence, advisory, and training C3 assets and capabilities available for use during each stage of this CONPLAN.
 - (2) (U) Provide for a counter C3 single point of contact.
 - (3) (U) Plan for and conduct counter C3 support actions in accordance with the concept of operations.
 - c. (U) Coordinating Instructions



- (3) (U) Security. Generally, counter C3 planning and actions will follow CONPLAN security guidance. Military deception aspects of counter C3 will follow security guidelines of Appendix 7.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Basic Plan and Annex D.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Annex J and Annex K.

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) AIR BASE OPERABILITY (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. USA-USAF Agreement for the Ground Defense of Air Force Bases and Installations, 25 Apr 85.
 - b. AFR 206-2, Ground Defense of Main Operating Bases, Installations, and Activities, 22 Sep 83.
 - c. FM 90-14, Rear Battle, Sep. 84.
 - d. JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) Dec 86.

1. (U) SITUATION

- a. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. This Appendix provides guidance for the conduct of Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) operations. The objective of ABGD is the development of local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of ground attack directed against air bases and installations.
- b. (S/NF) <u>General</u>. The generation of friendly aircraft sorties is essential to the success of operations envisaged within this CONPLAN. Air bases in host nations (HNs) supporting sortie generations are under the control of the HN forces. These bases present a lucrative target for enemy attack as they contain large concentrations of material and assets in relatively confined areas.
- c. (U) Assumptions
 - (1) (U) Basic Plan.
 - (2) (U) Host nation support for the ABGD is limited.
- d. (U) Enemy
 - (1) (U) Annex B.

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- (2) (C) The primary threat to bases supporting this CONPLAN is from Level I forces. A Level I threat is characterized by controlled agent activity, sabotage by enemy sympathizers, and terrorism.
- e. (U) Friendly. See Basic Plan.
- 2. (U) MISSION See Basic Plan.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (S/NF) Concept. ABGD is the overall responsibility of HNs. MILGP (SAO) personnel, in conjunction with Security Assessment Teams, will assist HN in determining security needs at air bases while in use by US aircraft.

b. (U) Tasks

- (1) (U) COMMANDER, COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK FORCE (COMCNTF).
 - (a) (U) Assist MILGP (SAO) in assessing ABGD requirements.
 - (b) (S/NF) Provide multi-source intelligence on ground forces for threat assessment and tactical counter-intelligence efforts to COMUSSOUTHAF.
- (2) (U) COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN AIR FORCE (COMUSSOUTHAF)
 - (a) (C) Provide ABGD Assessment Team to MILGP (SAO) when required.
 - (b) (C) Provide close security for USAF aircraft while using HN airbases.
 - (c) (c) Provide ABGD training teams as directed by COMCNTF.
- c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Not used.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Annexes D and E.
- 5. (U) <u>COMMAND AND CONTROL</u>
 - a. (U) COMCNTF through the COMUSSOUTHAF and COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH (COMUSARSO) will provide the command, control, and communications (C3) resources required to effect operational control for ABGD.
 - b. (U) C3 provided in paragraph 5.a. in support of ABGD will be interoperable.

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) AUDIOVISUAL OR VISUAL INFORMATION DOCUMENTATION (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. Basic Plan.
 - b. DOD Directive 5410.15 "Delineation of DOD Audio-Visual.
 - c. Public Affairs Responsibilities and Policies", 3 NOV 66.
 - d. SC Reg. 525-22.
- 1. (U) <u>GENERAL</u>. This appendix provides guidance for documentation of all phases of activities associated with this plan. Audiovisual support personnel provide visual information documentation of US forces engaged in combat support, combat service support, and military assistance operations. The purpose of the documentation is to acquire a broad and complete picture of activities and operations to meet users' requirements.
- 2. (U) MISSION. Audiovisual support units will provide still and video imagery to support the requirements of USCINCSO, DOD users, historical archives, and the National Command Authorities.

3. (U) TASKED ORGANIZATIONS

- a. (U) COMMANDER, COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK FORCE (CNTF)
 - (1) (U) Will draw combat audiovisual documentation (AVDOC) units from all component commands.
 - (2) (U) Will evaluate all situations to determine historical significance in order to direct proper usage of AVDOC personnel.
 - (3) (U) Will provide security for all footage taken to document the execution of this plan.
 - (4) (U) Will provide USCINCSO with all documentation after evaluation is completed.

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b. (U) <u>COMMANDER</u>, <u>MILITARY GROUPS (SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS)</u> (<u>MILGP (SAO)</u>). Will evaluate all actions for historical significance and will request audiovisual support from COMCNTF.

4. (U) SITUATION

- a. (U) <u>Background</u>. See Basic Plan, Annex C (Operations) and Annex F (Public Affairs). Documentation of all activities is required to satisfy operational, historical, and informational needs.
- b. (U) Facts. AVDOC is an integral aspect of joint operations planning and execution. Documentation is required and also derived as a by-product of various other imagery recording methods. This residual documentation is highly valuable but does not fulfill total AVDOC requirements. It is essential that an aggressive effort be made to actively complete operations documentation.
- c. (U) <u>Policy</u>. AVDOC teams will deploy with elements OPCON to CNTF to cover their activities as required by COMCNTF.
- 5. (U) ASSUMPTIONS. AVDOC support will be required.
- 6. (U) <u>RESPONSIBILITIES</u>. See Appendix 1 to Annex F (Public Affairs) for list of personnel and equipment.
 - a. (U) COMCNTF. Maintain sufficient trained combat-ready forces and equipment to support documentation requirements of this plan.
 - b. (U) Provide AVDOC services to JCS as required.
 - c. (U) AVDOC teams will be provided billeting and messing support by the activities they are supporting.
- 7. (U) ADMINISTRATION. Reporting requirements are outlined in reference c.
- 8. (U) <u>CLASSIFIED INFORMATION</u>. The security classification or sensitivity of subject matter does not preclude documentation. AVDOC products are intended for use by decision-makers at all levels. Every consideration should be given to the desirability of obtaining operational documentation.
- 9. (U) <u>COMMAND AND CONTROL</u>. See Basic Plan.

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APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. DOD Directive 5100.51, "Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad."
 - b. USCINCSO CONPLAN 6103-90.
- 1. (S/) BACKGROUND. IAW reference a, USCINCSO maintains reference b, for assisting the Department of State in the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants abroad.

2. (U) SITUATION

- a. (SY <u>General</u>. During the execution of counternarcotics operations, the potential threat to the security of U.S. citizens living in host nations where these operations are taking place is greatly increased.
- b. (U) Enemy. Basic Plan and Annex B.
- c. (U) Friendly. Basic Plan and Annex A.
- d. (C) <u>Assumptions</u>. Basic Plan. The host nation will permit the use of local airports and port facilities to evacuate noncombatants, if required.
- 3. (8) MISSION. USCINCSO conducts operations as required, to evacuate noncombatants placed in jeopardy as a result of counternarcotics operations in a permissive or non permissive environment in support of this plan.

4. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) <u>Concept of Operations</u>. Evacuation will be conducted IAW USCINCSO CONPLAN 6103-90.
- b. (U) Assignment of Tasks. Basic Plan and CONPLAN 6103-90.
- c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Basic Plan and CONPLAN 6103-90.

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- 5. (S) <u>ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS</u>. CONPLAN 6103-90. All noncombatants could be evacuated thru HOWARD AFB, PM using MAC backhaul aircraft. Aircraft seating configuration for noncombatant evacuation (NEO) would not require modification from that of arrival configuration. Load factors are: C-141 aircraft, 153 passengers; C-5 aircraft, 329 passengers; Civilian Reserve Fleet (CRAF), type dependent. The preferred method of evacuation is from POE direct to CONUS.
- 6. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Basic Plan and CONPLAN 6103-90.

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APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) ANTITERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. HQ USSOUTHCOM Intelligence Directorate: Latin American Insurgent Threat Analysis (S), Jun 89.
 - b. Terrorist Group Profiles, Nov 88, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

_1. (U) <u>SITUATION</u>

- b. (U) Task Organization. Not used.
- c. (U) Enemy. Annex B.
- d. (U) Friendly. Basic Plan.
- e. (U) Assumptions
 - (1) (U) Basic Plan.

3. (U) EXECUTION

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- a. (U) Concept of Operations. IAW appropriate USCINCSO OPLANS.
- b. (U) Tasks. IAW appropriate USCINCSO OPLANS.
- c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Not used.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 - a. (U) Logistics. Annex D.
 - b. (U) Administration. Annex E.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL -
 - a. (U) Command. Annex J.
 - b. (U) Control. Annex K.
- 6. (U) <u>SECURITY</u>. Not used.
- 7. (U) APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION. Not used.

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ANNEX D TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) LOGISTICS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces.
 - b. JCS Pub 4-01, Vol I, Joint Logistics Policy and Guidance.
 - c. JSCP FY 89-90 Annex B (Logistics).
 - d. JSCP FY 89-90 Annex J (Mobility).
 - e. USSOUTHCOM/Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan (JEEP).
 - f. SC Reg 638-1, Joint Central Graves Registration Office Southern Command, 15 Jun 84.

1. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. This Annex provides guidance for the logistical support of US military operations conducted under this CONPLAN, utilizing the assets listed in Annex A in accordance with the concept of operations in Annex C.

b. (U) Concept of Logistic Support

- (1) (U) General Guidance
- (a) (U) The logistic responsibilities and authority of USCINCSO and COMCNTF are specified in references a and b.
- (b) (S/NF) Concept of Logistics Support for this plan will include: deployment and sustainment of US assets and other US non-DOD agencies, and support provided to Host Nations (HN's). The relatively small number of US DOD assets involved and the nature of their activities will minimize service O&M-funded support requirements. Support requirements for US non-DOD agencies will be somewhat greater. The largest consumer is expected to be the HN's whose support will take the form of Security Assistance programs.

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- (c) (U) Generally, each Service is responsible for the logistical support of its own assets deployed for activities under this CONPLAN, except where otherwise directed or provided by agreements. Logistical support will be in accordance with Service directives and accomplished through appropriate agencies and/or Service component commanders, unless otherwise specifically arranged.
 - 1 (U) Assigned assets will be supported by Service component commanders. USARSO will continue to provide logistics support to SAO/MIL GROUPS.
 - 2 (C) Deploying assets to remote locations will deploy with a minimum of five days of supplies. Resupply will normally be coordinated through the SAO Commander. Logistics support for deployments scheduled under a Security Assistance funded program will not be funded by USCINCSO but by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) through the SAO Commander. Similarly, logistics support for activities sponsored by Narcotics Assistance Units (NAU) under the Bureau of International Narcotics Affairs will not be funded by USCINCSO but by the Department of State (DOS). Any costs incurred by USCINCSO in support of such activities will be captured for reimbursement.
 - $\underline{3}$ (U) Specific provisions or taskings for additional sources of support for the CNTF HQ must be delineated in implementing OPORDs.
- (d) {e} Additionally, a non-traditional aspect of support in this theater will be logistics training. US non-DOD agencies will require training in planning and executing logistics support for their operations. It is expected these will be battalion and below equivalent operations. Training will include, but not limited to, commodity requirements determination, acquisition and distribution, support techniques and extension of battlefield mobility.
- (e) (U) Non-DOD counternarcotics agencies requiring routine resupply through DOD channels will utilize Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) FEDSTRIP requisitioning procedures. Training provided in paragraph (d) above will address such procedures.
- (f) (C) Support requirements for the HN will take the form of review of logistics force structure, procedures, sustainment, provision of major end items, training, and may require the deployment of US CSS assets for management, distribution and maintenance of supplies and equipment. The extent of support provided will be based on results of an initial assessment of HN capability to support their proposed operations. These assessments must be lead by COMUSMILGP(SAO) of the HN involved and performed in conjunction with SCJ3/SCJ5. Augmentation of the MILGP(SAO) will be required by appropriate service personnel provided by or through USSOUTHCOM Service components.

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- (g) (U) Component commanders will deal directly with their respective Services on matters of uni-service interest. Direct coordination among supporting commands and agencies is authorized and encouraged.
- (h) (e) Logistical support to foreign military forces, to include those of other Organization of American States (OAS) member nations participating in combined activities with US forces, will be as directed by JCS and the DSAA, as appropriate.
- (i) (U) Logistical support for evacuees will be provided in response to requests by Department of State (DOS) authorities, subject to DOD/JCS approval. Reference e and Appendix 13 to Annex C.
- (2) (U) Specific Guidance
- (a) (e) Cargo requirements to accompany deploying assets will be identified by supporting and component commanders in OPLANs/OPORDs derived from this CONPLAN. Minimum accompanying supplies, less bulk Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL), for all assets deploying to remote areas will be five days of supply.
- (b) (U) Specific guidance for bulk POL will be provided by the USSOUTHCOM JPO.
- (c) (U) Estimated resupply requirements will be identified in supporting plans and OPLANS/OPORDs.

c. (U) Assumptions

- (1) (U) Basic Plan and Annex C.
- (2) (U) Additional funds for expenditures in support of operations under this CONPLAN, in excess of established service or Security Assistance program budgets, will be provided or arranged for by JCS and/or DOS upon request of the SAO Commander or supporting Service component.
 - (3) (U) Required personnel for logistics augmentation are available.
- (4) (E) Numbers of US citizens and designated aliens to be evacuated will be as indicated in the current US Embassy/Consulate F-77 Report or as updated by in-country US Embassy agencies.
- (5) (C) Evacuation of US noncombatants directly from host country to CONUS ports will be planned where possible. Temporary safe haven and onward movement operations in friendly third countries and in the PANAMA CANAL AREA may be required when transportation directly to CONUS is not

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feasible. The DOS will designate safe haven and temporary safe haven Points of Debarkation (PODs).

- (6) (U) Sealift of US Government and personal property, in that priority, will be considered in the development of all derivative OPORDs.
- (7) (U) Existing Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSAs) will remain in effect.
 - (8) (U) Access to HN facilities and services will be available.

d. (U) Resource Availability

- (1) (2) Existing in-theater logistic resources, including Pre-positioned War Reserve Material Stocks (PWRMS) (less bulk petroleum), may be used to support operations derived from this CONPLAN.
- (2) (2) Mobility Resources. Reference d, (regional scenario) as may be modified by the JCS. Barring the simultaneous execution of other major OPLANs/CONPLANs the lift assets available for planning are sufficient for any of the various concepts of operation envisioned in this plan.
- (3) LET Operations conducted under this CONPLAN will be dependent on CONUS-sourced logistic resources.
- (4) (U) HN support availability must be explored in all OPLANS/OPORDS. Maximum useage of HN support to fulfill logistic needs in the AO and thereby lessen deployment and sustainment requirements must be considered. There are currently no formal HN support agreements in support of this CONPLAN.
- e. (U) <u>Planning Factors</u>. Applicable Service planning factors will be used, except when theater experience and/or local conditions dictate otherwise. Service planning factors which deviate from the Logistics Factors File (LFF) must be identified in supporting plans and OPLANS/OPORDS.

f. (U) Responsibilities

- (1) (U) COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
- (a) (U) Direct/coordinate logistics planning and activities in support of this plan.
- (b) (U) Reviews component and supporting command plans and operations/administrative orders to assure complete logistic coverage and to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping efforts.

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(c) (U) Validates lift requirements and establishes priorities for airlift/sealift within the theater.

(2) (U) Supporting Commanders/Agency Directors

- (a) (U) Identify and assign logistic support tasks, reviews requirements, and coordinates priorities to assure efficient use of resources.
- (b) (U) Source logistic unit/personnel augmentation requirements in sufficient detail to permit sustainment and transportation planning.
- (c) (U) Establish procedures to account for all costs associated with operations under this CONPLAN, to include support for Allied units where authorized.

(3) (U) COMMANDER, COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK FORCE (COMENTF)

- (a) (U) Conduct logistical employment planning and advise USCINCSO on matters which impact on deployment planning.
- (b) (U) Review service component supporting counternarcotics plans and TPFDDs (as needed) and advise USCINCSO on adequacy.
- (c) (U) Review MILGP(SAO) Commander logistics requirements inputs and establish priority in support. Ensure counternarcotics supporting Security Assistance programs are coordinated with SCJ3 and SCJ5 and the appropriate Service component and national level Security Assistance agencies.
- (d) (U) Plan for and when directed by USCINCSO provide administrative and logistical support to evacuees. Support may be required at assembly areas and ports of embarkation. Support may also be required at temporary safe-havens in third countries.
- (e) (U) Assist SAOs in the recovery, accountability, and withdrawal of US government property and, time permitting, the personal property of US citizens.
- (4) (U) <u>USSOUTHCOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS.</u> Depending upon the mission and the AO, <u>USSOUTHCOM</u> component commanders, collectively or separately, may be designated as CNTF component commanders.

(a) (U) COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY SOUTH (USARSO):

 $\frac{1}{2}$ (U) In conjunction with MILGP(SAO) Commander and USSOUTHCOM HQ, determine logistics personnel requirements for MILGP(SAO)

augmentation, conduct HN assessments, and conduct training for both the HN and US non-DOD agencies operating therein.

- $\underline{2}$ (U) Monitor HN assessment and through DA channels assist in the acquisition and provision of required support.
- 3 (U) Provide augmenting logistics officer (0-3/0-4) and non-commissioned officer (E-6/E-7) to act as sole purpose SCJ4 Counternarcotics Logistics representatives in the preplanning and execution stages of this CONPLAN.
- $\underline{4}$ (U) Provide logistics support to all US Army forces deployed into the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- 5 (U) Assess US non-DOD agency logistics status and provide training in logistics planning and operations.
- $\underline{6}$ (U) Provide supply support to US non-DOD agencies as required, using DLA channels and funding through DOD, DSAA, or DOS as appropriate to the mission.
 - 7 (U) Act as single service manager for CL I and CL V supply.
- 8 (U) Provide inland distribution of bulk commodities within the theater as required.
 - 9 (U) Establish and operate SPOD's as required.

(b) (U) COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN AIR FORCE (COMUSSOUTHAF):

- $\frac{1}{2}$ (U) In conjunction with USMILGP(SAO) Commanders and USSOUTHCOM HQ, determine logistics personnel requirements for MILGP(SAO) augmentation, conduct HN assessments, and conduct training for both HN and US non-DOD agencies.
- $\underline{2}$ (U) Monitor HN assessment and through DAF channels assist in the acquisition and provision of required support.
- 3 (U) Provide logistics support to all US Air Force assets deployed into the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
 - 4 (U) Assist in determination of intertheater lift requirements.
- $\frac{5}{\text{CEN}}$ (U) Assess HN APOD capability and where necessary coordinate with SCEN for facility enhancement/construction.

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- 6 (U) Provide intratheater lift operations in support of this plan.
 - 7 (U) Establish and operate APOD's as required.

(c) (U) COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES SOUTH (COMUSNAVSO):

- 1 (U) In conjunction with USMILGP(SAO) Commanders and USSOUTHCOM HQ, determine logistics personnel requirements for MILGP(SAO) augmentation, conduct HN assessments, and conduct training for both HN and US non-DOD agencies.
- 2 (U) Monitor HN assessment and through DON channels assist in the acquisition and provision of required support.
- 3 (U) Provide logistics support to all US Naval assets deployed into the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- 4 (U) Assess US non-DOD agency logistics status and provide training in logistics planning and operations.

(5) (U) COMMANDERS, SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFICES (COMUSMILGP/SAOs)

- (a) (U) When directed, conduct survey of HN logistics status relative to planned activities. Determine and advise USCINCSO/COMCNTF of initial estimates of logistical support for host country forces, and evacuees, as appropriate.
- (b) (U) Provide to DSAA, service S/A organizations, and this HQ support requirements and recommendations for phased introduction of that support. Arrange for receipt and transfer of logistic support items to HN or allied authorities.
 - (c) (U) Manage US support operations to HN.
 - (d) (U) Assist CNTF with local procurement issues.
- (e) (U) Determine USMILGP(SAO) personnel and equipment augmentation requirements in support of this plan and provide to SCJ1 and SCJ5 respectively.
- (6) (U) <u>US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM)</u>. Provide strategic, and tactical lift and terminal operations support, as required.

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(7) (U) <u>DEFENSE FUEL SUPPLY CENTER (DFSC)</u>. Provide POL support to include, in coordination with <u>USCINCSO/COMCNTF</u> and the transportation operation agencies (TOAs), mode and source scheduling.

2. (U) SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION

- a. (U) General Guidance. References a and b.
- b. (U) <u>Specific Guidance</u>. Supply sources and CONUS terminals will be designated by the services and/or supporting agencies in accordance with existing directives and procedures.
 - (1) (C) Distribution and Allocation. Ports of support, local supply points and facilities, and estimates of supplies by class required to support operations under this CONPLAN will be identified in implementing operation/administrative orders. Significant expansion of terminals and facilities to be used in the AO in support of this CONPLAN is not envisioned, although personnel and equipment augmentation requirements must be examined in detail.
 - (2) (U) Level of Supply
 - (a) (U) Accompanying Supplies
 - 1 (e) Five days of supplies, less bulk POL, will accompany deploying units.
 - 2 Let Accompanying supplies will include ordnance items, ammunition, and protective equipment as directed by USCINCSO/COMCNTF and as authorized by current service directives. Additional requirements will be specified in implementing orders.
 - (b) (U) Stockage Objective
 - 1 (C) Stockage in the objective area will depend upon the anticipated type and duration of the operation. Specific guidance will be provided by USCINCSO/COMCNTF during execution planning.
 - 2 (S/NF) Prepositioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS) (less bulk petroleum) in the PANAMA CANAL AREA may be used; however, penetration of PWRMS stocks will be made only with USCINCSO approval.
 - $\frac{3}{3}$ (U) Theater stockage levels will be maintained in accordance with Service directives.
 - (c) (U) Resupply

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- Resupply will be planned for IAW Service directives and the recommendation of the component commander and MILGP(SAO) Commander. Approved costs attributable to Security Assistance or NAU programs must be captured for reimbursement.
 - 2 (U) Emergency resupply will be available via air on request.
- 3 (U) Supporting commands retain resupply responsibility for providing or arranging resupply for their units. USCINCSO/COMCNTF component commands will arrange resupply of augmentation forces.
- 4 (U) Support responsibility for the CNTF HQ will be designated in USCINCSO OPORDs.

(3) (U) Salvage

- (a) (U) Using units will salvage supplies and equipment in accordance with Service directives. Salvage requirements beyond the capability of deployed forces will be reported to the appropriate CNTF component command, with information copies to USCINCSO. ATTN: SCJ4-L.
- (b) (c) The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides a property disposal center in the PANAMA CANAL AREA for materiel salvaged by all Services. In emergencies and with JCS concurrence, USCINCSO may assume temporary operational control over the Defense Property Disposal Office, PANAMA.
- (c) (U) COMCNTF and/or COMUSMILGP/SAO's will submit requests to USCINCSO for authority for the transfer, sale, or other disposition of excess US material to foreign governments.
- (d) (U) Abandonment of US materiel will be executed in accordance with Service directives, subject to USCINCSO/COMCNTF concurrence.

(4) (U) Captured Enemy Materiel

- (a) (C/NF) The use and disposal of captured enemy materiel will be IAW the respective Service directives. The disposition of captured materiel which has technical intelligence value will be coordinated with USCINCSO/COMCNTF (J2).
- (b) (2) Captured enemy materiel may be used to support detainees when practicable; e.g., food, medical supplies. Other supplies and equipment may be used in the area of operations as feasible or necessary.

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- (5) (U) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. Normally, local procurement will be limited. If required, SAO's will assist with local purchase of supplies and services from indigenous sources.
- (6) (U) Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL). Existing procedures for the acquisition of POL, including into-plane contracts and Form 15's will be used in Phase I. In the event of significant expansion (i.e., Phase II), Panama-based military resupply support, DFSC contracts with private petroleum corporations, and a negotiated HN support agreement may be required.
- (7) (U) Inter-Service Logistic Support. Logistic support will be consolidated to the maximum extent feasible. Supporting plans and orders derived from this CONPLAN will identify existing ISSAs impacting on the conduct of operations. Services, components, and supporting commands and agencies will execute additional agreements as required.

(8) (U) Mortuary Services

- (a) (U) Component commands will establish or arrange their own mortuary services in accordance with Service directives and guidance provided by the USSOUTHCOM Joint Central Graves Registration Office (JCGRO), as outlined in reference f.
- (b) (U) Remains of deceased US personnel will be evacuated from the area of operations to CONUS as soon as possible, consistent with mission requirements and transportation availability.
- (c) (U) Mortuary services for deceased US Armed Forces personnel evacuated to the PANAMA CANAL AREA will be provided by USARSO.
- (d) (U) Temporary cemeteries will be established only as authorized by USCINCSO.
- (9) (U) Non-Nuclear Ammunition. Ammunition supply is a service responsibility except common item CLV which are provided by USARSO, CNTF, components and supporting forces will develop plans for ammunition support of subordinate forces IAW DOD and military service directives.

3. (U) MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION

- a. (U) General Guidance. Reference b, Setion I, Chapter 3.
- b. (U) Specific Guidance

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- (1) (U) Operator and direct support maintenance will be performed to the maximum feasible extent by deployed forces. The requirement for general support maintenance will probably necessitate evacuation from the AO to military facilities in the PANAMA CANAL AREA or in CONUS. Depot maintenance will necessitate evacuation to CONUS.
- (2) (U) Modification of equipment, evacuation and control of repairable items, and cannibalization will be done in accordance with service directives.
- 4. (U) MEDICAL SERVICES. See Appendix 3.

5. (U) MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION

- a. (U) General. Mobility and Transportation support for this plan will consist of inter-theater and intra-theater lift using USTRANSCOM and USSOUTHCOM assigned units. USTRANSCOM through Military Airlift Command (MAC) will support theater missions IAW JCS PUB 15. Sealift priorities will be through USTRANSCOM to Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC). USSOUTHCOM tactical lift assets will be employed in support of this plan. Requirements for augmentation of tactical lift assets will be identified in specific OPLANS/OPORDS.
- b. (U) Country team requirements as established will be sourced by appropriate supporting commands. Supporting commands will then secure transportation support as required and IAW normal DOD operating procedures and regulations. Transportation Operating Commands (TOC's) will ensure appropriate personnel and equipment are implace at Air/Sea Ports of Embarkation (APOE/SPOE) and Debarkation (APOD/SPOD).
- c. (U) USSOUTHCOM will monitor and coordinate support of transportation arrangements with regard to servicing country team requirements. Communications involving support will include SCJ4-PMD on all appropriate message traffic and correspondence.
- 6. (U) CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT PLAN (CESP) See Appendix 5.
- 7. (U) LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF COMBINED OPERATIONS
- a. (U) General Guidance. Reference b (Chapter 7) and current DOD, JCS and Service policies and procedures.
 - b. (U) Specific Guidance
 - (1) (C) COMUSMILGP/SAO's will be prepared to recommend to USCINCSO/COMENTF the support required to assist host country forces in

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dealing with internal disorders and/or to increase Host Nation capability for support of combined operations conducted under this CONPLAN.

(2) (2) When directed, USCINCSO/COMCNTF component commands will provide foreign internal defense (FID) assistance through appropriate Service channels or from existing theater stocks.

> MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Appendices:

- 1 Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) Supply (Not Used)
- 2 Mortuary Service (Not Used)
- 3 Medical Services
- 4 Mobility and Transportation (Not Used)
- 5 Civil Engineering Support Plan
- 6 Nonnuclear Ammunition (Not Used)

OFFICIAL:

OSE G. ALONZO Colonel, USMC

Director of Logistics

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) MEDICAL SERVICES (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. AR 40-350/NAVMEDCOMINST 6320.23/AFR 168-11, Medical Regulating To and Within the Continental United States.
 - b. AR 40-562/BUMEDINST 6230.16/AFR 161-13/CG COMDT Inst 6230.4B, Immunization Requirements and Procedures.
 - c. FM 8-8/NAVMED P-5047/AFM 160-20, Medical Support in Joint Operations.

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. This appendix outlines the medical concept of operations, assigns responsibilities and tasks, and provides guidance for the development of a medical system in support of the operations envisioned in the Basic Plan.
- b. (U) Applicability. This appendix applies to all USSOUTHCOM medical components and supporting commands.
- c. (8) Objective. Identify and clearly define the medical responsibilities and tasks to support counternarcotics (CN) operations.

d. (U) Assumptions.

- (1) (S) Except in a life threatening situation. US servicemembers will not be hospitalized in host nation (HN) medical facilities.
 - (2) (3) PANAMA based aeromedical evacuation assets will be used to support CN operations, however, augmentation of one additional crew will be needed to support both Phase I and Phase II operations.
 - (3) (U) All medical care provided to other government agency (OGA) personnel will be on a cost reimbursable basis.

2. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. (5) Medical care for US servicemembers is a US responsibility. Due to the ANDEAN RIDGE countries having a limited medical capabilities, US servicemembers will not normally be hospitalized in HN facilities. When a US servicemember is hospitalized, the in-country US support team will work with the USCINCSO Surgeon to insure the member is moved to a US facility as soon as the medical

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condition allows.

b. (8) US medical assets may be used to treat personnel from other federal agencies, however, personnel are required to pay for this treatment. Host nation personnel will not be routinely treated with US military medical assets nor will they be aeromedically evacuated using the US military system.

c. (U) Existing Assets

- (1) (S) For Phase I and II, inpatient medical care will be provided by Gorgas Army Community Hospital, ANCON HILL, PANAMA. Aeromedical evacuation will be provided by 24th Medical Group, HOWARD AFB, PANAMA. Existing lines of communication, systems of routine care, hospitalization, patient regulating, Class VIIIA and VIIIB resupply, and evacuation policies will remain unchanged.
- (2) (5) If available, in-country joint ground and aeromedical evacuation assets will be used. However, any suitable means of transportation and shelter will be utilized to support and protect patients until theater evacuation can take place.

3. (U) TASKS

a. (U) <u>COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US SOUTHERN COMMAND (USCINCSO)</u>. Responsible for ensuring continuity of inter-Service medical operations in the AO, to include using joint systems of patient regulating and blood management.

b. (U) USCINCSO COMPONENT COMMANDS

- (1) (U) Prepare a medical appendix to supporting plans.
- (2) (U) Provide service-unique medical advice to the USCINCSO Surgeon as required.
- (3) (U) Plan for increased activities requiring medical support in Phase I and Phase II of this CONPLAN.
 - (4) (U) Effect coordination with deploying medical elements.
- (5) (U) Adhere to joint medical regulating and blood management procedures contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 respectively of this Appendix.
- (6) (U) Establish preventive medicine programs commensurate with operational activities.
- (7) (8) Increase planning for medical deployments for training (DFTs) and civic actions in ANDEAN RIDGE countries, as required.

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c. (U) COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH (COMUSARSO)

- (1) (U) Plan to provide medical treatment, hospitalization, and retail Class VIIIA support for all U.S. supported personnel and those OGA's having supporting agreements, as required.
- (2) (U) Establish medical support request policy and procedures to be used by all components.
- d. (U) COMMANDER, U.S. NAVY SOUTH (COMUSNAYSO). Coordinate seaborne medical treatment—and evacuation capability for U.S forces, if—required.

e. (U) COMMANDER, US AIR FORCE SOUTH (COMUSSOUTHAF).

- (1) +37 In coordination with CINCMAC, plan to provide aeromedical evacuation of U.S. personnel from ANDEAN RIDGE countries to PANAMA or CONUS, whichever is appropriate.
- (2) (8) Provide additional aeromedical evacuation assets to the 24th Medical Group, HOWARD AFB, PANAMA to support Phase I and II CN operations.
- 4. (U) THEATER EVACUATION POLICY. Joint service regulations apply for aeromedical evacuation in support of CN operations. Unless specifically authorized by USCINCSO, ineligible beneficiaries will not be aeromedically evacuated.

5. (U) MEDICAL REGULATING

- a. (U) When required, USCINCSO Command Surgeon will establish a Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) to accomplish patient regulating from PANAMA to CONUS. This office is collocated with the Patient Administration Division, Gorgas Army Community Hospital, ANCON HILL, PANAMA. Each component will assign one medical regulating representative to the USCINCSOJMRO.
- b. (U) The USCINCSOJMRO will inform the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office (ASMRO), SCOTT AFB, IL, when regulating is required.

6. (U) JOINT BLOOD PROGRAM OFFICE (JBPO)

a. (U) When required, the USCINCSO Command Surgeon will establish a Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO). USARSO and USSOUTHAF will assign one blood program representative to the USCINCSOJBPO (located in the Command Surgeon's Office, BLDG 237, ANCON HILL, PANAMA). CONUS-based personnel are not authorized to deploy to USSOUTHCOM with their own whole blood supply.

7. (U) PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

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- a. (U) Commanders are responsible for implementation of effective preventive medicine programs IAW Service directives and for enforcing theater policies as established by the USCINCSO Surgeon.
- b. (5) All personnel deploying to ANDEAN RIDGE countries will be thoroughly indoctrinated in personal countermeasures. Emphasis will be placed on heat injury prevention, personal hygiene, water purification, field sanitation, insect control, and food preparation techniques.
- c. (U) Personnel will be immunized IAW Service directives. Cholera, plague, and gamma globulin are required. Typhoid and yellow fever immunizations must be current. Malaria chemoprophylaxis (chloroquine phosphate) and leptospirosis chemoprophylaxis (doxycycline) are required.
- d. (U) Service directed immunization requirements will be included in the medical appendix to the component supporting plan.
- e. (U) Unusual occurrences of disease will be reported through Service medical channels to the USCINCSO Surgeon.

8. (U) OTHER HEALTH CARE

a. (U) Dental Services. If available, dental care will be limited to emergency treatment necessary to relieve suffering and alleviate impairment of an individual's ability to adequately perform the mission. Dental treatment of other federal agency personnel will be emergency in nature and on a cost reimbursable basis.

b. (U) <u>Veterinary Services</u>

- (1) (U) USARSO is responsible for furnishing veterinary support. Requests for veterinary support will be forwarded through channels to USCINCSO Surgeon who will in turn pass the requirement to
- (2) (U) Special emphasis will be placed on the inspection of any subsistence items obtained through HN local procurement channels and on the treatment of any employed military working dogs (MWDs).
- (3) (U) The USCINCSO Surgeon, component surgeon, and supporting commands will be kept informed through Service medical channels of the prevalence of endemic zoonotic diseases and will be informed of measures to be taken to preclude transmittal of these diseases to personnel.
- 9. (8) MEDICAL SUPPLY. All components are authorized direct coordination with USARSO for medical supplies. Class VIIIA support for ANDEAN RIDGE

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countries will obtained from Gorgas Army Community Hospital, PANAMA. It is the only US military retail Class VIIIA requisitioning activity in CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA.

- 10. (U) PLANNING FACTORS. Service planning factors will be used. Deviations from prescribed service planning factors will be explained in component supporting plans.
- 11. (U) REPORTS. Component commanders will include USCINCSO, QUARRY HEIGHTS. PANAMA, ATTN: SCSG, as an information addressee for all Service medical reports.

12. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. (U) This appendix is effective for planning upon receipt and for execution on order.
- b. (U) Direct coordination between component surgeons is authorized and encouraged.

TABS:

- A Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) Not Used
- B Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) Not Used
- C Hospital Bed Requiremnts Not Used
- D Evacuees Not Used
- E Returns to Duty Not Used F Anesthesiologist Requirements Not Used
- G Orthopedic Surgeon Requirements Not Used
- H General Surgeon Requirements Not Used
- J Other Surgeon Requirements Not Used
- K Other Physician Requirements Not Used
- L Total Physician Requirements Not Used
- N Operating Room Requirements Not Used
- N Population at Risk or Loss Report Not Used
- P Medical Supply (Class 8A) Requirement Not Used
- Q Admissions Not Used
- R Command, Control and Communications Not Used
- S Host Nation Support Not Used

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX D TO USSOUTHCOM CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT PLAN (U)

- (U) References:
- a. (U) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Volumes I and II, 1988.
- b. (U) JCS Pub 1, "Department of Defense Dictionary"
- c. (U) JCS PUB 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
- d. (U) JCS Pub 3, "Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance (Chapter 6), Base and Facilities Development. 13 Nov 79.
- e. (U) MJCS 201-81, Planning Factors for Military Construction in Contingency Operations. 13 Oct 81.
- f. (U) DOD Directive 1315.6, Responsibilities for Military Troop Construction Support of the Department of the Air Force Overseas. 26 Aug 78.
- g. (U) DOD Instruction 4165.3, Department of Defense Facility Class and Categories. 24 Oct 78.
- h. (U) DOD Directive 4070.5, Military Construction Responsibilities. 2 Mar 82.
- i. (U) JCS MOP 68, Joint Protective Construction Policy.
 11 May 81.
- j. (U) DOD Directive 4270.1, Construction Criteria. 11 Jul 83.
- k. (U) DOD Directive 4270.1, Secretary of Defense Military Construction Contingency Authorities (U). 29 Mar 83.
- 1. (U) AR415-30/AFR 93-10, 15 May 79, "Troop Construction and Engineering Support of the Air Force Overseas".

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1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. To define methodology for facility, engineering and construction requirements determination, and to provide guidance for engineer planning to support this CONPLAN.
- b. (U) Executive Summary. This Appendix provides guidance to the services for preparation of their Civil Engineer Support Plans (CESP). The US Southern Command Director of Engineering in the capacity of Regional Wartime Construction Manager (RWCM), has the responsibility to insure that component engineer activities are consistent and mutually supportive and that facility utilization is in the best interests of the command. Planning objectives are to clearly identify facility needs for deploying forces, accurately assess existing facility availability to satisfy the need, identify what engineer units and construction materials are required to accomplish construction and repairs and, determine when resources must be in place.

c. (C) Approach

- (1) (C) In the near term engineers can influence and contribute to countering narcotics primarily through the development of transportation infrastructure to enhance movement; i.e., roads, bridges, airfields as well as specialized transportation facility projects associated with ports and railroads. Of course, direct U.S. combat force involvement would include the appropriate slice of combat engineers but that form of engineering is not being addressed. However, training of host nation engineers for the performance of tactical engineer support operations is a possibility, e.g., instruct/teach combat engineer tactics like construction of LZ/PZ/LAPES, demo, tactical bridging, counter mines and boobytraps, field fortification, etc., teach our mobility, countermobility, survivability doctrine.
- (2) (2) (2) In the long term more permanent infrastructure development lends itself to democratization through regional stability and also aids as an economic alternative to making drugs. Such large scale projects as flood control, hydroelectric dams, hospitals, etc., provide job alternatives and national development.
- (3) (e) These ideas have to be resourced and therefore necessitate a USG commitment. Inter-agency marriage is needed, i.e., USAID funding with Corps of Engineers management of a long term, large scale project. International agreements must be signed and support from nations outside the region (European, Japan, etc) could be solicited. Security assistance in the form of FMS construction has great potential (El Salvador is an example). MILCON, although without Congressional support elsewhere in LATAM, may have proponency for counterdrug operations.

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d. (U) Scope/Limitations

- (1) (U) Civil engineering support for this CONPLAN involves direct support normally associated with base development within the theater.
- (2) (2) The requirements must estimate anticipated facilities needed to support in-place and deploying forces from the date of arrival at pre-designated in-theater locations.
- (3) (U) Facility repair, force beddown, and new construction projects are limited to essential facilities and are based on planning factors described in reference e.
- (4) (U) Engineering Intelligence. See Annex B. Additional sources include service component engineering personnel, U.S. military personnel serving at applicable overseas locations, and interaction with friendly host country engineering personnel. Information is also contained in the LATAM Construction Manual available at USSOUTHCOM (SCEN).

e. (U) <u>Definitions</u>

- (1) (U) Reference b definitions apply.
- (2) (U) Contingency Projects: Engineering/construction projects will be grouped into six categories to assist in regional construction management:
 - (a) (U) Beddown. Provision of initial facilities to meet the needs of in-place and deploying forces.
 - (b) (U) Construction. Provisions or improvement of facilities to a standard greater than initial.
 - (c) (U) Follow-on constuction. Upgrade of an initial facility, normally from 30 to 90 days after a beddown project.
 - (d) (U) Emergency repair. Immediate repair of operations/logistics facilities to the minimum extent necessary to meet operational needs.
 - (e) (U) Restoration. Repair of facilities to a condition similar to their original condition.
 - (f) (U) Follow-on restoration. Upgrade of emergency repair normally to the original condition of the facility.

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f. (U) International Agreements and Political Factors

(1) (U) Real Property

- (a) (U) The acquisition and use of host nation real property is subject to agreement between the host nation and American Embassy, Defense Acquisition regulations (DAR), and other applicable regulations.
- (b) (U) Real estate transactions to include release or transfer of facilities or installations, will conform to applicable international agreements, government policies, local customs, and local controls whenever practical.

(2) Host Nation Support

- (a) (U) Local labor will be used to augment troop construction due to operational necessity and when the tactical situation permits. Local government agencies will be used in dealing with local nationals to the extent possible. The use of indigenous labor will be subject to wage scales coordinated among component commands and the American Embassy.
- (b) (U) Locally available construction materials, supplies and equipment will be utilized to the extent possible. Component required Class IV material will be computed to determine surface transportation requirements, including the time phasing of requirements.
- (c) (U) Local contractor capability will be used to augment troop construction due to operational necessity and when the tactical situation permits. Service component commands will address local contractor capabilities as a resource in their support plans to this CONPLAN.
- (d) (U) Components and supporting forces will identify local facilities required for use in support of this CONPLAN during development of the Civil Engineering Support Plan. Consideration must be given to joint use of local facilities by other components, supporting forces, and by the host nation. Use of local facilities will be in accordance with agreements to be negotiated with the host nation, and with the DAR and other applicable regulations.
- g. (U) Construction Standards. Standard of construction to support this CONPLAN will be austere, requiring a minimum expenditure of resources and effort. Maximum use will be made of available host nation resources. The general provisions of reference d ("initial" standard) and reference e will be strictly adhered to in the preparation of supporting Civil Engineering Support Plans.

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- h. (U) Planning Factors. All planning factors used will be in accordance with reference e.
- i. (U) <u>General Priority of Development</u>. Primary emphasis will be placed on repair of essential facilities. Otherwise, conversion of existing facilities to satisfy beddown requirements will have priority. All other facility construction/repair activities will be phased in accordance with required use dates.

j. (U) Contractor

- (1) (U) For the purposes of this plan, it is assumed that contract construction support, US or other, is available to augment US military construction efforts.
- (2) (U) Troop units will be assigned base construction responsibilities, if available, in areas which have limited or non-existent contractor capabilities. Contract construction will be utilized in areas where contractor resources are available and when the tactical situation permits.

k. (U) Protective Construction Policy

- (1) (8) The enemy may have the capability to achieve destruction of key operational, logistical, and communication facilities through either overt or covert methods.
- (2) (2) (2) Protective construction is restricted to limited hardening of selected critical command and control systems and facilities. Guidance and policy concerning the passive protection of facilities are contained in references i and j.
- (3) (U) Contract and self-help will be the principal means for individual unit and equipment protection (e.g., bunkers, berms, trenches, salvaged containers filled with earth, etc.) Engineer efforts will be primarily technical advice and limited use of special equipment when required.

2. (U) Responsibilities for Civil Engineering Support Planning

- a. (U) <u>Primary Responsibility</u>. The component services have primary responsibility for requirement analysis and civil engineer support planning. Service support plans will be submitted to and reviewed by USCINCSO (SCEN).
- b. (U) <u>Supporting Responsibility</u>. US Southern Command, through SCEN, will retain the responsibility for deconflicting service support planning and facility use.

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- c. (U) <u>Component Plans</u>. Service components will develop plans outlining engineer requirements to facilitate beddown of deploying forces to satisfy aircraft landing, parking, and staging area requirements and to maintain land lines of communication. Army component plans will insure requirements for tactical bridging are addressed.
- 3. (U) Command Relationships. The operational control structure is described in Annexes A and J. Logistic support is provided through Service channels. No deviations from these prescribed command relationships are envisioned. The US Southern Command Director of Engineering is the Regional Wartime Construction Manager. The RWCM will make recommendations to USCINCSO regarding the use of existing facilities.
- 4. (U) Time Phased Requirements Lists. Appendix 5 to Annex D of the component support plans will contain the following information.
- a. (U) A summary of facility requirements to support the deploying forces and how those requirements will be satisfied. Beddown locations will be indicated on installation maps. The USAF support plan will address the facility needs of US Navy and USMC fixed wing aircraft.
- b. (U) A summary of construction material requirements for barriers, beddown construction and damage repairs and the sources of those materials, i.e., service stocks, local purchase, non-unit cargo shipment, etc.
 - c. (U) A summary of type of engineer units required.
- 5. (U) Summary of Critical Factors Affecting the Civil Engineering Support Plan
- a. (C) The workload will be heavily concentrated during the early phase of operations.
- b. (5) The most critical deficiency is the lack of a capability to rapidly repair damage to airfield runways, taxiways and parking aprons.
- c. (5) Additional deficiencies include the lack of capabilities to rapidly assess, repair, and restore operational capability to command, control, and communications systems resulting from damage to utility, signal, data, and communications facilities.
 - d. (C) These shortfalls can be appreciably reduced by:
 - (1) (U) Prepositioning material in theater to include engineering equipment, base functional components, critical construction materials, rapid runway repair systems, and other war damage repair kits.

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- (2) (U) Maximum use of contract support and local labor.
- (3) U) Increased host nation support.
- e. (C) Damage to key facilities can be anticipated.

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ANNEX E TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) PERSONNEL (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
 - b. JCS Pub 4-01, Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy Guidance. Vol II, 10 Jan 80.
 - c. JCS Pub 1-03, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions, 30 Jun 77.
 - d. JCS MOP 179, International Agreements.
 - e. DOD 4525.6-M, Vol I and II, DOD Postal Manual.
 - f. U.S. Diplomatic Post Emergency and Evacuation Plans, as appropriate, with associated F-77 Reports.

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. This Annex provides personnel, financial, legal, postal and courier policy guidance for DOD support of counternarcotic activities conducted under this plan.
- b. (U) <u>Concept of Personnel Support</u>. The USSOUTHCOM J1 will provide guidance on personnel policies and procedures as required. Each Service, through appropriate component commanders, is responsible for personnel support of their respective personnel assigned or deployed in support of this plan. USSOUTHCOM J1 will coordinate personnel support to Military Groups (MILGPs) (Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs) and the Counternarcotic Task Force (CNTF).
 - c. (U) Assumptions. See Basic Plan and Annex C.
- d. (U) <u>Planning Factors</u>. Service Components will use Service planning factors and policies except where experience of local conditions favor otherwise. Deviations from prescribed Service planning factors will be shown and outlined in component supporting plans.

2. (U) PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

a. (U) <u>General Guidance</u>. References b and c, appropriate Inter-Service Support Agreements, and personnel policies and procedures of the respective Services apply.

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b. (U) Specific Guidance

- (1) (U) Reporting Procedures
- (a) (U) Personnel Status Reports (PERSTATREP) reflecting the CNTF, MILGP(SAO), and Component strengths will be submitted to USCINCSO, ATTN: J1-XP. Frequency and start date of reports TBD.
- (b) (U) CNTF, MILGP(SAO), and Component Commanders will keep USCINCSO informed on any major personnel problems affecting the accomplishment of their mission. Reports will be narrative in form citing the problem area, action taken or being taken to correct deficiencies, and assistance required, if applicable. Reports will be submitted to USCINCSO, ATTN: J1-XP.
- (c) (U) Casualty reporting will be in accordance with (IAW) applicable Service directives, with information copies sent to USCINCSO, ATTN: J1-XP.
- (d) (U) Reports of incidents against the civilian populace will be reported to USCINCSO, ATTN: J1, SJA, and SCJ3-DDN immediately. Initial and update reports are desired until a complete report can be submitted.
- (2) (U) Replacement Policies
- (a) (U) As determined by Services. Commanders will establish replacement schedules to maintain unit strengths.
- (b) (U) Ports of Embarkation (POE) will be determined by the Services in coordination with Component commanders and USTRANSCOM.
- (c) (U) Ports of Debarkation (POD) will be determined by the USSOUTHCOM J4, Service components and USTRANSCOM.
- (3) (U) Filler Policies. Filler personnel are provided to component commanders by the component's parent Service. Filler personnel will be assigned and employed as desired by the component commander IAW parent Service policies and directives.
- (4) (U) Personnel Center Operations. Each of the task force commanders is responsible for the establishment and operation of such personnel centers as may be required. In the interest of economy and efficiency, joint use of a personnel center by two or more components is authorized and encouraged where feasible. The use of such a joint center is to be predicated on a mutually agreeable cross Service arrangement, coordinated by USSOUTHCOM J1.

- (5) (U) Rotation Policies. Rotation and reassignment policies will be IAW Service policies and directives, in coordination with USCINCSO.
- (6) (U) Use of Personnel with Critical Skills, Female Personnel, and Specialists. The effective use and assignment of those type of personnel by commanders should be consistent with the situation and with Service directives.
 - (7) (U) U.S. Citizen Civilian Personnel
 - (a) (U) U.S. DOD civilian personnel will normally not deploy into the objective area after initiation of hostilities: Requests for exception to policy will be made to USCINCSO prior to deployment of the individual from areas outside the Joint Operation Area (JOA). Exceptions will be made only where required skills are not available from military or objective area sources.
 - (b) (U) Component and MILGP(SAO) commanders will keep USCINCSO, ATTN: J1, informed of the name, title/position, location, and total number of all U.S. DOD civilian personnel employed within the JOA.
- (8) (U) Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Other Detained Persons. Annex E, Appendix 1.
- (9) (U) Formerly captured, missing, or detained U.S. personnel. Annex E, Appendix 2.
- (10) (U) Casualty Reporting. Reports of casualties will be made IAW individual Service directives, with information copy to USCINCSO, ATTN: J1, and as part of the PERSTATREP.
- (11) (U) Commander U.S. Army South (COMUSARSO) is the executive agent for coordination with the Red Cross Regional Director. Coordination between components for Red Cross support is authorized.

(12) (U) Decorations and Awards

- (a) (U) Recommendations for decorations and awards shall be made IAW the policies and regulations of the individual Services.
- (b) (U) All recommendations for award of the Medal of Honor and Unit Decorations will be forwarded to USCINCSO for appropriate endorsement.
- (c) (U) Joint awards recommendations will be forwarded to USCINCSO, ATTN: J1-AG. Award authority for joint awards cannot be delegated.

- (d) (U) Address Service Award inquiries thru Service channels to the proponent with information copy to USCINCSO, ATTN: J1-AG.
- (13) (U) Hostile Fire Pay
- (a) (U) USCINCSO will determine whether the situation warrants payments of Hostile Fire Pay, Imminent Danger Pay, and IAW OSD authorizations, promulgate appropriate instructions.
- (b) (U) Component/Supporting Forces will submit requests for authority to pay Hostile Fire Pay through Service channels to appropriate Service finance centers.
- (14) (U) Medical Returnees to Duty. Consistent with Service policy and Commanders' priorities, medical returnees to duty will be returned to original unit.
- (15) (U) Spot/Field Promotions (S/FP). Authorized when determined by the separate Service Secretaries and managed by Component Commands IAW DOD/ parent Service policies and directives by CNTF, MILGP(SAO), and Component Commanders.
- (16) (U) Leave Accumulation. Accumulation of leave in excess of 60 days is authorized when such decision is made by separate Service Secretaries. Leave accumulation programs will be managed by CNTF, MILGP(SAO), and Component Commanders IAW DOD/parent Service policy and directives.
- (17) (U) War Zone Benefits. Various war zone benefits, other than those outlined above, may be authorized by separate Service Secretaries. When authorized, war zone benefit programs may be participated in by members of all forces contingent upon a "Hostile Fire Zone" being declared within USCINCSO's components areas of operations. "War Zone Benefits" programs will be managed by CNTF, MILGP(SAO), and Component Commanders IAW DOD/parent Service policy and directives.
- 3. (U) <u>FINANCE AND DISBURSING</u>. Funding of operations as outlined in this plan is a Service responsibility. Financial policies and procedures will be IAW the directives of the military departments concerned. U.S. Forces will be paid IAW the prescribed procedures of each Service.
- 4. (U) <u>LEGAL</u>. Annex E, Appendix 4.
- 5. (U) MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE. Will be provided IAW current procedures established for those assigned to the MILGP(SAO).

6. (U) <u>DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE</u>. Will be provided IAW existing procedures in MILGP(SAO).

> MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Appendices:

- 1 Enemy Detainees, Civilian Internees and Other Detained Persons
 2 Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained U.S. Personnel
 3 Finance and Disbursing Not Used—
- 4 Legal
- 5 Military Postal Service Not Used 6 Defense Courier Service Not Used

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM C. HARRISON Colonel, USAF Director, J-1

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) ENEMY DETAINEES, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINED PERSONS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. The Geneva Conventions, 12 Aug 1949.
 - b. JCS Pub 4-01, Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance, 1 Jul 79.
 - c. Army Field Manual 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons, 27 Feb 76.
 - d. Army Regulation 37-36, Pay, Allowances, and Deposit of Personal Funds: Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees. 1 May 83.
 - e. Army Regulation 380-200/OPNAVINST 5530.6B/AFR 205-30, Armed Forces Censorship, 13 Jun 69.
 - f. Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-25, Prisoners of War-Rights and Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 1 Mar 80.
 - g. Army Regulation 633-51, Civilian Internees-Administration, Employment and compensation, 8 Aug 63.
 - DOD Directive 5100.77, DOD Program for the Implementation of the Law of War, 10 Jul 79.
 - i. DOD Directive 5100.69, DOD Program for Prisoners of War and Other Detainees, 27 Dec 72.
 - j. Department of the Army Field Manual 27-10, Law of Land Warfare, 18 Jul 56.
 - k. AFP 110-31, International Law The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, 19 Nov 76.

1. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. This Appendix provides guidance on matters pertaining to Enemy Detainees (ED) of War (EPW), Civilian Internees (CI) and all other captured, or detained personnel (DET). This plan contemplates support to operations

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short of accompanying host nation forces on field operations. Consequently, the references pertaining to combat situations may be useful only as secondary guidance. If U.S. military personnel detain host nation individuals who have reacted or are about to react violently in a criminal manner, they will turn over such individuals to host nation authorities as soon as circumstances permit. In no instance are such potential criminals to be awarded status reserved for combatants, e.g. POW status.

- b. (U) <u>Scope</u>. This Appendix applies to all matters related to the capture, detention, employment, release, or other disposition of ED, CI, and other DET apprehended by and/or in custody of U.S. forces deployed for military activities under this plan. These matters include, but are not limited to, the following: collection, evacuation, segregation and control, medical treatment, labor programs, education and training, repatriation, release, parole or transfer, and maintenance of appropriate records and reports.
- c. (U) <u>Policy</u>. EDs/CIs/DETs will be secured, segregated, controlled and safeguarded as prescribed by reference c, with due regard for their rights and privileges under the provisions of references a, d, e, f, and i.

2. (U) SITUATION

- a. (U) Enemy. Basic Plan and Annex B.
- b. (U) Friendly. Basic Plan and Annex A.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) <u>Concept of Operations</u>. USCINCSO, through the USSOUTHCOM Provost Marshall, exercises overall supervision of ED/CI/DET programs within his geographical area of responsibility, insuring timely and effective coordination among all concerned agencies in the securing, controlling, safeguarding, employment, and disposition of such personnel.

b. (U) COMMANDER, COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK FORCE (COMENTE)

- (1) (U) Acts as Executive Agent and Coordinating Authority for USCINCSO on all matters related to EDs/CIs/DETs.
- (2) (U) Establishes and operates facilities as required to secure, safeguard, administer and account for ED/CI/DET.

4. (U) SPECIAL GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS

a. (U) <u>Accountability for EDs/CIs/DETs</u>. Develop appropriate procedures for early and continuous accountability for all persons captured or detained.

- b. (U) Interrogation and Exploitation. Annex B.
- c. (U) According of Legal Status
 - (1) (U) Reference a.
 - (2) (U) Develop and publish instructions as required to ensure that all personnel are aware of the laws of war and the legal status of EDs/CIs/DETs.
- d. (U) <u>Transfer of EDs/CIs/DETs to a Protecting Power</u>. EDs/CIs/DETs will be transferred to a host nation, as directed by USCINCSD, after accountability has been established and—legal status IAW reference a, has been accorded.
- e. (U) <u>Investigation</u>, <u>Reporting</u>, <u>and Adjudication of Alleged Violations of the Laws of War as Applicable to EDs/CIs/DETs</u>. IAW reference a, the UCMJ, and appropriate Service regulations.
- 5. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 - a. (U) Accounting for Personal Property and Deceased EDs/CIs/DETs
 - (1) (U) Procedures will comply with the provisions of references a and d and appropriate Service regulations.
 - (2) (U) Annex D.
 - b. (U) EDs/CIs/DETs Documentation and Records
 - (1) (U) References a, b, d, and e and appropriate Service regulations.
 - (2) (U) Reports (TBD) will be sent to USCINCSO, ATTN: SCJ1-XP, CNTF.
 - c. (U) Medical Care and Treatment. Appendix 3, Annex D.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX E TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) PROCESSING OF FORMERLY CAPTURED, MISSING OR DETAINED U.S. PERSONNEL (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Policy for Processing of Returned U.S. Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel, 8 June 1968.
 - b. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Policy for Processing of Returned U.S. Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel, 18 January 1969.
 - c. The Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949.
 - d. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Policy for Processing of Returned U.S. Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel, 15 July 1972.
 - e. JCS SM 399-68, Policy for Processing Returned U.S. Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel, 18 June 1968.

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) General

- (1) (U) This appendix provides guidance for processing formerly captured, missing, or detained U.S. personnel returned to U.S. control as a result of activities conducted under this plan.
- (2) (U) The processing of returned US personnel is a sensitive matter which will require close coordination among all agencies involved. All reasonable efforts will be directed toward the goal of assuring timely, adequate and uniform medical treatment, debriefing, protection of legal rights, release of information, visitor privileges, and evacuation of recovered U.S. personnel.
- b. (U) Enemy. Basic Plan and Annex B.
- c. (U) <u>Friendly</u>. The Department of State (DOS) will develop overall policy for negotiations for the release of detained (DET) personnel and will assume responsibility for all non-military returnees.
 - d. (U) Assumptions. See Basic Plan.

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2. (U) MISSION. COMCNTF will direct, coordinate, and monitor the recovery of U.S. military personnel.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) <u>Concept of Operations</u>. USCINCSO, through COMCNTF will direct, coordinate, and monitor the recovery of captured, DET, and missing U.S. personnel by U.S. forces deployed IAW this plan. Service component or MILGP(SAO) commanders will process formerly captured, detained or missing U.S. personnel who have been returned to U.S. Government control. U.S. civilian personnel not sponsored by a DOD agency will also be turned over to DOS representatives at the earliest possible time.

b. (U) Assignments of Tasks

- (1) (U) Service Components or MILGP(SAO) commanders.
- (a) (U) Receive, debrief and process of returned U.S. personnel as required, and arrange for their transportation to selected processing centers. Location of centers TBD.
- (b) (U) Arrange for support of non-DOD sponsored civilian returnees until such time as they can be turned over to DOS representatives.
- (2) (U) Director, J2, USSOUTHCOM. Coordinate and direct debriefing.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

- (1) (U) The health, welfare and morale of returned personnel is of prime importance. All reasonable efforts will be made at all levels to provide for their needs. All returned personnel will be placed under medical auspices as soon as possible and evacuated to an appropriate facility, either in CONUS or the PANAMA CANAL AREA.
- (2) (U) Processing and debriefing in the Andean Ridge countries will be held to a minimum.
- (3) (U) Returnees will be accorded all legal rights and privileges which they are entitled at every stage, including debriefing. Their former status does not imply misconduct, and evidence of misconduct should be referred to the appropriate agency for disposition.
- (4) (U) Factual information will be made available to news media, subject to security requirements, welfare of the individual and relatives, and safety of other U.S. personnel who may still be detained. Requests for interviews by news media representatives will be referred to the PAO, USSOUTHCOM.

- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 - a. (U) Processing Sites. TBA
 - b. (U) Intratheater Airlift Support. As required.
 - c. (U) Medical Care and Treatment. Appendix 3, Annex D.
- d. (U) <u>Establishment and Disposition of Processing Files</u>. Service Directives.
 - e. (U) According of Legal Rights. Service Directives.
- f. (U) <u>Assignment of Returned Personnel to CONUS Hospitals</u>. IAW DOD guidance and Service Directives.
 - g. (U) Public Affairs Guidance. Annex F.

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E-2-4 UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX E TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) LEGAL (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. Claims: DOD Directive 5515.8, 3 Jun 87; AR 27-10, 1 Jul 84; AFR 112-1, 1 Jul 83; JAGMAN; 1 Jul 78.
 - b. International Legal Considerations: DA FM 21-10, 18 Jul 56; DA PAM 27-1, 7 Dec 56; AFP 110-20, 27 Jul 81; AFP 110-3, Dec 87; AR 27-50/SECNAVINST 5820.4F/AFR 0-12, Jul 88; NWP 9 Jul 87.
 - c. Legal Assistance: AFR 110-22, 22 Aug 78; AR 27-3, 1 Mar 84; JAGMAN, 1 Jul 78.
 - d. Military Justice: Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) 1984; JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 1 Dec 86; AR 27-10, 1 Jul 84; AFR 111-1, Aug 84; AFR 111-9, Sep 84; JAGMAN, 1 Jul 78.
 - e. DOD 4525.6-M, Vol I and II, DOD Postal Manual.
 - f. U.S. Diplomatic Post Emergency and Evacuation Plans, as appropriate, with associated F-77 Reports.
- 1. (U) <u>GENERAL GUIDANCE</u>. The USSOUTHCOM SJA is responsible for providing legal guidance in all areas of concern and shall be responsible for the coordination and control of legal activities incident to the conduct of the basic plan involving all forces.
- 2. (U) <u>SPECIFIC GUIDANCE</u>. The USSOUTHCOM SJA provides legal advice to USCINCSO and his staff regarding all aspects of this plan. He is the single point of contact for any legal matters which may arise regarding this plan. The USSOUTHCOM SJA acts as liaison with other Staff Judge Advocates and civilian legal authorities as appropriate, and provides legal advice to COMCNTF/J3-DDN. This plan contemplates support to operations short of accompanying host nation forces on field operations. Consequently, legal considerations in the references which pertain to combat situations may be useful only as secondary guidance.

a. (U) Claims

(1) (U) Settle claims against the U.S. under provisions of the Foreign Claims Act (10 USC 2734). Services will process claims against the U.S.

according to their own regulations. For-claims having no connection to a particular Service, or in doubtful cases, forward to USSOUTHCOM SJA for disposition.

(2) (U) Process personnel claims (31 USC 240-243) under the claimant's Service directive.

b. (U) International Legal Considerations

- (1) (U) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty provides for the status of U.S. military personnel present in Panama. Agreements with the governments of all other countries within the USSOUTHCOM AOR are considerably less specific and do not necessarily ensure a favorable legal status for U.S. military personnel supporting actions contemplated by this plan. To facilitate implementation of this plan, USCINCSO requests the U.S. Embassy concerned to negotiate an exchange of notes based on the proposed note at Tab A. Such an exchange will provide immunity from the host country's criminal jurisdiction and immunity from that country's civil and administrative jurisdiction as it may apply to acts performed in the course of duties.
- (2) (U) Status of Host Country Détainees. Under the circumstances in which this plan will be executed, the host nation provides security for U.S. military personnel. It is possible this security may be inadequate at times, and certain individuals may take violent, criminal action against U.S. military personnel, such individuals will be treated as criminal suspects and turned over to host country authorities immediately. In no event is any suspect to be accorded any status (such as POW status) under the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
- (3) (U) Actions pertaining to relations with host countries will be IAW the agreements between the U.S. and the host nations.
- c. (U) <u>Legal Assistance</u>. Unless otherwise directed, component SJAs provide legal assistance for U.S. military personnel within their Service. Utilize Inter-Service support where feasible.
- d. (U) <u>Military Justice</u>. Reference d. For military justice purposes, jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel will be exercised by the respective Service to which personnel are assigned or as designated by SECDEF.

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX E TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) DRAFT Exchange of Note (U)

(U) The Embassy of the United States has the honor to refer to discussions between representatives of our two Governments concerning (state the reason why U.S. military personnel are to arrive in the host country) in connection with the provisions of (defense articles and services, etc.). The Embassy proposes that such personnel shall be accorded the same status provided to members of the administrative and technical staff of the U.S. Embassy under the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations (or if the host country is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention: The Embassy proposes that such personnel shall be accorded all privileges and immunities conferred by international custom to Embassy personnel of corresponding rank.) The Embassy further proposes that such U.S. personnel shall enjoy freedom of movement and the right to undertake those activities deemed necessary for the performance of their mission and for the support of their personnel. If the foregoing is acceptable to your government, the U.S. Embassy has the honor to propose that this note, together with your reply, shall constitute an agreement between our two governments, effective from the date of your reply.

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E-4-A-2 UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. JOPS, Volume I, SM 362-84, dated 28 Jun 84, with Second Note dated 17 Sep 86.
- b. JOPS, Volume II, Annex F, dated 8 Jun 77, "Policy Guidance, Public Affairs."
- c. DOD Directive 5105.35 dated 7—May 85, "Responsibilities of Unified and Specified Commands in Public Affairs Matters."
- d. DOD Directive 5230.9 dated 24 Dec 66, "Clearance of DOD Public Information."
- e. DOD Directive 5400.7 dated 14 Feb 75, "Availability to the Public of DOD Information."
- f. DOD Instruction 5230.13 dated 23 Oct 73, "Principles of Public Information."
- g. DOD Directive 5122.8 dated 13 Dec 63, "Use of Military Carriers for Public Affairs Purposes."
- h. DOD Instruction 5435.2 dated 25 Apr 75, "Delegation of Authority to Approve Travel in and Use of Military Carriers for Defense Public Affairs Purposes."
- i. DOD Instruction 5410.5 dated 3 Nov 66, "Delineation of DOD Audiovisual Public Affairs Responsibilities and Policies."
- j. DOD Regulation 5200.1-R dated 12 Jul 82, "Information Security Program Regulation."
- k. USCINCSO 312050Z MAY 89 "Public Affairs Guidance Requirements and Procedures."
- Letter, subject "USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs Guidance for Conducting Interviews," dated 18 Nov 87.

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F-1 UNCLASSIFIED

- m. USSOUTHCOM Reg 360-1, "Public Information."
- n. National Security Directive 18, 21 Aug 89.
- o. USCINCSO Counterdrug Opord 1-89

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) General

- (1) (U) This annex assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for the conduct of Public Affairs (Command Information and Public Information) in support of the USSOUTHCOM counternarcotics campaign described in Annex C.
- (2) (U) Planning and preparations necessary to support the DOD media pool will be included in all phases of the strategy. If the DOD media pool is activated, detailed public affairs guidance will be provided by USSOUTHCOM by separate correspondence.
- (3) (U) In an open society, the public can be expected to have access to military information which does not damage national security. With the exception of information controlled by operational security restrictions, activities conducted under this plan may offer an opportunity for positive news media coverage for participating commands and the armed forces in general. News media interest in such activities will be high.
- (4) (U) News media representatives covering activities or operational events are not considered official visitors. Their activities will be managed through the USSOUTHCOM PAO. Official military and civilian visitors, if any, will be managed by other assets.
- b. (U) Enemy. Annex B.

c. (U) Friendly

- (1) (U) Department of State (DOS). Responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy, and conducts information programs through the U.S. Information Service (USIS).
- (2) (U) Department of Defense (DOD). Responsible for the conduct of U.S. military activities/operations and information programs worldwide, through unified/theater commands. → The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD)-Public Affairs (PA) plans, coordinates, executes and monitors defense information programs.
- (3) (U) American Embassy. Headed by U.S. Ambassador, appointed by and representing the President of the United States, who is responsible for all

- U.S. activities and citizens in the host country. The Ambassador is assisted by senior representatives of DOS, USIS and DOD, and is the approving authority for execution of U.S. information programs in the host country.
- (4) (U) Host Country PAO. Conducts information programs in support of forces; is capable of supporting dissemination of U.S. and/or combined information products to host country or regional audiences; and can provide indispensable advice in the planning, preparation, and coordination stages.
- d. (U) <u>Policy</u>. A vigorous, pro-active public affairs program in support of the USSOUTHCOM counternarcotics mission must:
 - (1) (U) Articulate to both the internal and external audiences the clear first priority of counternarcotics within USSOUTHCOM.
 - (2) (U) Provide accurate, comprehensive information to all publics through the media consistent with operational security.
 - (3) (U) Conserve favorable public opinion regarding USSOUTHCOM efforts to combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.
 - (4) (U) Change negative opinions concerning USSOUTHCOM efforts involving counternarcotics.
 - (5) (U) Cooperate fully with host nation desires concerning publicity on counternarcotics operations.

e. (U) Assumptions

- (1) (U) Commander, Counternarcotics Task Force (COMCNTF), through the Counternarcotics Task Force Public Affairs officer, will provide proposed PA guidance IAW procedures described in Reference k. OASD-PA will provide guidance for releasing information upon receipt of proposed PA guidance.
- (2) (U) The American public will be informed to the maximum extent possible consistent with operational security and troop safety. This release of information can best be accomplished through U.S. and international media.
- (3) (U) The President of the United States and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) have made initial announcements concerning major military aspects of this CONPLAN. The National Command Authority (NCA) and SECDEF will make subsequent announcements concerning major military aspects of this CONPLAN.
- (4) (U) Forces hostile to U.S. efforts will attempt to discredit U.S. efforts through the media.

- (5) (U) The information agencies of the U.S. Government and of the host nation (HN) can be expected to cooperate in an effort to explain military aspects of this CONPLAN.
 - (6) (U) Media interest will focus on U.S. presence in the host nation, whether or not in training or operational areas, and USSOUTHCOM/COMCNTF will be subject to close scrutiny.
 - (7) (U) Relative freedom of movement could result in media overflights and news media visits in the training or operational area without prior coordination.
 - (8) (U) Distance to the training or operational site, poor road networks and the length of the training/operation may all lead to excellent opportunities for media flights, tours, and group visits at coordinated times. DOD Reg 4515.13R will be observed.
- (9) (U) A public affairs detachment may be deployed to support the mission.
- (10) (U) Beliefs and attitudes about USSOUTHCOM and the U.S. and host-nation militaries' roles and missions, as well as U.S. policy, concerning counternarcotics efforts, will largely determine the support for and success of these programs.
- (11) (U) Heightened public awareness in the host country, developed through USIS, the country team, and the host nation media, will help develop public support for the counternarcotics efforts.
- (12) (U) A strong public affairs effort in the host nation will send the drug traffickers a strong message that the U.S. will not tolerate narcotics trafficking.
- (13) (U) USSOUTHCOM has, can coordinate for, or can obtain the resources with which to conduct a successful counternarcotics PA program.

2. (U) MISSION

a. (U) The public affairs mission is to pursue an aggressive public affairs strategy implemented in the host countries to: train host nation public affairs officers, downplay the role of the U.S. military, increase awareness of the host nation role in counternarcotics training/operations, increase host nation commitment to counternarcotics efforts, educate the host nation on the damage that drugs are doing to the economic and moral fiber of their nation, and provide both timely and factual on-the-scene coverage of the training/operation to both the internal military audience and the American public through

national, regional, and local news media. Public affairs asset priorities, however, will be given to DOD-coordinated media pool operations.

- b. (U) All public affairs actions associated with this plan will be consistent with essential military security and within policy guidance provided by higher authority.
- c. (U) The following goals will be accomplished by public affairs personnel participating in this strategy:
 - (1) (U) Plan and assess public affairs requirements in coordination with host nation counterdrug forces, public affairs organizations, USIS and the interagency environment.
 - (2) (U) Provide extensive on-ground public affairs assistance to host nation counterdrug forces.
 - (3) (U) Conduct public affairs training for host nation counterdrug and military forces in the host nation, at USSOUTHCOM, and in CONUS at the Defense Information School.
 - (4) (U) Provide public affairs materials for put in affairs training. At this time, there are no public affairs reference or teaching materials available in Spanish with which to support host nation public affairs training.
 - (5) (U) Coordinate all regional support or augmentation required for the public affairs counterdrug mission.
 - (6) (U) Exercise the DOD media pool deployment concept and its attendant public affairs, logistics (airlift, messing, billeting, ground transportation, etc.) and communications requirements.
 - (7) (U) Counter hostile disinformation.
 - (8) (U) Support U.S. regional objectives.

3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) <u>Concept of Operations</u>. The Director, Public Affairs, USSOUTHCOM, is responsible for the conduct of U.S. military public affairs within the region.
 - (1) (U) <u>Planning</u>. Public affairs planning will commence concurrently with conceptional and/or operational planning. Unless otherwise directed, initial PA planning will consider deployment of the DOD media pool. OASD-PA will help coordinate PA matters outside USCINCSO AOR during all phases of the plan/operation.

(2) (U) <u>Deployment</u>. During the deployment stage, COMCNTF will activate and prepare to deploy a public affairs team (PAT) to handle the media already in the area of operations (AO) or to escort the DOD media pool into the AO. On Secretary of Defense approval for DOD media pool activation, OASD-PA, in coordination with COMCNTF, is responsible for notification and deployment of the pool. COMCNTF PAT will facilitate the pool's coverage of any training/operations.

(3) (U) <u>Technical Assistance/Operations</u>

- (a) (U) PA actions will be accomplished in collaboration with both U.S. military and AMEMBASSY diplomatic representatives and HN Armed Forces.
- (b) (U) The responsibility for planning, coordinating and directing military public affairs field operations rests with the USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs Officer (SCPAO), who will work in close coordination with the Public Affairs Counselor of the American Embassy and the HN Public Affairs officer. The SCPAO may activate a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) to facilitate public affairs coverage.
- (c) (U) Initial concurrent news releases will be made from the seats of government by OASD-PA and HN Armed Forces. (See reference k for detailed procedures on development of public affairs guidance and releases). Subordinate commanders may hold media interviews and issue media releases only after coordination with SCPAO and receipt of amplifying public affairs policy guidance.
- (d) (U) The SCPAO will determine the best dates for media days and will make arrangements for transportation and accommodations of media to cover activities.
- 4. (U) <u>REDEPLOYMENT/AFTER-ACTION EVALUATION</u>. The SCPAO will provide written after-action PA evaluations to COMCNTF defining problem areas, proposed solutions, and lessons learned.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) JCS will activate the JCS PA Response Cell before Phase II operations commence in order to keep OASD-PA and the NCA informed of significant PA actions.

(2) (U) CNTF Public Affairs will:

(a) (U) Provide OASD-PA with proposed policy guidance on PA matters, and when approved by OASD-PA, provide approved guidance to all subordinate commanders participating in the training/operation.

- (b) (U) Determine and develop public affairs plans and products in support of deployments for training (DFTs), mobile training teams (MTTs), contingencies and other activities and deployments with counterdrug implications.
 - 1 (U) Use established systems to monitor and track activities with counterdrug implications.
 - 2 (U) Update policy guidance, files and statements as required.
 - 3 (U) Write or coordinate with appropriate staff, National Command Authority (NCA), components and other agencies to ensure incorporation of all appropriate information in public affairs plans, guidance, news releases and reports. These products will be coordinated IAW SCPA guidance.
- (c) (U) Conduct and/or coordinate all public affairs training for LATAM military public affairs officers and host-nation counterdrug forces.
 - 1 (U) Coordinate with TRADOC to allow LATAM officers to fill excess slots when available or possible. Work with Defense Information School (DINFOS) to allow more LATAM officers slots in DINFOS as International Military Student Officers (IMSOs).
 - 2 (U) Conduct or organize seminars in host countries and conduct one-on-one training with individual officers as requested.
- (d) (U) Conduct staff assistance visits at the request of host nations to determine host nation needs in coordination with USIS, the country team and host nation counterdrug forces.
 - 1 (U) Advertise availability of and schedule USSOUTHCOM counternarcotics PAO to conduct staff assistance visits. Coordinate visits with country team.
 - 2 (U) Develop self-inspection checklists for country team and LATAM officers' use, and develop staff assistance visit checklist to ensure continuity.
- (e) (U) Develop and implement public affairs counterdrug strategy in coordination with USIS, the country team, and host nation counterdrug forces to increase their ability to keep the public informed of their key role in counterdrug operations and to heighten host nation public commitment to counterdrug efforts.

- 1 (U) Coordinate all plans and statements with primary players at USSOUTHCOM (SCJ3, SCSJA, SCJ5) and within the theater. Work closely with USIS, etc. to write plans and guidance.
- 2 (U) Develop and disseminate information on media techniques, procedures and attitudes and methods of working with media in host nations as well as in U.S.
- 3 (U) Solicit input from SAOs, JTFs, country teams and host nation PA officers on media reaction, Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports, USIS wireless files and other sources of information which reflect the progress of the counternarcotics public affairs effort.
- (f) (U) Determine and develop Spanish language training literature—and material in the public affairs field tailored for LATAM and counterdrug force public affairs personnel.
 - 1 (U) Coordinate with the JCS-PA, OASD-PA, service and reserve component public affairs entities, DINFOS, State Department, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Low Intensity Conflict at Langley AFB, the Low Intensity Conflict Cell at Ft Leavenworth, Defense Language Institute and other developmental activities as necessary.
- (g) (U) Coordinate for extra theater support or augmentation for training programs or literature, and determine host nation needs, funding procedures, selection of personnel or materials, type of training support, and timing of requirements.
 - 1 (U) Work with Reserve Component advisor (SCRA) and Reserve Component PA plans officer to coordinate support from public affairs detachments for DFTs, exercises, counterdrug operations where feasible, and other activities with counterdrug implications.
 - 2 (U) Coordinate with J1 to provide other augmentees when possible.
 - 3 (U) Contact DINFOS for training and material support.
- (h) (U) Coordinate and control all theater PA activities of commands concerned with this plan.
 - (i) (U) Maintain liaison with OASD-PA on policy matters.
- (j) (U) Ensure that Public Affairs elements are properly equipped and staffed, and provided ready access to voice and message communications connecting USSOUTHCOM Headquarters and the nearest State Department PA

representative. This support will be provided, unless unavoidable military necessity, respecting mission and/or safety of U.S. Armed Forces, requires all available assets.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

- (1) (U) Command Relationships. Annex J.
- (2) (U) Coordination of Release of Information. SC Public Affairs Office is authorized to provide UNCLASSIFIED synopsis of technical assistance after coordination in U.S. and host nation public affairs and command channels. Spokespersons may confirm presence of troops, ships, and aircraft where they plainly are visible to news media, and when confirmation of their presence is requested. Response to media query is authorized as prescribed in Appendix 3.
- (3) (U) Component commands will provide public affairs representatives to augment CNTF public affairs in the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) or Joint Information Office (JIO) or as required.
 - (4) (U) Other Coordinating Instructions
 - (a) (U) The physical security of PA personnel, equipment, and visiting media is a command responsibility and will be incorporated into all planning.
 - (b) (U) Communiques, briefings, and news summaries will be required. Specific requirements will be transmitted after plan implementation.
 - (c) (U) Public Affairs activities will be incorporated in established reports.
 - (d) (U) Materials produced during the execution of this plan will be approved by the USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs Officer, who will coordinate with the AMEMBASSY Public Affairs counselor and HN Armed Forces prior to public release. If there is no concurrence, the materials will not be released; but instead forwarded through USSOUTHCOM for SECDEF/SECSTATE review and decision.
 - (e) (U) Hometown news release items should be generally approved by SCPAO or his designated representative. Due to the nature of this program, subordinate commands are not encouraged to pursue an aggressive Hometown News Release Program.
 - (f) (U) Close coordination will be maintained at all levels with United States Information Service (USIS) and the American Embassy concerned as well as HN Armed Forces Public Relations.

- (g) (U) Timely, accurate and appropriate information will be made available regarding casualties. Appendix 4.
- (h) (U) Routine coordination will be made with PSYOP commands and staffs to preclude contradictory efforts. However, PA assets will not be used for PSYOP purposes, nor will PSYOP staffs be permitted to participate in public affairs operations.
- (i) (U) The commander of the forces involved is responsible for immediately notifying the nearest Public Affairs officer in the event of an accident or incident; who will in turn coordinate directly with COMCNTF or DOD Public Affairs Officers. Appendix 4.

4. (U) ACCREDITATION

- a. (U) USCINCSO will not recommend accreditation of news media representatives (NMRs) to the DOD. However, correspondents will be expected to certify association with recognized media by formal identification. All representatives of legitimate news organizations will be afforded equal consideration with regard to releasable information on this exercise.
- b. (U) All news media representatives will be required to comply with HN requirements prior to being afforded access to U.S. military activities. SCPAO should obtain names and next of kin (NOK) notification for U.S. media representatives.
- c. (U) The USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs Officer, on behalf of his/her commander, is responsible for U.S. news media representatives in the area of operations in coordination with AMEMBASSY and host nation.
- d. (U) Media access may be cleared through and confirmed by public affairs channels when required.
- 5. (U) <u>FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP WARTIME INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM (WISP)</u>. Field press censorship will not be applicable for this plan/operation and may only be invoked by OASD-PA message.
- 6. (U) <u>ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEDIA</u>. Operations/training conducted under this CONPLAN may provide an opportunity to facilitate public understanding of the USSOUTHCOM mission and scope of the strategy and merit consideration for media tours.
- a. (U) <u>Facilities</u>. Facilities and logistics support will be provided on a noninterference basis, when commercial facilities are not available.
 - b. (U) Inoculations. Correspondents accompanying forces in the field should

have the same inoculations required for military personnel participating in the strategy.

- c. (U) <u>Expenses</u>. In the absence of commercial facilities, messing and billeting may be extended to NMR's on a space available basis. The expenses will be borne by individual news media representatives.
- d. (U) <u>Simulated Rank</u>. Correspondents will be afforded the privileges of an officer for messing, billeting and transportation. This provision applies to reserve or retired military acting as civilian news media representatives regardless of their reserve or retired grade.
- e. (U) <u>Daily Briefing</u>. The SCPAO will arrange for UNCLASSIFIED briefings by the commander or his representative. The briefing will outline, as far as possible and within the bounds of security, plans and activities.
- f. (U) Communications. Commands at which PAO facilities are physically located will provide the media communications service when commercial facilities are not available. Commercial news copy will be transmitted by military communications facilities free of charge and IAW Annex K. Commercial news copy normally will be transmitted with a precedence of ROUTINE; however, the SCPAO may approve up to a precedence of IMMEDIATE in exceptional circumstances. When commercial facilities are not available, no attempt will be made to censor news copy to be filed over military communications facilities, unless field press WISP has been invoked by higher authority. However, copy filed over military communications facilities may be reviewed before transmission, and potential violations of military security may be called to the attention of the sender. If the copy is not redrafted to overcome valid security objections, it is entirely within the prerogative of the commanding officer of the unit or communication facility to refuse to accept it for transmission. However, force will not be used to withhold the drafted material, nor will material be confiscated without authorization from higher headquarters. Media may be reminded that 18 USC, 793e, 795 make it a criminal offense to photograph, publish or refuse to surrender classified information. Appendix 4.
- g. (U) <u>Courier Flights</u>. If government communications facilities are not available, the on-scene commander will provide an air-courier flight for forwarding news materials to appropriate processing or news filing points.
- h. (U) <u>Transportation</u>. USSOUTHCOM will plan for and provide authorized media representatives military travel into and within the area of operations when such travel has been approved by OASD-PA and is in connection with assignments to cover this training/operation and commercial transportation is not available. Unit PAOs will also be provided dedicated local ground and air transportation to enhance media coverage. Invitational travel orders will be issued as required.

- i. (U) <u>Travel Orders</u>. Correspondents will travel on orders issued or authorized by COMCNTF or other supporting/supported CINCs or OASD-PA or JIB. Under this CONPLAN, authority to issue travel orders for correspondents for a specific phase of training/operations may be delegated upon individual request from components.
- j. (U) <u>Pools</u>. Depending on the situation, it may be necessary to select a small group or pool of media representatives to cover certain aspects of the training/operation. It is important that all types of media are represented and that the pool be as large as transportation facilities will permit. News media participation in the pool will be contingent on proper identification and compliance with HN requirements for news media.
- k. (U) <u>Media Days</u>.—This will be the preferred method of handling media. Paragraph 3a.
- 7. (U) <u>SECURITY OF ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL</u>. Certain precautions are required by the presence of correspondents in the operating areas.

a. (U) Technical Assistance Activities

- (1) (U) Execution of this CONPLAN presents a variety of challenges in maintaining military security as well as diplomatic or political propriety. Security at the source offers the best protection of classified information. Diplomatic and political implications of statements or news releases to media representatives should be weighed carefully at all echelons of command.
- (2) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) must be protected.
- (3) (U) Access to training, operations, intelligence, and other classified areas must be controlled. Media normally will be accompanied by a PAO or a PAO NCO. Media will not be permitted to visit those portions of installations which have been restricted for security reasons. They will not be excluded from training or operational areas solely on the grounds of personal danger but will be warned when danger exists and advised that the government assumes no responsibility. The commander is the sole and final judge in determining when their presence interferes with activities.
 - (4) (U) Security at the source is essential.
- (5) (U) The on-scene commander will review all materials to be released locally for OPSEC considerations.
- b. (U) Personnel

- (1) (U) Personnel security is the responsibility of the NMRs. The SCPAO will ensure that NMRs are briefed on the dangers of accompanying forces into combat areas and areas within the AO that are temporarily restricted.
- (2) (U) The SCPAO will determine the necessity for physical security forces at the location(s) of the SCPAO, PAT, JIB, or Sub-JIBs, and make recommendations to COMCNTF. Component commands will be prepared to respond to these security requirements on short notice.
 - (3) (U) No correspondent is cleared for classified information.
- (4) (U) Correspondents will assume that all statements made to them are "for the record."
- (5) (U) "Off the Record" or "deep background" statements will not be included in briefings for members of the press corps.
- 8. (U) <u>OPERATIONS SECURITY</u>. The purpose of Operations Security (OPSEC) is to identity, control, and protect indicators associated with planning and conducting military activities. Indicators, often obtained from open source data, provide information that results in adversary appreciations, plans and actions harmful to achieving friendly intentions. Critical information, or Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), are determined during OPSEC planning. Public affairs, then, becomes an integral part of the overall OPSEC plan. The SCPAO must ensure that material released in the area is reviewed for OPSEC as well as security considerations. The protection and control of unclassified OPSEC indicators is not intended to deny unclassified information from the media. Proper OPSEC/PA planning will eliminate or reduce OPSEC indicators of friendly critical information from media exposure. OPSEC review of media material is intended to measure real-time OPSEC postures and take corrective actions, if required.

9. (U) <u>AUDIOVISUAL/VISUAL INFORMATION</u>

- a. (U) Operational/training documentation, traditionally a staff function of the J3, becomes a critical public affairs requirement. The ability to rapidly, clearly and graphically portray the circumstances surrounding a contingency to key decision-makers and the public can have a profound effect on their perceptions and decisions to support or subvert ongoing activities.
- b. (U) Audiovisual Documentation (AVDOC) in the form of motion media (videotape, motion picture film), stifl photography and audio recording is essential to preserve imagery for public affairs purposes. Imagery for public affairs use differs from the imagery normally captured for operational documentation, in that it focuses on news-quality journalism which tells the story of the people involved.

- c. (U) The SCPA staff will coordinate and define public affairs documentation requirements, and interface with the COMCNTF and SAO commanders to provide technical expertise in supervising the effective employment of AVDOC assets and expediting the clearance and release of AVDOC products. COMCNTF will coordinate for an audiovisual team to be deployed in support of the training/operation.
- d. (U) The SCPAO staff officer will interface with host country counterparts to effect combined AVDOC operations wherever possible, and will share materials produced. This relationship provides for increased capabilities in camera crews, linguists, and production; expands access to host country activities; expedites clearance; and increases the distribution and public acceptance of AVDOC products.
- e. (U) Copies of all finished AVDOC products will routinely and expeditiously be forwarded to OASD-PA.
- f. (U) Release authority for audiovisual materials is described in paragraph 3c.

10. (U) INTERNAL INFORMATION

- a. (U) Commanders at all levels are responsible for implementing vigorous command information programs to insure their troops are kept well informed, in order to reinforce confidence in the chain of command and counter the effects of hostile propaganda and disinformation.
- b. (U) Internal information programs and assets will be expanded and used to the maximum extent possible to support deploying forces.
- c. (U) Public Affairs Detachments (PADs) may deploy to support internal information programs.
- d. (U) CNTF/PAO may increase distribution of Tropic Times to support units deployed in coordination with Director of Public Affairs, USSOUTHCOM.
 - e. (U) AFRTS support may be provided as feasible.
- 11. (U) COMMUNITY RELATIONS. Not used.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

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APPENDICES:

- 1 Personnel Requirements for JIB/Sub-JIBs
- 2 Equipment Requirements for JIB/Sub-JIBs (not used)
 - 3 General Ground Rules for Media
- 4 Release of Information Concerning Adverse Incidents When More Than One Service Is Involved
 - 5 DOD Media Pool

OFFICIAL:

RONALD T. SCONYERS

Colonel, USAF

Director, Public Affairs

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U)
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB)/JOINT INFORMATION
OFFICE (JIO)

Position	<u>Grade</u>	MOS/AFSC	<u>svc</u>	JIB/JIO	Source
Director	06	7916	AF	X X	USSOUTHCOM
Deputy	•	•		X	USIS Panama
Chief, Crisis Action Team (PA)	05	46A	Α		USSOUTHCOM
Member, Crisis Action Team (PA)	04	46A	Α		USSOUTHCOM
Member, Crisis Action Team (PA)	04	1650	N		USSOUTHCOM
Public Information Officer (PIO)	-	•	-	X X	USSOUTHCOM
Officer in Charge (OIC) Press Center	• .	· -	-	X	USIS Panama
NCOIC Press Center /830 AD Rep	E7	79170	AF	X X	830 AD
Escort Officer Press Center	03	46A	A	X X	USSOUTHCOM
USARSO Rep	-	-	-	x x	USARSO
USNAVSO Rep		•	-	x x	USNAVSO

*If feasible

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) GENERAL GROUND RULES FOR MEDIA

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) The principle of maximum information flow to the public will be followed, consistent with safety and security. The situation in any military operation is such that correspondents may come into possession of information which has not been released officially under set ground rules. Such information is not to be transmitted or publicly released by US military sources until officially released by American or allied spokesmen in regard to their respective national forces.
- b. (U) Restrictions will be kept to a minimum but may be applied by a commanding officer when security warrants such action. Correspondents will be advised of restrictions by the commanding officer or public affairs officers of the unit involved.

2. (U) GROUND RULES

- a. (U) <u>Releasing Authority</u>. CINCSO or the SCPAO (if designated by the CINC) are sole releasing authorities for all military information material contained in any medium (audiovisual, photography, drawings, etc.) gathered or produced within his area of operations.
- b. (U) <u>Release of Cleared Information</u>. Information cleared for official release will be made available to the press through one or more of the following means.
 - (1) (U) Press releases
 - (2) (U) Press briefings
 - (3) (U) Call outs
 - (4) (U) Special press handouts
 - (5) (U) Interviews
- c. (U) <u>Categories of Releasable Information Following Initial</u> <u>Official</u> <u>Release</u>

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- (1) (U) General
- (a) (U) Arrival of major units in country or within critical areas when officially announced by US spokesman.
- (b) (U) Approximate friendly force strength figures, by service after announced by DOD spokesman.
- (2) (U) Air, Ground, Sea Operations (Past and Present)
 - (a) (U) Approximate friendly force size in an exercise.
 - (b) (U) Nonsensitive tactical details.
 - (c) (U) Origin of air operations (i.e., land based or carrier based).
- (d) (U) Date/time/location of previous conventional military missions/activities.
 - (e) (U) Previous conventional mission results.
- (f) (U) Number of aerial combat/reconnaissance missions/sorties flown in theater or area.
- (g) (U) Type forces involved (infantry, armor, Marines, carrier battle group, interceptors, fighter-bombers, etc.).
 - (h) (U) Weather/climatic conditions.
 - (i) (U) Allied participation by type.
 - (j) (U) Nicknames of plans.

d. (U) <u>Categories of Information Not Releasable</u>

- (1) (U) General
- (a) (U) Any information--general, implied, or specific--regarding any aspect of actual or conceptual future military plans, activities, or operations. Includes all information directly or indirectly associated with combat, combat support, or combat service support endeavors (i.e., operations, logistics, administration, politico-military, civil affairs, C3S, etc.).
- (b) (U) Information on any command, control, personnel, operational, or support vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or shortfalls.

- (c) (U) Rules of engagement details.
- (d) (U) Information on friendly force security and deception measures/countermeasures.
- (2) (U) Air, Ground, Sea Operations (Past and Present)
- (a) (U) Information on intelligence collection activities to include targets, methods, and results.
- (b) (U) Information on the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of simulated enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct/indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
- (c) (U) Information on classified unique operations methodology/tactics (air ops angles of attack, speeds, etc.; naval tactical/evasive maneuvers, etc.).
- (d) (U) Information on classified special operations and special purpose operations and activities.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U)
RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ADVERSE INCIDENTS WHEN MORE THAN ONE SERVICE
IS INVOLVED (U)

- 1. (U) <u>PURPOSE</u>. To provide basic procedures for the release of information concerning adverse incidents/accidents to aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, missiles, ships or facilities, and casualties to personnel involving more than one military Service.
- 2. (U) <u>APPLICABILITY</u>. This <u>Appendix applies</u> to personnel of the United States Army, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Coast Guard and civilians serving or accompanying those forces when they are participating in joint operations. It applies to the US Southern Command within the geographic limits of the AO.
- 3. (U) <u>DEFINITIONS</u>. For the purpose of this Appendix, four categories of adverse incidents are established. They are:
- a. (U) Emergency. Any incident which results in the death of one or more participants, or which has a high probability of causing the death of one or more participants.
- b. (U) <u>Accident</u>. Any incident which involves serious injury to one or more participants not causing death, but requiring his/her withdrawal from the training/operation. Also included are incidents which cause a short delay in training/operational events, or incidents which would have resulted in an emergency if emergency procedures had not been successful. Aircraft accidents are included in this category to include mishaps, crashes or emergency landings.
- c. (U) <u>Civil Disturbance</u>. Any incident involving the local population which would tend to disrupt peace and order under non-hostile circumstances. The incidents may range from a nonviolent demonstration to actual physical interference with the conduct of activities in non-hostile situations.
- d. (U) <u>Routine</u>. All injuries, equipment failures, etc., which are not classified as emergencies, accidents or civil disturbances. Incidents in this category will not involve adverse incident procedures.
- 4. (U) BASIC PROCEDURES

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- a. (U) During joint training/operations, initial release of information concerning all emergencies or accidents will be made by OSC PAO after coordination with USSOUTHCOM and the service(s) involved. All initial inquiries from the public concerning these accidents or incidents will be referred to the OSC PAO, regardless of the service involved. Where necessary, appropriate OSC PAO will coordinate with AMEMBASSY PAO. It is important in this regard that information not be held at any one level, but that prompt, accurate information be available for release. Bad news does not get better with age.
- b. (U) Participating commands and units will notify the OSC PAO as expeditiously as possible when an emergency or an accident occurs. The OSC PAO will inform USCINCSOUTH and OASD/PA, USIS, AMEMBASSY immediately upon notification of any emergency, accident, or incident involving major damage to facilities or any other potentially newsworthy incident. The Service(s) involved will immediately report the adverse incident through its/their) public affairs channels in accordance with applicable regulations.
- c. (U) An adverse incident during joint training/operations will generate requests from NMRs to visit the scene of the incident. NMRs may visit the scene after approval of OSC under escort of public affairs personnel or by a representative designated by the OSC. While NMRs are on-scene, they will have access to the accident on a non-interference basis within the limits of established security policy, and if their personal safety is not endangered. Personal safety decisions will be made only by the OSC.
- d. (U) The OSC PAO or his/her designated representative will be the official spokesperson on-scene, and all initial on-scene media queries will be referred to him/her.
- e. (U) Photography of an adverse incident will be permitted if no classified material is exposed. Determination as to the exposure of classified material will be made by the cognizant Service. If there is doubt as to the exposure of classified material, photographers will be advised they cannot take photographs and that taking photographs of classified material is in violation of federal law. Federal Criminal Statutes 28, U.S.C. 795 and 797 may render them liable for criminal prosecution. 'However, force will not be used to prevent photography. Film and/or videotape will not be confiscated without authorization from higher authority.
- f. (U) After the initial news release has been made, or after the NMRs have departed the scene, the responsibilities for follow-on public affairs actions relative to adverse incidents may be delegated to the Service involved in accordance with applicable regulations, including the release of information concerning the personnel or equipment involved. All follow-on public affairs activity will be coordinated with the OSC PAO. At this time, if not previously

identified, other Services assisting or participating in rescue operations may make public release of their part in these operations.

- g. (U) If not stated in the initial release, a statement that an investigation is being or will be conducted to determine the exact cause of the incident will be included in a subsequent release. If no subsequent release is planned, this information will be available to response to queries.
- h. (U) Release of information concerning incidents involving civil disturbances will be coordinated with AMEMBASSY PAO.

5. (U) CASUALTY INFORMATION ACTIONS

- a. (U) Names of casualties will normally be released only by the Service to which casualties belong. Where facts of the emergency are obvious to the public or covered by NMRs on-scene, the exercise public affairs officer may announce, when queried, the number of known dead, the number of known survivors, and the number of known injured survivors.
- b. (U) The OSC PAO will inform NMRs that release of names of casualties will be made by the parent Service involved after casualties' next of kin have been notified and that all subsequent queries concerning casualties should be addressed to the public affairs office of the parent Service.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) DOD MEDIA POOL (U)

1. (U) SITUATION

- a. (U) The DOD Media Pool was established to accord media the opportunity to cover certain military contingencies that they otherwise might be excluded from coverage because of security considerations. Today's media are highly competitive and extremely mobile and can be counted upon to find their way to the scene of a military operation quickly, once it becomes known. In the Grenada operation "Urgent Fury," the joint information bureau, established at Barbados, had over 700 individuals claiming to be reporters request accreditation during the first 24 hours of the operation. That experience serves to emphasize the situation that public affairs officers and commanders may have to deal with during counternarcotics activities, especially because of the nature of such activities to draw high media interest.
- b. (U) Because operational security is the primary consideration during the planning and initiation of counternarcotics activities, use of DOD Media Pool will be considered. The DOD pool would normally be used until open coverage of the operation is established. However, since no open coverage is anticipated, all PA planning should consider using the DOD pool. DOD may also consider lack of access to the theater by other means as consideration for pool deployment.
- c. (U) When deployed, the DOD Media Pool is an official DOD-sponsored group and is considered part of the counternarcotics activity.
- 2. (U) <u>MISSION</u>. Provide logistical and administrative support and arrangements to ensure adequate, prompt and accurate coverage of U.S. military activities to the American public consistent with operational security and troop safety.

3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) Concept of Operation
 - (1) (U) Sequence of Events
 - (a) (U) Notification and Deployment. A decision on deployment is made at DOD and call-out of the media pool in Washington will be

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accomplished by the DOD Media Pool coordinator, and the pool size and call-out time will be based on transportation and OPSEC considerations.

- (b) (U) Arrival and Activities. The arrival of the media pool in the operational/training area normally will be timed to enable poolers to be briefed on the upcoming activity. Due to security considerations, media will be escorted at all times but will be allowed to provide balanced coverage. Sufficient extra time should be built in to allow for potential minor delays in the itinerary.
- (c) (U) Reassembly. Once the pool has covered the initial event, it will need to be reassembled so pool members can consolidate and file their stories. Then the pool should be returned to the operational/training area to repeat this cycle as often as necessary until open coverage can be established, if it is to be established.
- (d) (U) Departure. Pool members will return to point of origin with their DOD host unless prior arrangements are made for further activity.
- (2) (U) Provisions of Annex F to this plan apply as appropriate to execution of the DOD Media Pool operation. For purposes of this appendix, the on-site-commander (OSC) will be JIB/JIO.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) OASD-PA is responsible for the following:

- (a) (U) Establishing general ground rules for the pool which are listed at TAB A to this appendix. Also general ground rules for media at Appendix 3 to Annex F of this plan will apply. Specific ground rules for on-site activities may be established by the OSC and disseminated to pool members on arrival or in advance through OASD-PA.
- (b) (U) Notification/assembly/deployment using the checklist at TAB B to this appendix.
- (c) (U) Notifying pool members to have essential items to include luggage, clothing, toilet articles, sleeping gear, passports, money, immunizations, medicines as delineated at TAB C to this appendix.
- (d) (U) Briefing and checking pool members for essential items at airport using the checklist and associated forms at TABs D through H to this appendix.
- (e) (U) Assigning an escort officer and assistant(s) to monitor media operations.

- (f) (U) Initiating a message to sponsoring command which delineates names and composition of the pool, instructions for message format and addressees for pool reports and other information as appropriate such as expected time of travel.
 - (g) (U) Receipt of products of pool.
 - (h) (U) Regional and theater transportation.
- (i) (U) Providing general OPSEC guidelines to pool members as described at TAB A to this appendix.

(2) (U) USCINCSO will:

- (a) (U) Notify the OSC of impending pool deployment.
- (b) (U) Coordinate with OSC to establish communications procedures to insure prompt transmission of pool products.
- (c) (U) Assign a senior officer to escort the pool to further assist in coordination with subordinate commands.
- (d) (U) On coordination with the OSC provide any additional clothing and equipment necessary, e.g., mosquito netting, web gear and canteens, ponchos, and water purification tablets.
- (e) (U) Coordination with the OSC to insure arrangement of intratheater and on-site transportation.

(3) (U) The OSC will:

- (a) (U) Be prepared for the requirement to transport pool members to sites of activity for coverage. The normal size of the pool is 12, plus two DOD military escorts and one USSOUTHCOM escort. Pools may have female members. General pool composition is:
 - 1 (U) One wire service reporter and one wire service photographer.
 - 2 (U) One Pentagon press reporter.
 - 3 (U) One reporter and one photographer from a national weekly magazine.
 - 4 (U) One network TV team: reporter, cameraman, soundman.

- 5 (U) One network radio reporter.
- 6 (U) Two national daily reporters.
- 7 (U) An additional weekly magazine reporter.
- (b) (U) Accordingly, the OSC must be prepared for transportation of personnel and equipment as well as security of equipment both on site where pool members may have residual items left in vehicles or aircraft and/or at the base camp, rear area, where luggage and other equipment may remain.
- (c) (U) Be prepared for the electronic transmission of three 600 to 800-word media pool messages with an immediate precedence at the beginning of the operation for exercises, one filing of three messages is normal. For actual contingency operations, the requirements will vary depending upon the availability of adequate civilian communications and the period of time the pool is in-theater. Movement of other media products (video/audio tapes, exposed film, etc.) is also critical and the OSC should be prepared to provide for rapid movement of those products to the nearest secure area where the DOD Media Pool coordinator will arrange for its pick-up by the participating bureaus.
- (d) (U) Be prepared to establish a press center where pool and escorts will receive an actual briefing on the operation or activity, store equipment if necessary, and have access to communications for filing of stories. The press center should have equipment or access to facilities as listed in TAB J to this appendix.
- (e) (U) Be prepared to host pool members who, by prior arrangement, remain under the sponsorship of the theater command, or to arrange for hosting by appropriate subordinate/lateral commands.
- (f) (U) Coordinate with appropriate commanders to insure availability of briefers and information for the pool.
- c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. See Annexes F and J.
- 4. (U) ACCREDITATION. See Annex F and TAB D to this appendix.
- 5. (U) WISP. See Annex F.
- 6. (U) <u>ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES</u>. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB J to this appendix.
- 7. (U) SECURITY. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB J to this appendix.

- 8. (U) AUDIOVISUAL. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB J to this appendix.
- 9. (U) INTERNAL AUDIENCE. To the extent feasible, coverage and documentation of pool activities will be captured for use in internal publications.
- 10. (U) TRANSPORTATION. See Annex F and the checklist at TAB J to this appendix.
- 11. (U) COMMUNITY RELATIONS. See Annex F.

TABS:

A - Ground Rules (U)

B - Notification/Assembly/Deployment Checklist (U)

C - Memorandum for Bureau Chiefs (U)

D - Application for DOD Accreditation (U) E - Airport Briefing Checklist for Pool (U)

F - Media Pool Questionnaire (U)
G - Waiver of Liability for Travel in Government Conveyance (U)

H - OPSEC Guidance for DOD Media Pool (U)

J - USSOUTHCOM Checklist for DOD Media Pool Operations (U)

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) GROUND RULES (U)

- 1. (U) You have been selected to participate as member of the DOD media pool in an activity for which you will be briefed soon. The following ground rules will protect the security of the activity and the safety of the troops involved, while allowing you the greatest permissible freedom and access in covering the story as representatives of all U.S. media.
- 2. (U) You may not mention to anyone the fact that the pool has been activated.
- 3. (U) You may not file stories, or otherwise attempt to communicate with any individual about the operation until stories and all other material (film, sound bites, etc.) have been pooled with other media organizations. This pooling may take place at a briefing immediately following the operation, or by filing from military communications facilities. You will be expected to brief other members of the media concerning your experiences at this briefing. Detailed instructions on filing will be provided at a later briefing.
- 4. (U) You must remain with the escort officers at all times, until released--and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting, and are given only to facilitate movement of the pool and ensure troop safety.
- 5. (U) Failure to follow these ground rules may result in your expulsion from the pool.
- 6. (U) Your participation in the pool indicates your understanding of these guidelines and your willingness to abide by them.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) NOTIFICATION/ASSEMBLY/DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST (U)

 Gate guards briefed Parking lot guides in place Collect pool members at parking lot Secure vehicles	form .
Complete forms for each person Participants read Ground Rules Application for accreditation Invitational travel orders Waiver of Liability Agreement Media Pool Questionnaire Issue badges	
 Complete forms for escorts Invitational travel orders (for group) Manifest	:
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	craft and

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) MEMORANDUM FOR BUREAU CHIEFS (U)

SUBJECT: Essential Items List for Pool Reporters (U)

- (U) Pool reporters will experience the same conditions as troops. We will provide purely military equipment such as canteens, web belts, ponchos, first aid kits, and any special gear required for extreme cold weather conditions. Pool members are responsible for the rest of their gear. Generally, this should be similar to what they would take on a backpacking trip to a remote area. Some examples are:
- 1. (U) <u>Luggage</u>: Easily portable gear, like a flight bag, is strongly recommended. A backpack is best. Poolers will need to carry all their own gear and equipment in the field, and the more mobility they have, the better.
- 2. (U) Clothing: First, a well broken-in pair of lightweight hiking boots, with soles that won't slip on the wet deck of a ship or aircraft. Leather boots breathe better than man-made materials, and are more adaptable to different climates. Trousers should be of heavy cotton twill or denim material, so they do not tear easily. Shirts should be of similar material, and long-sleeved, for protection against sun and insect bites. A medium-weight windbreaker with waterproofing is necessary in nearly all climates. Polyester, or "double-knit" materials should never be used since they tear and snag easily, do not breathe, and can cause serious burns if they catch fire. A "floppy" wide-brimmed hat to protect against sun is also recommended.
- 3. (U) <u>Toilet equipment</u>: Reporters should bring their own towels, soap, shaving equipment, metal mirrors, etc. Extra toilet paper is useful--electric razors are not.
 - 4. (U) Sleeping gear: A sleeping bag, rated for cold climates is needed.
 - 5. (U) Medical/protective requirements:
- a. (U) Shots. Reporters must have immunizations current for travel worldwide; otherwise they are not deployable. Required shots and their duration are: Yellow Fever, 10 years; Cholera, 6 months; and Typhoid, 2 years. Shots which are not required but recommended are Diphtheria, Tetanus, and Gamma Globulin (for protection against Hepatitis). Smallpox shots are no longer

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- required. All immunizations should be documented on Public Health Service Form 731, "International Certificates of Vaccination as approved by the World Health Organization," which may be obtained through the Government Printing Office (cost \$0.10) or at any PHS clinic. The shots may be obtained by making an appointment through the George Washington University Hospital Traveller's Clinic, at 676-8466. Appointments may be made for Mondays, between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., or Wednesdays and Fridays, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. The cost per shot is \$15.00, with a \$15.00 office fee per visit. The Typhoid series requires two shots, taken four weeks apart. Public Health Service Clinics, which previously administered the shots for a nominal fee, were disestablished in 1982.
- b. (U) Other. Reporters should take a sufficient supply of any prescription medication, and should inform the pool officers of their medical condition upon reporting. Sending personnel whose condition could become serious or life-threatening if their medication was not administered properly is strongly discouraged. DOD cannot guarantee access to a pharmacy, if their supply of medication should run out, be lost or destroyed. Other recommended supplies are sunscreen, insect repellent and band-aids (for blisters).
 - 6. (U) Passport: A valid U.S. passport is an absolute requirement.
- 7. (U) <u>Miscellaneous</u>: Any equipment which your correspondent takes must be carried and supported by him. That support includes protective cases for transportation, batteries, cables, converters, etc. Since overseas telephones generally do not have modular jacks, an acoustic coupler for the modem on portable word processors is necessary if you intend to receive copy in that manner.
- 8. (U) Money: Reporters should take funds sufficient to cover minimal expenses (such as messing aboard ship, purchase of field rations, use of a commercial long distance telephone exchange, etc.). It never hurts to bring extra, if the pool happens upon a local cafe, store, hotel, etc.

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TAB D TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) APPLICATION FOR DOD ACCREDITATION (U)

Last Name	First	MI _	Nationality	Age
Employer	Employer'	s Address	Phone	Passport #
Business Phone	Home Phor	ne .	Length of Time w	ith Employer
eck Type of Medi	a:		and a second delication of the color	
Wire Radi TV	Service _ o _ -	Newsp News Magaz	ServiceF	hoto Service reelance ther
support governii concern underst present may resi accredii respons	activities, Ing public releing access to and that viola credentials tult in suspenstation. I ambilities in catment in	agree to ases of mithe operattion of the omilitary ion or can also aware ase of ill	over counternarcot abide by the rules litary information ional area. I e rules or failure police upon requecellation of my of my financial ness or injury that ernment medical	and to st
support governi concern underst present may resi accredi respons require	activities, Ing public releing access to and that viola credentials tult in suspenstation. I ambilities in catment in	agree to ases of mithe operattion of the omilitary ion or can also aware ase of ill	abide by the rules litary information ional area. I e rules or failure police upon requescellation of my of my financial ness or injury that	and to st

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AIRPOR	TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) T BRIEFING CHECKLIST FOR POOL (U)
	Collect pool members at operations center. Make sure all have arrived. Provide beverages and make comfortable.
	Check passports and collect personal data for master list.
	Welcome address. Introduce escorts. Emphasize importance of secrecy, that they will be briefed on operation on a as-we-go basis, and that yo can't tell them about it now. They will need to read some paperwork and fill some forms out. Left-hand (loose) side is info and will be returned to DOD, right-hand (stapled) side are copies of information on which their bureau chiefs were briefed and the ground rules for the operation.
	Have them read ground rules and briefing materials. If there are any questions, tell them the rules are hard and fast. If anyone objects to going, they may decline, but must not tell anyone else in order to protect the security and safety of the operation, troops and the pool. Record objections and advise OASD-PA/Bureau Chiefs if anyone refuses.
	Explain purpose and have them complete an hold-harmless agreement, with NOK data. DOD retains.
	Explain purpose and have them complete an accreditation application. When complete, issue badge and record badge number on application. DOD retains application. Warn them to keep the badge safe at all times. They will be told to put it on when appropriate (in actual area of operations).
<u> </u>	Check shot records to insure each is current.
-	Issue invitational travel orders (ITOs). They must keep these for identification at all times.
	Conduct safety briefing. Tell them they will be permitted to film in flight, provided conditions are VFR and that their equipment does not interfere with aircraft instruments.
	Equipment issue.

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	Make Wait	them comfortable, for aircraft.	inform	OASD-PA if	any	unusual	situations	arise.
	Load	into aircraft and	depart.	· ·		,		

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TAB F TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) MEDIA POOL QUESTIONNAIRE (U)

PERSONAL INFORMATION:			
NAME:	DAT	TE:	
ORGANIZATION:	•		
•	DATÉ OF BI	RTH:	
PASSPORT PLACE/COUNTRY OF ISSUE:			
PP DATE OF ISSUE:	CURRENT?	YES	NO
MEDICAL INFORMATION:			
SHOTS: **REQUIRED** MUST BE DOCUMENTED ON PUB.	HEALTH SVC	. FORM #7	31.
YELLOW FEVER (10 YRS) MUST BE DALL AFTER:		YES	NO
CHOLERA (6 MO) MUST BE DATED AFTER:	_	YES	NO
TYPHOID (2 YRS) MUST BE DATED AFTER:	_	YES	NO
SHOTS: **RECOMMENDED** (CHECK IF YOU HAVE)			
DIPTHERIA SMALL POX TETANUS	GAMMA GL	OBUL IN	-
OTHER MEDICAL INFORMATION: AMPLE SUPPLY OF NEEDED MEDICINE? ANY SPECIAL MEDICAL CONDITION/PROBLEMS? PROFESSIONAL EQUIPMENT:		IN I	KEMAKKS)
IS EQUIPMENT ADEQUATE? IS EQUIPMENT SUITABLE FOR OPERATIONAL CLIMATE/CONG IS EQUIPMENT AS AGREED UPON WITH BUREAU CHIEFS?	OITIONS?	YES YES	NO NO
PERSONAL EQUIPMENT: (CHECK IF ON-HAND/SUITABLE. IF		•	
TOILET ARTICLES WALKING SHOES SLEEPI ARE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTABLE BY ONE PEREMARKS:	ING BAG RSON?	YES	NO

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TAB G TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) WAIVER OF LIABILITY FOR TRAVEL IN GOVERNMENT CONVEYANCE (U)

WHEREBY, I	am about to
embark as a passenger i	in certain Department of Defense and/or
	conveyances, and whereas I am doing so
	nitiative, risk and responsibility;
now, therefore in consi	ideration of the permission extended to
me by the United States	, through its officers and agents to
travel by said conveyan	nce; I do hereby for myself, my heirs,
executors, and administ	rators, remiss, release and forever
discharge the Governmen	nt of the United States and all its
officers, agents and em	ploy, acting officially or otherwise,
from any and all claims	, demands, actions or causes of
action, on account of m	y death or on account of any injury to
me or my property which	may occur from any cause during said
transportation, as well	as all ground, flight or sea
operations incident the	reto.
	<u> </u>
	(Signature)
	(Witness)
•	of person to be notified in an emergency:
	Phone:
s:	
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TAB H TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) OPSEC GUIDANCE FOR DOD MEDIA POOL (U)

D 0:

Upon receiving a call that activates the DOD pool, have prepared in advance what you are to tell your family, friends and co-workers about your absence.

Drive yourself, take a taxi or use another transportation system to get to assembly point without getting anyone else involved with your departure.

Have your equipment, clothing and other material needed for the deployment, ready to go; but not in a place that would raise questions.

Have prearrangements made that will allow you to disappear with no significant disturbance in your work, neighborhood and family.

Think hard about things you do or say that might be out of the ordinary or give indications/signals that you are doing something unusual. Could a good investigative reporter determine something unusual was going on?

Keep the fact you have been called away on the pool secret. Lives depend on your ability to do this.

Follow the ground rules and instructions given you by your PAO escort.

DON'T:

Let your co-workers know you are in the DOD media pool.

Let the equipment you take with you give away that something "big" is going on.

Have a friend drive you to the assembly area.

Call home until allowed to do so by PAO escort.

Use the telephone to notify your headquarters that the pool has been called away.

Be concerned if the story of your deployment is released in Washington, D.C. because it normally will be done that way. Remember your pool report will be the first on-scene report with information about the planning phase.

Let the clothes you pack signal where you are going. Have both warm and cold environment clothing in a location where they won't be missed.

Inadvertently disclose information concerning call-up, destination, etc.

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TAB J TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) USSOUTHCOM CHECKLIST FOR DOD MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS (U)

<u>ACTIONS</u>	RESPONSIBLE AGENCY
1. (U) Receipt of LIMDIS Warning Order/Message Addressees and formats and transmission to OSC.	DOD, SCPA
2. (U) Establish and test communications between USSOUTHCO OSC and DOD by voice (commercial and military) and message. Establish feasibility and/or procedures for collect calls. Consider and use facsimile machines if feasible.	DM, SCPA, SCJ6 OSC, DOD
3. (U) Establish Press Center for Pool: a. 4-5 typewriters (preferably electric to be tested in advance), paper, pencils. v. Electrical outlets and extension cords to be tested in advance.	OSC
c. 4-5 tables, chairs for tables and for briefing area. d. Access to telephone, message center facsimile machine and transportation facilities. e. Secure facility for equipment. f. Access to food, beverages (MREs are acceptable). g. Access to rest area (cots, blanket, etc).	•
4. (U) Arrange intra-theater transportation for pool members with backup. Time and recon routes. Plan for communications during transport and appropriate security/escort.	ers OSC
5. (U) Coordinate for briefings, briefers and associated equipment (map, charts, etc).	OSC
6. (U) Coordinate for security of pool equipment.	OSC
7. (U) Determine and arrange means for transmission of pool A/V products.	OSC
8. (U) Coordinate for customs and immigration and entry and exit procedures if required.	OSC
9. (U) Coordinate with debark/embark location officials for entry/exit and pickup and delivery of pool members.	OSC

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ACTIONS RESPONSIBLE AGENCY (U) Evaluate likelihood and/or implications of host 080 . Get. try international or U.S. media or representatives based in country. Coordinate with USIS. 11. (U) Consider in-country media representatives for OSC handoff of A/V products. If used, coordinate for identification of those personnel, access to facilities and possible translator requirements. Arrange transportation if necessary. 12. (U) Arrange deployment of USSOUTHCOM public affairs **SCPA** representative. 13. (U) Coordinate for message typing, location personnel, OSC equipment. 14. (U) Arrange for foreign currency transactions OSC and change. 15. (U) Determine local ground rules and arrange for distri-OSC bution to pool on arrival or in advance by DOD; e.g., photography restrictions on flight lines, etc. 16. (U) Consider safety, OPSEC, A/V considerations (e.g., OSC sunlight) for pool requirements. 17. (U) Consider and arrange if necessary billeting for OSC pool members and food service arrangements.

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ANNEX G TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. SECDEF Memorandum, -18 Sep 89, "Elevation of the Mission Priority of Counternarcotics Operations." (NOTAL)
 - b. DOD Guidance for the Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, 18 Sep 89. (NOTAL)
 - c. (e) CJCS MSG, DTG 192340Z Sep 89, Subject: Planning Order--USCINCSO Enhanced Operations.
 - d. DJS 081112Z Sep 89. (NOTAL)
 - e. JCS 080054Z Dec 88 (Chain of Command). (NOTAL)

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) General

- (1) (S/NF) The supply of illicit drugs to the United States (U.S.) from abroad, the associated violence and inter-national instability, and the use of illegal drugs with the U.S. pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the U.S. The threat of illicit drugs strikes at the heart of the Nation's values.
- (2) (S/NF) One of the principal foreign policy objectives of the U.S. is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the U.S.
- (3) (S/NF) An effective attack on the flow of illegal drugs depends upon action at every phase of the flow; in source countries, in transit, and during distribution.
- b. (U) International and Civil Affairs (CA) Agreements

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- (1) (S/NF) International Agreements. At the present time, no bilateral agreements exist between the United States Government (USG) and COLOMBIA, BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, or PERU (collectively referred to as the Andean Ridge, or HN countries) which specifically cover U.S. counternarcotics efforts as envisioned in this CONPLAN.
- (2) (5/NF) Civil Affairs Agreements. No Civil Affairs Agreements presently exist between or among the USG and the HN governments. Therefore, no explicit authority exists for the conduct of CA counternarcotics operations in any of the HN countries affected by this CONPLAN.
- c. (U) <u>Purpose of this Annex</u>. The CA Annex provides information and guidance:
 - (1) (S/NF) On CA organization, concepts, and operations for U.S. Armed Forces executing counternarcotics operations.
 - (2) (S/NF) For the conduct of all relationships between the U.S. Armed Forces and the HN civil authorities and local populace in the area of operations (AO).
 - (3) (S/NF) For the conduct of all relationships between the U.S. Armed Forces and USG agencies conducting counternarcotics operations within the HN countries.
 - (4) (5/NF) For the conduct of all relationships with U.S. and International Humanitarian Relief Organizations which may be associated with counternarcotics operations.
- d. (U) Enemy. Annex B, Intelligence.
 - (1) (S/NF) For the purposes of this CONPLAN, the AOR is divisible into three (3) interdependent sportiness: The Circumcarribbean, the Andean Ridge, and the Southern Cone. The Andean Ridge [COLOMBIA, PERU, BOLIVIA, and ECUADOR] both possesses and faces the greatest threats in the counternarcotics effort.
 - 2) (U) Drug cartels in the Andean Ridge area have, in recent years, crippled the economies of the affected nations by:
 - (a) (U) Contributing to the drug-producing nation's annual inflation rate and a significant percentage to the growth of its money supply.

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- (b) (U) Jeopardizing the drug-producing nation's financial institutions and rendering precarious all forms of economic planning.
- (c) (U) Diverting large sums of the drug-producing nation's governmental funds, which are needed elsewhere, to suppress growing and trafficking.
- (d) (U) Contributing substantially to the drug-producing nation's becoming a food importing country through the conversion of crop lands and rural laborers to drug production rather than that of staples.
- (e) (U) Shrinking the pool of money available for legitimate lending and raising credit rates to the point that borrowers turn to extra-legal sources, including drug traffickers, to secure financing.
- (f) (U) Contributing to increased tax evasion among populations which may be noted for not paying taxes.
- (g) (U) Penetrating or gaining control of legitimate private businesses and corporations.
- (h) (t, Becoming the largest source of dollars in underground economies and adding unquantifiable millions to the affected nation's foreign exchange surplus.
- (i) (U) Grossly inflating the value of farm land, property, foods, services, and even art works in trafficking areas.
- (3) (U) Drug cartels operating in the affected countries have used their financial gains from illicit drug trafficking to influence, and in many cases corrupt, important segments of indigenous societies.

e. (U) Friendly

- (1) (S/NF) National Security Directive (NSD) 18 directed the Secretaries of State, Justice, and Defense to prepare detailed military and law enforcement programs in support of the "United States International Drug Control Policy and Strategies." NSD 18 also directed a revision of Department of Defense (DOD) policy to expand DOD support to U.S. counternarcotics efforts and permit DOD personnel to conduct training and operational support anywhere in the Andean subregion.
- (2) <u>(S/NF)</u> DOD Support to Department of State (DOS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will provide the DOS with an Operations Team (OPS TEAM) for each Country Team. The function of these teams is to coordinate and integrate all DOD in-country support. The OPS TEAM will support the

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Ambassador but work as an integral part of the U.S. Military Group/Security Assistance Organization (USMILGP/SAO).

- (3) (S/NF) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Coordination of operations with current intelligence will be another important aspect of the strategy. DIA will build the architecture for a Washington-based theater fusion center. In CA operations, integration of DIA capabilities should be taken into consideration.
- (4) (S/NF) Defense Communications Agency (DCA). A Joint Office of the National Communications System (NCS) and Defense Communications Agency (DCA) have been established to ensure coordination and integration of telecommunications networks and assets in support of the national counternarcotics strategy and Command, Communications, Control, and Intelligence (C3I) requirements.
- (5) (S/NF) Host Nation Support to U.S. International Drug Control Policy and Strategies.
 - (a) (U) COLOMBIA. To Be Determined.
 - (b) (U) BOLIVIA. To Be Determined.
 - (c) (U) ECUADOR. To Be Determined.
 - (d) (U) PERU. To Be Determined.

f. (U) Assumptions

- (1) (S/NF) The USG will conduct a protracted effort over a substantial period of time to sustain U.S. Armed Forces counternarcotics efforts in the Andean Ridge countries.
- (2) (S/NF) Appropriate multilateral and bilateral international agreements among and between the USG and affected Latin American (LATAM) nations will be consummated to permit the employment of U.S. Armed Forces in the Andean Ridge countries with terms consistent with the missions, tasks, and responsibilities explicit and implicit in this CONPLAN.
- 3) (S/NF) Appropriate multilateral and bilateral Civil Affairs
 Agreements affecting the relationships between military forces and civil authorities and populations will be consummated among and between the USG and selected LATAM nations containing terms and conditions consistent with the missions, tasks and responsibilities assigned to Civil Affairs Forces (CASF) and Civil Affairs supporting Forces (CASF) by this CONPLAN.

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- (4) (S/NF) DOD and the Military Services will obtain and allocate sufficient CAF and CASF to support this CONPLAN.
- 2. (S/NF) MISSION. When directed by National Command Authority (NCA) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO), Civil Affairs Forces (CAF) and Civil Affairs Supporting Forces (CASF), in conjunction with cooperating Host Nations (HN), International Humanitarian Relief Organizations (IHRO), and other USG agencies, conduct Civil Affairs Politico-Military Operations to support the national drug control strategy by: assessing the Civil Affairs environmental factors in each affected country; assessing the apportioned and assigned Civil Affairs unit capabilities to conduct and support counternarcotics operations in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR); coordinating Civil Affairs nation-building programs into the national drug control strategy; providing Civil Affairs support to U.S. Armed Forces introduced into the USSOUTHCOM AOR; and by training HN Armed Forces in Civil Affairs doctrine, organization, responsibilities, missions, operations, and programs.

3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (S/NF) Concept of Operation. Civil Affairs Forces and Ci il Affairs Supporting Forces will support the national drug control strat y in two phases, operating to concurrently attack illicit drug trafficking at its source, while it is in transit, and in the United States. These forces will be simultaneously employed to assist in infrastructure development and nation building efforts at the national and subnational levels of government of the cooperating LATAM nations; as Civil Affairs coordinating staffs in Unified and/or Combined Commands; as Civil Military Operations (CMO) staffs with U.S. Armed Forces deployed in LATAM; as trainers and advisers to Host Nation Armed Forces; and as liaison with U.S. Country Teams, Host Nation civil governments, USG agencies, and International Humanitarian Relief Organizations.
 - (1) (S/NF) Phase I. This phase consists of Civil Affairs Operations short of direct armed military action against drug cartels, their collaborators, and supporting insurgencies. Civil Affairs Operations will consist of:
 - (a) -(S/NF)-Assessing the DOD capability to provide Civil Affairs personnel and units trained and in sufficient quality and quantity to meet all Civil Affairs requirements.
 - (b) (S/NF) Assessing the Civil Affairs environmental factors in each affected country in order to form a basis for nation-building and infrastructure planning and development.

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- (c) (S/NF) Assisting cooperating countries to plan, implement, and evaluate nation-building programs.
- (d) (S/NF) Training and advising the Armed Forces of cooperating countries in Civil Affairs doctrine, organization, missions, operations, and programs; and assisting in the development and implementation of a Civil Affairs force structure and associated programs, to include formal Civil Affairs military training opportunities.
- (e) (S/NF) Plan and execute Civil Military Operations in support of U.S. Armed Forces deployed to LATAM.
- (f) (S/NF) Establish liaison with U.S. Country Teams, USG agencies, and International Humanitarian Relief Organizations to ensure unity of effort.
- (2) (S/NF) Phase II. This phase, consisting of Civil Affairs Operations supporting direct U.S. armed military action against drug cartels, their collaborators, and supporting insurgencies, will commence on order of the NCA and USCINCSO. The scope of Civil Affairs Operations will vary with the capabilities of the Host Nation government. Economic, social, and political situations will also be important factors affecting the scope of Civil Affairs Operations. These operations will include:
 - (a) (U) Prevention of civilian interference with military operations.
 - (b) (U) Support of Host Nation governmental functions.
 - (c) (U) Community relations.
 - (d) (U) Military civic action.
 - (e) (U) Civil defense.

b. (S/NF) Specific Taskings

- (1) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USCINCSOC).
 - (a) (S/NF) Provide trained Special Operations Forces (SOF), including Civil Affairs personnel and units, to support Civil Affairs Operations.
 - (b) {S/NF) Plan and coordinate the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of SOF, including Civil Affairs personnel and units in theater to support Civil Affairs Operations.

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(2) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FORCES COMMAND (CINCFOR).

- (a) (S/NF) Provide trained General Purpose Forces (GPF), including U.S. Army Military Police, Engineer, and Medical units, to support Civil Affairs Operations.
- (b) (S/NF) Plan and coordinate the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of GPF in theater to support Civil Affairs Operations.

(3) (U) COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH (COMUSARSO).

- (a) (S/NF)—Plan and coordinate the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. Army CAPSTONE-aligned Civil Affairs personnel and units in theater to support—Civil Affairs operations.
- (b) (S/NF) Plan and coordinate the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of USARSO assigned Military Police, Engineer, and Medical units to support Civil Affairs Operations in theater.
- (4) (S/NF) COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN AIR FORCE (COMSOUTHAF). Be prepared to support Civil Military Operations with military airlift as directed.
- (5) (S/NF) COMMANLIR, US NAVAL FORCES SOUTH (COMUSNAVSO). Be prepared to support Civil Military Operations with military sealift as directed.

(6) (S/NE) COMMANDER, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND SOUTH (COMSOCSO)

- (a) (S/NF) Plan and coordinate the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of all Special Operations Forces (SOF), less Civil Affairs Forces, in support of Civil Affairs Operations.
- (b) (S/NF) Plan and coordinate funding for all Military Civic Action (MCA) projects sponsored or conducted by SOF, less CAF, in theater.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (S/NF) Commander's Intent. In developing counternarcotics strategy and plans, be mindful that we will support the Host Nation's and Ambassador's close-in battle in their attack on regional and subregional key nodes of the drug trafficking industry. Additionally, we also have a deep battle which will involve alliance-building, not only in the Andean Ridge subregion but throughout our theater. Our security and non-security assistance initiatives, especially in the Civil Affairs arena, must link to an additional political-military objective of shared US/LATAM participation in this effort. This shared vision of a drug-free

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region, supported by total unity of effort and synchronized to have maximum effect against the drug cartels, their collaborators, and their supporting insurgencies, promotes open societies which serve U.S. national security interests. For this reason, use of combat forces in a direct role will be avoided or recommended only as a last resort.

- (2) (S/NF) During Phase I Civil Affairs operations, the Security Assistance Organization (SAO) in place in each cooperating country will initially coordinate the in-country aspects of Civil Affairs operations pursuant to guidance from HQ USSOUTHCOM.
- 4. (U) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION. Annex D.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Annex K and J.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, USA Director, J3

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ANNEX H TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. AFR 60-16, General Flight Rules, 10 Dec 85.
 - b. AFM 105-4/FM 34-81, Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations, 31 Aug 84.
 - c. TACR 105-1, Weather Support—for TAC/TAC-Gained Aircraft Operations, 25 Jul 88.
 - d. MACR 105-1, MAC Weather Support, 20 Jul 88.
 - e. SACR 105-1, Weather Support Procedures, 24 Dec 85.
 - f. AWSR 55-2, AWS Tactical Weather Support, 26 May 89.
 - g. AWSR 105-18, The AWS Support System, 1 Dec 86.
 - h. USSOUTHCOM Weather Support Plan, 1 Aug 89.
 - i. JCS MOP 50, Control of Unclassified Meteorological (METCON) Oceanographic and Ice Information, 20 Jul 87.
 - j. Naval Oceanographic Command (NAVOCEANCOM) Instruction 3140-H, U.S. Navy Meteorological and Oceanography Manual, 1 Feb 86.
 - k. 5WW OPORD 04-88, USSOUTHCOM Weather Support Plan, 1 May 1988.

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) <u>Purpose</u>. This Annex outlines the concept of weather support for the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) forces when exercising this CONPLAN.
- b. (U) Concept of Environmental Support. Military Airlift Command (MAC),

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through Air Weather Service (AWS), will provide a Weather Support Force (WSF) established at the HOWARD AIR FORCE BASE, PANAMA (PM) weather station as prescribed in reference h to support USCINCSO forces, as required. Centralized weather support will be provided by the USSOUTHCOM Forecast Unit (SFU) at QUARRY HEIGHTS, PM and will be supplemented by Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) in accordance with (IAW) references g and k. The QUARRY HEIGHTS SFU will act as the Tactical Forecast Unit (TFU) and the Base Weather Station (BWS) at HOWARD AFB, PM will serve as the alternate. The Commander, Detachment 25, 5th Weather Wing (Det 25, 5 WW), HOWARD AFB, PM will serve as the Officer-in-Charge of weather support and will arrange for weather support for all forces tasked under this CONPLAN.

c. (U) Assumptions

- (1) (2) Indigenous weather facilities may not be available for the use of US Forces.
- (2) (U) In-place base communications services will be available at the Base Weather Station (BWS) at HOWARD AFB and QUARRY HEIGHTS during the implementation phases of this CONPLAN.
- (3) (U) Satellite imagery will be available.
- d. (C) <u>Constraint</u>. In the event of a global conflict, AWS ability to fill manning support requirements will be limited by the availability of qualified weather personnel.

e. (U) Responsibilities

- (1) (U) <u>NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHY COMMAND</u>. Provides meteorological support to US Naval Forces deployed in support of this CONPLAN and Oceanographic support to all forces deployed in support of this CONPLAN.
- (2) (U) <u>AFGWC and US AIR FORCE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS</u>
 <u>CENTER (USAFETAC)</u>. Provide specialized weather support requested by Det 25, 5 WW IAW reference g.

(3) (U) AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND

- (a) (U) Provides weather satellite imagery from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) direct readout facility to the HOWARD AFB Weather Station and the SFU.
- (b) (U) Provides weather communications and equipment maintenance support.

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- (4) (U) Weather reconnaissance will be provided in theater by USAF counternarcotics units assigned in support of this CONPLAN.
- (5) (U) <u>US ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS COMMAND (USAISC)</u>. Provides weather communications equipment, circuitry and maintenance support from, and between, DCS point-of-entry to the HOWARD BWS and the SFU at QUARRY HEIGHTS.
- 2. (U) <u>SITUATION</u>. The area of expected operations covers lowlands, dense jungles, tropical rain forests, lakes and coastal areas. Heavy precipitation and flash flooding often occur during rainy season. Grass fires and jungle burning occur throughout the area of operations during dry season. Units operating in coastal areas on the PACIFIC side of the continent must consider the effect of large ocean tides on their activities. PACIFIC tidal range is often in excess of 14 feet from low to high tide.
 - a. (U) Climate. See Appendix 1 to this annex.
 - b. (c) Facilities. The availability of facilities will be evaluated based on conditions existing at the time of implementation of this CONPLAN. Fixed meteorological equipment and services may or may not be available during the implementation of the CONPLAN, spending on the location of operations. In the event fixed weather facilities are available, types of weather equipment and services available vary widely from one location to another in the Andean Ridge area.

3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) Concept of Operations
 - (1) (U) Support of this CONPLAN will be carried out with the services available at the Howard Base Weather Station and the forecast unit at Quarry Heights, PM.
 - (2) (U) Employment
 - (a) (U) Weather support will be accomplished using existing facilities and in-place personnel.
 - (b) (U) Staff Weather Officers (SWOs) will provide support to forces involved in the execution of this CONPLAN as required.
 - (c) (U) Weather support for operations and counternarcotics activities will be IAW references a, b, c, f and k.

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(d) (U) The SFU will provide planning and specific mission forecasts as required. The BWS will serve as a backup Tactical Forecast Unit (TFU) if required.

b. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities

- (1) (U) <u>AFGWC</u>. Provides forecast support to counternarcotics and tanker aircraft deploying from and redeploying to CONUS IAW references c, d and e as required.
- (2) (U) 5 WW, 3 WW, and 7 WW. Provide support to deploying and redeploying aircraft IAW references c, d and e.
- (3) (U) $\underline{\text{USAFETAC}}$. Provides climatological products and unique weather support products through Det 25, 5 WW for use in counternarcotics operations.

(4) (U) COMMANDER DETACHMENT 25, 5TH WEATHER WING

- (a) (C) Provides or arranges environmental support to the Counternarcotics Task Force (CNTF) through the USSOUTHCOM Forecast Unit.
- (b) (e) Ensures the SFU at QUARRY HEIGHTS, PM provides environmental support to USCINCSO and staff.
- (c) (C) Ensures the BWS personnel at HOWARD AFB, PM provide environmental support to the Air Force component.
- (d) (U) Supervises all weather support activities in USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.
- (e) (U) Coordinates the employment of weather forces supporting this CONPLAN.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

- (1) (U) The OICWSF is responsible for the coordination of all WSF support requirements and interservice support procedures.
- (2) (U) AFGWC, 3 WW, and 7 WW support requirements will be coordinated through representatives of Det 25, 5WW at HOWARD AFB, PM, or the USSOUTHCOM Forecast Unit at QUARRY HEIGHTS, PM
- (3) (U) Direct coordination is authorized between the Howard Base Weather Station, the SFU and supported units.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

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a. (U) Det 25, 5WW provides administrative and logistics support to the Howard Base Weather Station and the SFU at Quarry Heights.
b. (U) Communications support equipment used in the support of this plan will be in-place, fixed equipment located at the BWS at HOWARD AFB, PM and at the SFU at QUARRY HEIGHTS, PM.

5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL

- a. (U) Command, technical and administrative control of all WSF personnel will be exercised by the Commander, Det 25, 5 WW.
- b. (U) AFCC will maintain weather communications equipment.
- c. (U) Common user and/or command and control communications, to include WWMCCS, will be used during periods of weather communications outage.
- d. (C) Control of meteorological (METCON) information will only be implemented if directed by USCINCSO or higher authority IAW reference i. I implemented, secure messages, secure voice or messengers will distribute weather data. Latin American countries may also restrict the flow of weather data which would have an adverse impact on weather support to US Forces.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

APPENDIX: Country Climatology

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, USA Director, J3

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COUNTRY CLIMATOLOGY (U)

(U) <u>GENERAL</u>. This appendix provides general climatology discussions for countries in South America. Any specific climatology support can be requested through the supporting staff weather officer. The source for this climatology is the US Air Force Technical Applications Center, Scott AFB, IL.

TABS:

A--Country Climatology for BOLIVIA B--Country Climatology for COLOMBIA

C--Country Climatology for ECUADOR

D--Country Climatology for PERU

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COUNTRY CLIMATOLOGY FOR BOLIVIA (U)

DECEMBER - FEBRUARY

- 1. (U) GENERAL. Summer is wet and cloudy in BOLIVIA. The exception is the southwest plateau where the least cloud cover and precipitation occur. The lowlands are hot and humid and the temperatures are frequently above 90 degrees. The highlands are cooler and less humid with high temperatures averaging 60-70F and low temperatures 25-45. Monthly precipitation amounts average 2-8 inches in the highlands and 6-11 inches in the lowlands. EL CAFETAL receives as much as 56 inches in February. Snowfall is confined to the highlands above 14,000 feet. Thunderstorm frequency increases during the summer, particularly over the northern highlands where hail frequently accompanies the thunderstorms. The mean number of thunderstorm days per month ranges from 13 in the northern highlands to 6 in the northern lowlands. Visibility is generally good, except that heavy rain showers and morning fog reduce visibility and low-hanging clouds obscure the higher terrain. The greatest incidence of fog occurs in the northern highlands, an average of 3-6 days, and in the northern lowlands, 2-4 days. Surface winds are light, except for afternoon gusts in the central foothills of the lowlands and in the northeast-southwest highlands.
- 2. (U) <u>FLYING WEATHER</u>. Most favorable in the southwest plateau region; least favorable in the central to northern regions due to morning fog and heavy afternoon rain showers. In the highlands, ceilings/visibilities less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles occur 10-20 percent of the time; 1500/3, 2-15 percent of the time. In the lowlands, ceilings/visibilities less than 5000/6 occur 45-65 percent of the time; 1500/3, 10-20 percent. Over higher terrain, high-level clear-air turbulence can be severe.
- 3. (U) <u>RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER</u>. Poor during the summer. The exception is the southwest plateau where, during the morning in December, fair to good weather occurs, an average of 19 days. All locations have a greater incidence of cloud cover during the afternoon. Sky cover equal to or less than 2/8 and visibility equal to or greater than 3 miles ranges from 5-10 days.
- 4. (U) <u>TERMINAL WEATHER</u> LA PAZ, BOLIVIA. Cloudy skies, cool temperatures and occasional rainy periods. The greatest incidence of low ceilings and visibilities occurs during the morning. Fog occurs on the average of 5 days

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per month. The frequency of ceiling/visibility less than 300/l is 2 percent. Crosswinds greater than 15 knots occur 2-4 percent of the time; greater than 25 knots, l percent.

5. (U) EXPOSURE WEATHER. Cool with occasional rain showers in the plateau regions. Higher elevations (above 14,000 feet where the precipitation occurs as snow) are cold with perennial snow cover on the mountain peaks. From the foothills to the lowlands, the conditions are hot and humid, with frequent, heavy rain showers, sometimes causing flash flooding.

LA PAZ, BOLIVIA	DEC	JAN ·	<u>FEB</u>
TEMPERATURE (F) Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum	76 65 42 22	77 63 43 26	76 63 43 26
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	3.7	4.5	4.2
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS Precipitation Thunderstorms	6 2	7 2	7 2

6. (U) <u>PARADROP WEATHER</u>. Favorable 35-75 percent of the time. Most favorable areas are the southwest plateau regions in the morning. Least favorable are the northern highlands and lowlands due to morning fog, low ceilings and afternoon rain showers. Conditions are also unfavorable 10-35 percent of the time at all locations during the afternoon due to gusty winds.

	DEC	JAN	FEB
First Light	0531	0549	0606
Last Light	1925	1936	1928

MARCH - MAY

- 1. (U) GENERAL. Autumn is the transition season from the rainy summer to the dry winter. The climate undergoes a decrease in cloudiness and precipitation. In the highlands, mean precipitation amounts range from 1-4 inches during March to less than 1 inch in May. In the lowlands, averages range from 3-20 inches in March to 1-10 inches in May. Snowfall is confined to the higher elevations above 14,000 feet. The highlands are cool with high temperatures in the 60s and low 70s (F) and the lows in the 30s and low 40s. The lowlands are hot and humid with mean highs in the 80s and low 90s; lows range from the 60s to the 70s. In May temperatures at a few southern stations drop to the 50s. Thunderstorm frequency ranges from 1-5 days. The greatest incidence occurs over the northern highlands during March and April. Visibilities are good except during morning fog and rain showers Fog occurs in the northern lowlands on 10-13 days per month. Surface winds are usually less than 10 knots.
- 2. (U) <u>FLYING WEATHER</u>. Most favorable over the highlands, particularly during the morning in the southwestern plateau; least favorable in the northern lowlands due to morning fog and afternoon showers. In the highlands ceiling/visibility less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles occurs 10-20 percent of the time; 1500/3, 2-10 percent. In the lowlands, less than 5000/6 occurs 25-45 percent of the time; 1500/3, 5-15 percent. High-level clear-air turbulence can be severe, particularly over higher terrain.
- 3. (U) <u>RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER</u>. Good over the southwestern plateau. Poor during March to fair to good by May over the northern highlands. The lowlands have generally poor reconnaissance weather, except the southeast areas where fair conditions prevail during the morning. In the highlands, cloud cover equal to or less than 2/8 and visibility equal to or greater than 3 miles occurs on 10-20 days during March and increases to 15-25 days in May. In the lowlands favorable conditions occur on 3-9 days in March and 5-15 days in May.
- 4. (U) TERMINAL WEATHER. LA PAZ, BOLIVIA. Decrease in cloudiness and precipitation. The greatest incidence of low ceilings and visibilities occurs in March. The occurence of fog decreases from 6 days in March to 1 day in May. The frequency of ceilings/visibility less than 300/1 is 1 percent. The frequency of flight restrictive crosswinds is small, with crosswinds greater than 15 knots occurring only 2 percent of the time.
- 5. (U) <u>EXPOSURE WEATHER</u>. The highlands are generally dry with temperatures from cool at the plateau level to cold at higher elevations (above 15,000 feet where perennial snow covers mountain peaks). The lowlands are warm to hot and humid with occasional heavy rain showers

LA PAZ	MAR	APR	MAY
TEMPERATURE (F) Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum	76 64 42 27	75 65 50 24	72 64 37 14
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	2.6	1.3	0.3
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS Precipitation Thunderstorms	4 3	2 1	2 *

^{* =} less than 0.5 day

^{6. (}U) <u>PARADROP WEATHER</u>. Favorable 40-90 percent of the time. The northern lowlands are least favorable due to morning fog, low ceilings, and afternoon rain showers Paradrop can be affected by low air density over the high plateau, especially on warm, sunny days. Afternoon winds in excess of 13 knots produce unfavorable conditions 10-30 percent of the time in the foothills and higher elevations.

7. (U) <u>ASTRONOMICAL DATA</u> .	LA PAZ, BOLIVIA.	(Data as of the	e 15th, local
Standard time)			•

CIVIL TWILIGHT	MAR	APR	. •	MAY
First Light Last Light	0614 1909	0619 1846		0629 1832

JUNE-AUGUST

- 1. (U) GENERAL. Winter is the season of minimum cloudiness and precipitation. Partly cloudy skies prevail and showers are less frequent. The greatest incidence of cloud cover and precipitation occurs over the lowlands. In the highlands mean high temperatures vary from 60 to 70F; mean lows from 10 to 35. In the lowlands, daytime highs reach the 80s and 90s. Mean nighttime lows occasionally drop below 50 and, on rare occasions, drop below freezing in the extreme south. Mean precipitation amounts in the highlands are less than an inch and in the lowlands, range from less than an inch to 6 inches. Snowfall is confined to elevations above 14,000 feet. Visibility is good with the exception of morning fog and low-lying clouds over the slopes and ridges. The greatest incidence of fog occurs during June in the northern lowlands (14 days). Thunderstorms occurs on an average of 2-4 days per month. Surface winds are light except over higher terrain where speeds range from 10 to 15 knots during the afternoon.
- 2. (U) <u>FLYING WEATHER</u>. Most favorable over the highlands and southern lowlands; least favorable over the northern lowlands due to morning low cloudiness, fog, and afternoon rain showers. In the highlands, ceiling/visibility less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles occurs 5-15 percent of the time; less than 1500/3, 1-5 percent. In the lowlands, less than 5000/6 occur 25-50 percent of the time; 1500/3, 5-18 percent. High-level clear-air turbulence can be severe, particularly over higher terrain.
- 3. (U) <u>RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER</u>. Fair to good over the highlands, poor in the northern lowlands to good over the southern lowlands. The most favorable conditions occur over the southwestern plateau. The least favorable conditions occur over the northern lowlands where the greatest incidence of cloud cover occurs. In the highlands sky cover equal to or less than 2/8 and visibility equal to or greater than 3 miles occurs on 15-27 days. In the lowlands good weather occurs on 10-20 days.
- 4. (U) <u>TERMINAL WEATHER</u>. LA PAZ, BOLIVIA. Partly cloudy skies, mild to warm afternoons, cool to cold nights, and infrequent precipitation. Visibility is restricted due to morning fog on the average of 1-2 days. The frequency of ceiling/visibility less than 300/1 is 1 percent. Crosswinds greater than 15 knots occur 2-4 percent of the time; greater than 25 knots, less than 1 percent.
- 5. (U) <u>EXPOSURE WEATHER</u>. The highlands are mainly dry with mild days and cool to cold nights. The higher elevations, where perennial snow covers the highest peaks are cold. The tropical lowlands are warm to hot and humid with occasional rain showers, particularly in the northern regions.

LA PAZ	<u>Jun</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>
TEMPERATURE (F) Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum	70 62 34 12	71 62 33 5	72 63 35 9
MEAN PRECIPITATION	0.3	0.4	0.5
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS Precipitation Thunderstorms	. <u>1</u>	1 0	. 1

^{6. (}U) <u>PARADROP WEATHER</u>. Favorable 30-95 percent of the time. Low ceilings associated with afternoon rain showers make the lowlands the least favorable. Unfavorable conditions occur 10-40 percent of the time with winds in excess of 13 knots in the highlands and the foothills of the lowlands. Over the higher elevations low air densities can effect paradrops, particularly on warm and sunny days.

7. (U) <u>ASTRONOMICAL DATA</u>. LA PAZ, BOLIVIA. (Data as of 15th, local standard time)

CIVIL TWILIGHT	JUN	<u>Jul</u>	AUG
First Light	0635	0639	0629
Last Light	1831	1839	1846

SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER

1. (U) GENERAL. The spring season is characterized by increasing cloudiness and precipitation as the rainy summer months approach. The lowlands average 15 percent more cloud cover than the highlands. In the highlands, mean precipitation amounts gradually increase from 1 inch during September to nearly 6 inches in November. In the lowland areas, averages of 3 inches increase to 8 inches by November with a maximum of 29 inches in November at EL CAFETAL. Temperatures are controlled by elevation. Mean high temperatures are in the 90s in the lowlands to the 60s at higher elevations. Mean lows from the foothills to higher elevations (above 15,000 feet) range from the high 60s to the below zero. Visibility is generally good except restrictions do occur with

morning fog, low hanging clouds over high terrain, and heavy showers. The latter is particularly a problem in the lowlands in the afternoon hours. The greatest incidence of fog occurs during September at northern lowland localities (9 days) and in the western highlands (4 days). Surface winds are light with the highest speeds in the afternoon. Gale force winds are uncommon except with thunderstorms.

- 2. (U) FLYING WEATHER. The most favorable flying weather occurs in the southwestern highlands; the next most favorable weather is in the central to northern areas where maximum cloudiness and/or fog occurs during the morning. The least favorable flying weather occurs in the northern lowlands where morning fog and afternoon showers prevail. The entire country has a greater incidence of cloudiness in November than during the other months as the spring season ends. In the highlands the ceiling/visibility equal to or less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles occurs 10-15 percent of the time; 1500/3, 1-6 percent. In the lowlands conditions less than 5000/6 occur 35-60 percent of the time; 1500/3, 5-15 percent. Thunderstorms, accompanied by hail usually occur over the higher elevations with the highest occurence in the northern regions of the highlands and the lowlands. Over the higher terrain severe, high-level, clear-air turbulence is a hazard.
- 3. (U) <u>RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER</u>. Good over the southwestern plateau; fair to good in the northern highlands but becomes poor during November; generally poor in the lowlands. All locales have a higher incidence of cloud cover during the afternoon. In the highlands sky cover equal to or less than 2/8 and visibility equal to or greater than 3 miles occur on 10-25 days during September. The occurrences decrease to 5-20 days in November. The occurrences in the lowlands range from 5-15 days in September to 3-10 days in November.
- 4. (U) TERMINAL WEATHER. LA PAZ, BOLIVIA. Partly cloudy to overcast skies, cool temperatures, and occasional periods of precipitation. The greatest incidences of low clouds and precipitation occur in November. Visibility restrictions occur with morning fog which develops on an average of 4 days per month. The frequency of ceiling/visibility equal to or less than 300/l is 1 percent. Crosswinds greater than 15 knots occur 3-5% of the time; greater than 25 knots, 1 percent.
- 5. (U) EXPOSURE WEATHER. The lowlands are hot and humid with occasional periods of heavy showers. The highlands are mainly dry and cool at the plateau level and very cold at the higher elevations where perennial snow covers the highest mountain peaks.

LA PAZ	SEP	OCT	NOV
TEMPERATURE (F) Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum	80 64 38 18	76 66 40 16	77 67 42 23
MEAN PRECIPITATION	1.1	1.5	1.9
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS Precipitation Thunderstorms	3 2	<u>3</u>	4

^{* =} LESS THAN 0.5 day

7. (U) $\underline{\mathsf{ASTRONOMICAL\ DATA}}$. LA PAZ, BOLIVIA. (Data as of 15th, local standard time).

CIVIL TWILIGHT	<u>sep</u>	<u>OCT</u>	NOV
First Light	0607	0543	0528
Last Light	1849	1854	1907

^{6. (}U) <u>PARADROP WEATHER</u>. Favorable 35-85 percent of the time. The least favorable areas are in the lowlands due to morning fog, low ceilings and afternoon rain showers. Low air densities on the high plateau can affect paradrops, particularly during the afternoon on warm sunny days. Winds in excess of 13 knots produce unfavorable conditions 10-30% of the time.

HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) ANNUAL COUNTRY CLIMATOLOGY FOR COLOMBIA (U)

- 1. (U) GENERAL. The weather is cloudy with abundant precipitation year-round. the only exception is the Caribbean coast province of LA GUAJIRA, which is arid. The lowlands are hot and humid, but the mountains are cool. Mean cloudiness ranges from about 60 percent to nearly 100 percent. Mean daily maximum temperatures in the lowlands are in the upper 80s (F) to lower 90s; minimums are in the 70s. The mountains have maximums in the upper 60s and lower 70s and minimums in the 40s. Rainfall on the Pacific slopes of the ANDES is extremely heavy; annual amounts range between 250 and 400 inches. Mountain locations receive between 30 and 70 inches annually. Thunderstorms occur sporadically year-round with peak occurrence from August through October when the intertropical convergence zone traverses the country. Winds of 17 knots or greater occur less than 1 percent of the time; gale force winds are rare.
- 2. (U) <u>FLYING WEATHER</u>. Poor on the Pacific slopes of the ANDES and fair to poor over the remainder of COLOMBIA. The mountains are frequently cloud-enshrouded and visibility is low. Ceiling/visibility less than 5000 feet/6 miles occurs approximately 35-55 percent of the time; less than 1500 feet/3 miles, 10-20 percent; and less than 500/1, 5-12 percent. Ceilings tend to be lowest in the middle of the day. Thunderstorms may be numerous at times and the likelihood is high of aircraft icing above 15,000 feet.
- 3. (U) <u>RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER</u>. Very poor all year in COLOMBIA except for a brief winter dry season on the Caribbean coast.
- 4. (U) TERMINAL WEATHER. BOGOTA/ELDORADO International. Generally fair. Conditions are cloudy and foggy with frequent moderate rain. Thunderstorms are infrequent except during October and November. Conditions less than 300/1 occur about 3-5 percent of the time. During the early afternoon, runway crosswinds greater than 15 knots occur only 1-4 percent of the time.
- 5. (U) <u>EXPOSURE WEATHER</u>. The lowlands are cloudy, hot, and humid with frequent heavy rainfall. The mountains are cool, cloudy, and damp.

						t	
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA	<u> </u>	AN F	<u>FEB</u>	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
TEMPERATURE (F) Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum		77 69 45 29	77 69 46 23	77 69 47 36	76 68 49 34	76 68 49 39	74 67 48 40
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES	5) 2	.3 2	2.6	4.0	5.8	4.5	2.4
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS Precipitation Thunderstorms		9	12	13	21 5	20	17 1
TEMPERATURE (F)	<u>J</u>	UL E	<u>NUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	NOV	DEC
Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum		74 68 48 33	74 67 47 35	75 68 46 35	76 68 48 36	74 68 47 33	75 69 45 34
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES	5) 2	.0 2	2.2	2.4	6.3	4.7	2.6
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS Precipitation Thunderstorms		17 1	15	14	20 8	18 6	13 5
6. (U) <u>PARADROP WEATHER</u> . percent of the time.	Generally	good.	Condit	ions a	re favo	rable 7	0-95
7. (U) <u>ASTRONOMICAL DATA</u> .	BOGOTA.	(Data a	s of 1	5th, 1	ocal sta	andard	time)
CIVIL TWILIGHT	:	JAN	<u>FEB</u>	MAR	APR	MAY	<u>JUN</u>
First Light Last Light				0542 1829	0529 1824	0521 1825	0522 1831
		<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	NOV	DEC
First Light Last Light				0527 1817	0521 1804	0522 1800	0534 1810

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) ANNUAL COUNTRY CLIMATOLOGY FOR ECUADOR (U)

- 1. (U) <u>GENERAL</u>. ECUADOR has extensive cloudiness, warm temperatures, and contrasting rainfall. Mean cloudiness ranges from 75-100 percent. Windward exposures (northeast to southeast) in the ANDES Mountains are cloudy with heavy rain, while leeward locations are relatively cloudfree and semiarid. Mean daily temperatures range from minimums of 65-70F to maximums of 80-90F. Temperatures in the mountains frequently drop-below freezing. Rainfall is abundant throughout the year, although the southern coast is arid. Thunderstorms are relatively uncommon; however, they are locally numerous at a few locations.
- 2. (U) <u>FLYING WEATHER</u>. Poor. Ceiling/visibility less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles occurs 50-95 percent of the time; 1500/3 and 500/1 occur much less frequently except on the eastern slopes of the ANDES where cloud ceilings commonly touch the ground. Dense cloudiness, heavy rainfall and turbulence, especially over the mountains make conditions poor.
- 3. (U) <u>RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER</u>. Very Poor. Sky cover of 2/8 or less usually occurs less than 10 days per month and frequently less than 5 days per month.
- 4. (U) TERMINAL WEATHER. QUITO/MARISCAL SUCRE. Good. Conditions are usually cloudy but low ceilings are uncommon. Rain showers and thunderstorms are frequent except during July and August. Ceiling/visibility less the 300/l is rare. Surface winds occasionally become gusty during the mid to late afternoon, especially during the less cloudy months of July and August.
- 5. (U) EXPOSURE WEATHER. Conditions are cloudy, warm and humid with frequent heavy rain in most lowland areas. Cloudy, cool and damp in the mountains.

QUITO	<u>Jan</u>	<u>FEB</u>	MAR	<u>APR</u>	MAY	JUN
TEMPERATURE (F) Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum	81	79	78	78	81	78
	70	• 69	69	69	69	70
	46	47	47	47	47	45
	32	34	34	38	35	35

*	<u>Jan</u>	<u>FEB</u>	MAR	APR	MAY	<u>Jun</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHE	S) 4.9	5.3	6.2	7.1	5.1	2.0
NUMBER OF DAYS OF Precipitation Thunderstorms	. 17	17	20	22 6	19 5	11 2
*	<u>Jul</u>	AUG	<u>SEP</u>	<u>oct</u>	NOV	DEC
TEMPERATURE (F)	•		-	•		
Absolute Maximum	. 79	82	83	86	81	81
Mean Maximum	70	72	72	71	70	70
Mean Minimum	44	. 44	45		46	46
Absolute Minimum	32	34	35	32	32	33
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHE	S) 0.7	0.9	3.2	5.2	4.4	4.2
NUMBER OF DAYS OF	·					
Precipitation	6	6	13	19	16	16
Thunderstorms	. 1	2	5	7	3	3

^{6. (}U) <u>PARADROP WEATHER</u>. Good at QUITO except for occasional gusty winds during mid afternoon. Conditions are suitable for paradrops 35-55 percent of the time during mid afternoon, and 70-95 percent at other hours.

7. (U) <u>ASTRONOMICAL DATA</u>. QUITO/MARISCAL SUCRE. (Data as of the 15th, Local Standard Time).

CIVIL TWILIGHT	JAN	<u>FEB</u>	MAR	APR	MAY	<u>Jun</u>
First Light	0557	0603	0559	0550	0545	0548
Last Light	1849	1853	1847	1838	1835	1840
	JUL	AUG	<u>SEP</u>	<u>0CT</u>	NOV	DEC
First Light	0554	0554	0545	0535	0533	0543
Last Light	1845	1843	1833	1824	1824	1836

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TAB D TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) ANNUAL COUNTRY CLIMATOLOGY FOR PERU (U)

- 1. (U) GENERAL. The ANDES Mountains cause a distinct contrast in climate, i.e., cloudy and very dry to the west, and hot, humid, and wet to the east. Mountainous areas are generally cloudy with moderate rainfall and temperatures governed by elevation. A coastal desert exists west of the ANDES with mean cloudiness ranging from 30-100 percent and little or no rain. Average maximum temperatures vary between 75-95F along the northern coastal section and 65-80 in the south. Mean daily minimums in these regions range from 45-60. A jungle climate prevails east of the ANDES with mean cloud cover of 50-100 percent and torrential rain. Low temperatures average in the upper 60s. Highs are in the upper 80s. Temperatures vary widely in the mountains and can approach -10 F at higher elevations. Thunderstorms are uncommon in PERU; however, they are locally numerous at a few mountain locations.
- 2. (U) <u>FLYING WEATHER</u>. Fair to good. Poor on the eastern slopes of the ANDES due to dense clouds and heavy rain. Ceiling/visibility less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles occurs 70-100 percent of the time along the coast during the winter (June-September) and 50-85 percent of the time elsewhere. Ceiling/visibility less than 1500/3 and 500/1 are common along the coast and occur as often as 50 percent of the time during the early morning in eastern jungles.
- 3. (U) <u>RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER</u>. Poor to fair. Fair to good in the southern mountains. Sky cover of 2/8 or less and visibility of 3 miles or greater occur up to 25 days per month in the southern mountains, but 15 days or less elsewhere. Less than 5 favorable reconnaissance days per month occur in the eastern jungles.
- 4. (U) TERMINAL WEATHER. LIMA/JORGE CHAVEZ. Fair. Low clouds are the rule. Ceilings less than 1500 feet occur up to 75 percent of the time; less than 300/1 is rare. Very light drizzle occurs frequently, but accumulations are insignificant. Thunderstorms almost never occur.
- ,5. (U) <u>EXPOSURE WEATHER</u>. Cloudy, warm and humid along the coast where rain is almost nonexistent. The mountains are partly to mostly cloudy with temperatures at night falling below freezing during all months. The slopes and lowlands east of the mountains are hot and humid with frequent heavy rain.

LIMA	<u>JAN</u>	' FEB	MAR	<u>APR</u>	MAY	JUN
TEMPERATURE (F) Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum	84 78 65 59	86 79 66 59	84 79 66 61	84 76 63 52	81 72 60 50	77 68 59 48
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	. *	* .	*	*	0.1	0.2
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH Precipitation Thunderstorms	2	1	1 0	1 0	7 0	16 0
TEMPERATURE (F)	JUL	AUG	SEP	<u>0CT</u>	NOV	DEC
Absolute Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Minimum Absolute Minimum	82 65 58 48	73 66 58 52	75 65 58 54	72 68 59 55	79 71 61 50	84 76 63 57
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	*	*
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH Precipitation Thunderstorms	16 0	17	16 0	9 0	5 0	3 0

NOTE: * = less than 0.5 day or 0.05 inch

6. (U) <u>PARADROP WEATHER</u>. Fair to poor at LIMA due to low cloud cover. Conditions are at their worst during the morning and during the winter (JUN-SEP). Conditions are favorable for paradrops only 20-25 percent of the time during the winter.

7. (U) ASTRONOMICAL DATA. LIMA. (Data as of the 15th, local standard time).

CIVIL TWILIGHT	<u>JAN</u>	FEB	MAR	<u>APR</u>	MAY	<u>Jun</u>
First Light	0532	0546	0551	0552	0555	0603
Last Light	1903	1859	1844	1825	1814	1814
	JUL	AUG	SEP	<u>0CT</u>	NOV	DEC
First Light	0607	0600	0542	0522	0511	0515
Last Light	1821	1826	1826	1827	1836	1852

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ANNEX J TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

REFERENCES: a. Basic Plan.

- b. JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Forces (UNAAF), Dec 86 with change 1.
- c. SECDEF Memorandum, 18 Sep 89, "Elevation of The Mission Priority of Counternarcotics Operations."
- d. DOD Guidance for the Implementation of the President's—National Drug Control Strategy, 18 Sep 89.
- e. CJCS MSG, DTG 192340Z Sept 89, Subject: Planning Order--USCINCSO Enhanced Operations.
- f. JCS 081112Z Sep 89.
- g. JCS 080054Z Dec 89 (Chain of Command)

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) Purpose. This annex establishes the relationships between:
 - (1) USCINCSO and:
 - (a) (U) National Command Authorities (NCA).
 - (b) (U) Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT).
 - (c) (U) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC).
 - (d) (U) Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC).
 - (e) (U) Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS).

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- (f) (U) Commander in Chief, Forces Command (CINCFOR).
- (g) (U) USSOUTHCOM Service Component Commanders.
- (h) (U) Commander, Counternarcotic Task Force (COMCNTF).
- (i) (U) Commander, Special Operations Command South (COMSOCSO).
- (j) (U) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
- (k) (U) U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).
- (1) (U) U.S. Customs Service.
- (m) (U) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
- (n) (U) Bureau of International Narcotic Matters (INM).
- (o) (U) Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).
- (p) (U) American Ambassador to Bolivia.
- (q) (U) American Ambassador to Colombia.
- (r) (U) American Ambassador to Peru.
- (s) (U) American Ambassador to Ecuador.
- (t) (U) Defense Logistics Agency
- (2) (U) Commander, Counternarcotics Task Force and the MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders within the Andean Ridge Countries.
- (3) (U) MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders and non-DOD Counternacotics Agencies within the Andean Ridge countries.

b. (U) Scope

- (1) (S/NF) The command relationships outlined in this annex apply to counternarcotic activities conducted in the USCINCSO's theater when in a supported role for detection and monitoring; when supporting other CINCs in detection and monitoring, and when supporting the host governments in Andean Ridge countries.
- (2) (S/NF) USCINCSO will coordinate detection and monitoring activities, and support to host nation counternarcotics operations conducted within his assigned area of responsibility (AOR), except as otherwise directed

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by the Secretary of Defense and CJCS. Supporting CINCs, component and MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders will prepare supporting plans and provide information in support of this CONPLAN.

2. (U) COMMAND LINES

a. (U) <u>USCINCSO Service Components</u>

- (1) LET Commander, U.S. Army South (COMUSARSO), with headquarters at Fort Clayton, PM provides support to USCINCSO as required.
- (2) (2) Commander, U.S. Southern Command Air Forces (COMUSSOUTHAF), with headquarters located at Bergstrom AFB, TX provides support to USCINCSO, as required. Upon direction of USCINCSO, COMUSSOUTHAF will assume the role of Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Air Space Control Authority as outlined in Basic Plan.
- (3) (C) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces South (COMUSNAVSO), located at Fort Amador, PM provides support to USCINCSO as required.

b. (S/NF) Other Subordinate Commands

- (1) _(S/NF) Commander, Counternarcotics Task Force. USCINCSO designates the Commander, Counternarcotics Task Force (COMCNTF) with delegated authority for all counternarcotics tasking purposes. COMCNTF will assume Operational Control (OPCON) of designated DOD forces tasked to support counternarcotics activities within the theater. Upon arrival in host nation, DOD counternarcotics forces will chop OPCON to respective MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders. COMCNTF has direct tasking authority to Andean Ridge MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders, theater components, and USSOUTHCOM staff on all counternarcotics matters. COMCNTF is delegated coordinating authority with all DOD and USG forces/agencies for counternarcotics purposes.
- (2) \(\sumsymbol{LS/NF} \) Commander, Special Operations Command South (COMSOCSO), exercises OPCON of all theater-assigned Army SOF. Assumes OPCON of CONUS SOF and CA/PSYOP Forces when forward deployed to USSOUTHCOM.
- (3) \(\{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma}\) MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders in the Andean Ridge countries are delegated OPCON of DOD forces within their respective countries in support of counternarcotics activities. MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders are delegated coordination authority with non-DOD counternarcotic agencies.
- c. (S/NF) Augmentation Forces. CONUS based forces deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR for counternarcotics activities will be assigned to USCINCSO and OPCON to COMCNTF. Special Operations forces will be OPCON to COMSOCSO

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until arrival in HN. Upon arrival in host nation, forces will chop OPCON to the MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders.

3. (U) SUPPORT AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS

a. (U) Supporting Military Forces

- (1) (U) USLANTCOM. USLANTCOM forces will remain OPCON to USCINCLANT, a except in the circumstances described below.
 - a) (U) USLANTCOM forces conducting detection and monitoring activities and operating from a LANTCOM base will remain OPCON to USCINCLANT.
 - (b) (S/NF) Air assets deployed to and operating from a USCINCSO base for five (5) days or longer will be transferred OPCON to USCINCSO. USCINCSO will have tasking authority of those LANTCOM air assets which remain OPCON to USCINCLANT but operate within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Operations involving LANTCOM Forces which do not meet the five (5) days rule are considered to be cross boundary operations.
 - (c) (U) Cross boundary operations will be closely coordinated between both CINCS.
 - (d) (S/NF) USLANTCOM will have tasking authority of USCINCSO Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN) assets during an on-going detection, monitoring, or interdiction operation.
 - (e) (U) Blue water surface and all subsurface forces will remain OPCON to USCINCLANT.
- (2) (U) USPACOM.' USPACOM forces will remain OPCON to USCINCPAC, except in the circumstances described below.
 - (a) (U) USPACOM forces conducting detection and monitoring activities and operating from a PACOM base will remain OPCON to USCINCPAC.
 - (b) (S/NF) Air assets deployed to and operating from a USCINCSO base for five (5) days or longer will transferred OPCON to USCINCSO. USCINCSO will have tasking authority of those PACOM air assets which remain OPCON to PACOM forces which do not meet the five (5) days rule are considered to be cross boundary operations.
 - (c) (U) Cross boundary air operations will be closely coordinated between CINCs.

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- (d) (U) Surface or subsurface cross boundary operations in the Eastern Pacific Ocean will be closely coordinated between USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT. USCINCSO will be kept informed of these operations.
- (e) (U) OPCON of surface and subsurface forces will be as agreed upon by USCINCPAC and USCINCLANT.
- (3) (U) USCINCTRANS. Airlift, sealift, or surface assets supporting intra or intertheater deployment, resupply, evacuation, and redeployment will remain under USCINCTRANS operational control, but will be fully responsive to USCINCSO.
- (4) (U) Forces Command. Forces deployed from FORSCOM in support of counternarcotics activities will be OPCON to COMCNTF upon arrival at POD within USCINCSO AOR. Once deployed to Andean Ridge countries forces will be chopped OPCON to respective MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders.
- (5) (U) U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Special Operations forces to conduct counternarcotics support activities will be OPCON to SOCSO upon arrival in theater. Once deployed to Andean Ridge countries forces will be chopped OPCON to respective MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders.

b. (U) Supporting Agencies

- (1) (U) U.S. Coast Guard. Basic Plan.
- (2) (S/NF) DEA. Deputy Chief of Mission for Counternarcotics (DCM-CN) will have tasking and coordinating authority in support of counternarcotics activities within the U.S. Ambassadors' Country Teams for each of the Andean Ridge countries.
- (3) (S/NF) INM. Deputy Chief of Mission for Counternarcotics (DCM-CN) will have tasking and coordinating authority in support of counternarcotics activities within the U.S. Ambassadors' Country-Teams for each of the Andean Ridge countries.
- (4) (S/NF) CIA. Deputy Chief of Mission for Counternarcotics (DCM-CN) will have tasking and coordinating authority in support of counternarcotics activities within the U.S. Ambassadors' Country-Teams for each of the Andean Ridge countries.
- (5) (U) Customs Service. Basic plan.
- (6) (U) Defense Logistic Agency (DLA). Basic plan.
- (7) (U) Defense Communications Agency (DCA). Basic plan.

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- (8) (U) Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). Basic plan.
- c. (U) Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies.
 - (1) (U) USCINCSO will coordinate policy guidance with the U. S. Ambassadors to Andean Ridge countries as required based upon NCA guidance, host nation needs, and counternarcotic support requirements.
 - (2) (U) This CONPLAN proposes that each Ambassador to the Andean Ridge countries designate a Deputy Chief of Mission for Counternarcotics (DCM-CN) with prearranged tasking authority to coordinate host nation support between DOD and non-DOD assets. The DCM-CN will coordinate directly with non-DOD agencies, and will coordinate with DOD assets (MTTs, DFTs) through the MILGROUP(SAO) Commanders of his respective country.

4. (U) RELATIONSHIPS WITH INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN COMMANDS AND ORGANIZATIONS

- a. (U) USCINCSO through the MILGROUP (SAO) Commanders will assist/advise cooperating host nations on counternarcotics matters and operational techniques and will be responsive to the host countries' needs as determined by the U.S. Ambassador to that country.
- b. (U) U.S. forces will not be placed under the operational command of commanders of forces from other nations.

5. (U) PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS

- a. (C) The NCA through the JCS, monitors, coordinates and controls counternarcotic support activities conducted under this plan. USCINCSO is the theater military commander.
- b. (S/NF) USCINCLANT and USCINCPAC, in coordination with USCINCSO, will plan for counternarcotic detection and monitoring activities regarding the Andean Ridge countries and narcotics trafficking routes to the United States. Interdiction activities will also be planned with law enforcement agencies (LEA) on routes within U.S. national air and sea space.
- c. (c) USCINCTRANS, USCINCLANT, USCINCSOC, USCINCPAC, CINCFOR, CINCNORAD, Department of the Air Force, and Department of Navy will plan for and coordinate deployment of forces in support of counternarcotics activities.

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d. (SNF) Defense agencies will plan to provide support in accordance with current directives. When authorized during emergencies, USCINCSO will assume OPCON of defense agency elements operating in the USSOUTHCOM theater.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Appendix:

1 - Command Relationships Diagram.

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, USA Director, J-3

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
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX J TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM (U)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS



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ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. Joint Army Navy Air Force Publications (JANAPs) and Allied Communications Publications (ACPs).
 - b. USSOUTHCOM Regulation 105-1, Radio Frequency Management, 2 April 1973.
 - c. DCA Circular 310-130-1, Submission of Telecommunications Service Requests, February 1986.
 - d. JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) No. 95, Electronic Warfare, 14 March 1983.
 - e. JCS MOP 167, JCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets, 8 January 1988.
 - f. AFR 55-3/AR 105-3/OPNAVINST 3430.18C/MCO 3430.3B, Reporting, Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference of Electromagnetic Systems, RCS: JCS-1066 (MIN), 31 July 1986.
 - g. JCS MOP 178, Military Satellite Communications Deliberate Planning, 4 September 1986.
 - h. USCINCSO Joint COMMO Plan, 1 June 1989.

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (S) Purpose. This annex contains general guidance for communications-electronics (C-E) systems in support of U.S. and Host Nation counternarcotics operations in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. The plan establishes C-E concepts, assigns responsibilities, and provides planning guidance for US Southern Command, service components and supporting commands.
 - b. (U) Situation
 - (1) (U) General. See Basic Plan.

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(2) (U) Enemy

- (a) (U) See Annex B.
- (b) 487 Paramilitary and narcotrafficer elements could disrupt friendly communications through sabotage, jamming and/or imitative deception.
- (c) (S/NF) Existing C-E systems are subject to interception and analysis by unfriendly elements. These groups can be expected to take full advantage of intercepted messages for communications intelligence (COMINT) and other intelligence gathering products.
- (d) (U) Communications may be affected by the following types of electronic warfare (EW):
 - 1 (U) Meaconing. A system of transmitting actual or simulated radio navigation signals for the purpose of confusing navigation.
 - 2 (U) Intrusion. The intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into transmission paths in any manner with the objective of deceiving the operators or causing confusion.
 - 3 (U) Jamming. The deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the objective of impairing the use of electronic devices, equipment or systems.
 - $\underline{4}$ (U) Interference. As used herein, the term interference denotes the type of interference which precludes effective use of a frequency as opposed to interference which is purely a source of annoyance.

(3) (U) Friendly

(a) (U) DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (DCA)

- 1 (U) Plans and coordinates all interfaces of joint tactical systems with the Defense Communications System (DCS), fixed communications systems, and special communications systems, as required.
- 2 (U) Provides support for the planning and use of Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) for joint and service component communications as required.
- 3 (U) Provides voice, Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) Automatic Secure Voice Network (AUTOSEVOCOM), and record, Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), circuits in accordance with (IAW)

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telecommunications service requests (TSRs) issued by participating commands and agencies.

- 4 (U) Provides drug enforcement telecommunications systems acquisition management.
 - 5 (U) Assures interoperability of network elements.
- (b) (U) MILITARY SERVICES. Operate and maintain those parts of the DCS for which responsibility has been assigned, provide communications support for augmentation forces staging at CONUS bases, and augment USSOUTHCOM component communications capabilities, as required.

(c) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC COMMAND (USCINCLANT)

- 1 (U) Ensure that essential secure ship-to-shore communications are provided between supporting naval forces under USCINCLANT operational command.
- 2 (U) Prepare to activate one full duplex 100 word per minute (WPM) secure teletype circuit for direct communications with COMUSNAVSO and USLANTCOM/USLANTFLT Headquarters.
- (d) (e) <u>COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USCINCSOC)</u>. Provide communications support as required.
- (e) (U) DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE (NSA/CSS)
 - 1 (4) In coordination with USSOUTHCOM, plan and coordinate the installation, operation and maintenance of intelligence communications systems to, or between USCINCSO and DEA, US COAST GUARD, and other subordinate and supporting commands and agencies, as required.
 - 2 (U) Provide COMSEC support and communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOIs) development, production and distribution to joint and component forces as requested by USSOUTHCOM to include prior preparation and distribution of material to USSOUTHCOM for contingency purposes.
- (f) (S) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). Coordinates with USSOUTHCOM for entry into military networks in support of US operations in the theater, as required.

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- (g) 457 <u>DEPARTMENT OF STATE</u>. Coordinates with USSOUTHCOM for entry into military networks in support of US counternarcotics operations, as required.
- 2. (S/NF) MISSION. Establish, operate and maintain joint USSOUTHCOM command control and communications (C3) systems in support of U. S. and host nation counternarcotics operations in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Guiding Principles

- (1) Let The communications plans of the supporting commands must be prepared in sufficient detail and in close coordination with one another to ensure interoperability of equipment, COMSEC, procedures and CEOIs. References (a) through (f) apply.
- (2) (U) Absolute communications discipline at all levels of command is required for mission success.
 - (3) (U) No subordinate/supporting command will authorize subordinate units access into USSOUTHCOM communications nets without specific permission from USSOUTHCOM.
 - (4) (S/NF) Tactical satellite (TACSAT) systems will be backed up by terrestrial systems in case of satellite failure and/or destruction.

b. (U) Operational Concept

- (1) (2) Upon receipt of JCS Warning Order/Alert Order, USSOUTHCOM will direct the activation of selected communications nets consistent with the concept of operations.
- (2) 487 The USSOUTHCOM C3 system will employ in-place fixed communications systems and facilities (e.g. base telecommunications centers, switchboard, and AUTOSEVOCOM) to the maximum extent feasible. Tactical ground mobile force (GMF) satellite and terrestrial communications systems will be established to supplement or replace existing fixed communications, as required.
- (3) (U) Functional communications support requirements such as intelligence, search and rescue, special security operations (SSO), and weather circuits, will be supported through common user systems except when those functions have specific and unique requirements. As such, these communications systems will either be supported by internal service component systems or with joint systems, as required.

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- c. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities
 - (1) (U) See Appendices.
 - (2) (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF. US SOUTHERN COMMAND (USCINCSO)
 - (a) (U) Validate and obtain satellite access for TACSAT systems.
 - (b) 45) Direct installation of terrestrial systems to replace existing fixed communications systems, when required.
 - (c) (U) Release USCINCSO controlled UHF TACSAT terminals, as required.
 - (3) (U) COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN COMMAND AIR FORCE (COMUSSOUTHAF)
 - (a) (U) Provide communications support as required for Air Force Forces.
 - (b) (e) Provide alternate HF access to CONUS from the Albrook Global Command and Control Station, as required.
 - (c) 19 Furnish, install and maintain HF connectivity between the Tactical Forecast Unit, HOWARD AFB PM and any forward deployed weather team.
 - (d) (U) Provide communications teams with equipment to the USMILGROUP/SAOS and Host Nation forces in support of deployed MTTs/DFTs, as required.
 - (e) (U) Provide secure communications connectivity from the Southern Regional Operations Center (SROC) to air assets operating within the USSOUTHCOM AOR in support of counternarcotics operations.
 - (f) (U) See appendices for additional taskings.
 - (4) (U) COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH (COMUSARSO)
 - (a) (U) Install, operate and maintain terrestrial communications systems when directed.
 - (b) (U) Provide communications support to USMILGROUPs as required.
 - (c) (U) Develop and publish a Joint CEOI to support this plan.
 - (d) (U) Provide communications teams with equipment to the USMILGROUP/SAOs and Host Nation forces in support of deployed MTTs/DFTs, as required.

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(e) (U) See appendices for additional tasking.

(5) (U) COMMANDER, US NAVAL FORCES SOUTH (COMUSNAVSO)

- (a) (U) Be prepared to activate one full duplex 100WPM secure teletype circuit between USNAVSO and USLANTCOM.
 - (b) (U) Provide communications support as required to Naval Forces.
- (c) (U) Provide communications teams with equipment to the USMILGROUP/SAOs and Host Nation forces in support of deployed MTTs/DFTs, as required.
 - (d) (U) See appendices for additional tasking.

(6) (U) 1109th SIGNAL BRIGADE

- (a) (U) Provide over-the-counter message service to augmenting forces, as required.
 - (b) (U) Provide telephone service to augmenting forces, as required.
- (c) (U) Implement restoral plans in the event of disruption of the DCS.
- (d) (e) Activate teletype circuit between USSOUTHCOM, QUARRY HEIGHTS PM and Naval Operations Center (NOC) FORT AMADOR PM, as required.

(7) (U) COMMANDER, USMILGROUP/SAO HOST NATION

- (a) (U) Coordinate for the reception of and the beddown for augmenting forces deployed in support of the MILGROUP/SAO.
- (b) Let In conjunction with AMEMBASSY personnel, coordinate the incountry use of required frequencies.

4. (U) SPECIAL MEASURES

- a. (U) <u>COMSEC</u>. See Appendix 1.
- b. (U) Maximum use of communications assets already deployed within the theater of operations will be considered in the development of supporting plans.
 - c. (E) Frequencies. USCINCSO will assign frequencies for joint nets

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identified in this plan. Any shortfalls will be identified to USSOUTHCOM/J6 for resolution IAW reference (b).

- d. (U) Minimize will be imposed by USSOUTHCOM in coordination with JCS.
- e. (U) All references to time will be expressed as Greenwich Mean Time (ZULU).
- f. (U) <u>Recognition and Identification</u>. Identification friend or foe/selective identification feature (IFF/SIF) will operate IAW ACP 160 US SUPP-1.
- g. (U) <u>Command</u>, <u>Control and Communications (C3) Protection</u>. See Appendix 2.
 - h. (U) Joint Command and Control Circuits/Nets. See Appendix 3.
 - i. (U) <u>Tactical Satellite Circuits/Nets</u>. See Appendix 4.
- 5. (U) <u>LOGISTICS</u>. Logistical support will be IAW the Basic Plan and Annex D. Logistical considerations beyond the scope of the Basic Plan will be referred to USSOUTHCOM for resolution.
- 6. (U) ADMINISTRATION REPORTS
- a. (U) <u>Communications Spot Reports (COMSPOT)</u>. Subordinate units will submit COMSPOT reports to USSOUTHCOM SCJ6-0.
- b. (U) Meaconing, Interference, Jamming and Intrusion (MIJI) Reports. Subordinate units will submit MIJI reports through their higher headquarters to USSOUTHCOM SCJ6-0.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

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Appendices:
1 - Communications (Transmission/Crypto) Security
2 - Command, Control and Communications (C3) Protection
3 - Communications Planning
4 - Satellite Communications Planning

OFFICIAL:

TIMOTHY J. SHEIL Colonel, USA Director, J6

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COMMUNICATIONS (TRANSMISSION/CRYPTO) SECURITY (U)

REFERENCE USCINCSO Joint COMMO Plan, dtd 1 June 89

1. (U) <u>PURPOSE</u>. This Appendix outlines the minimum Communications Security (COMSEC) procedures required to establish a secure Communications-Electronics environment in which hostile elements are denied interception, intrusion, imitative deception, extraction, and analysis of Essential Elements of Friendly Information. This is accomplished through the conscious and thorough use of established COMSEC directives and procedures. Stronger measures may be implemented at local levels when conditions warrant.

2. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) The provisions of this Appendix apply to commanders, staff officers, message drafters, releasers, communications personnel, and all others who have occasion to use electrical communications, including the standard telephone, in the performance of their duties.

b. (U) Causes of COMSEC Violations

- (1) (U) Insufficient advance security planning.
- (2) (U) Inadequate training and failure to appreciate modern intercept techniques and capabilities.
- (3) (U) Lax security discipline, including the attempt to use "double talk" to circumvent security directives.
 - (4) (U) Failure to use approved COMSEC materials and procedures.
- c. (U) Commanders will emphasize communications discipline to all users of communications in order to reduce the amount of defense information that foreign intelligence agencies can extract from intercepted communications.
- d. (U) Strict radio discipline will be maintained at all times. Point-to-point, ground/air/ground, and air/air transmissions will be held to the essential minimum requirement for the accomplishment of the mission and/or flying safety.

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3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) The COMSEC objective is to achieve maximum protection against hostile interception and analysis of communications by:
 - (1) (U) Minimumizing use of nonsecure communications systems.
 - (2) (U) Complying with established Red/Black installation standards as they relate to static/mobile/tactical use of electrical processors of classified information.
 - (3) (U) Separating classified processors from unclassified processors in order to minimize acoustical and/or electromagnetic coupling that could result in inadvertent transmission beyond established physical control zones.
 - (4) (U) Establishing procedures to reduce electromagnetic emissions (e.g., low transmit power, directional antenna, and elimination of unnecessary transmissions).

b. (U) Tasks

- (1) (U) Predeployment
- (a) (U) All participants will insure that appropriate keying material codes and authenticators are issued from their unit's COMSEC account to support operations.
- (b) (U) Commanders will insure that all unit personnel are briefed on the following:
 - 1 (U) Proper COMSEC procedures.
 - 2 (U) EEFI.
 - $\underline{3}$ (U) Proper use of applicable call signs, cryptographic codes and authentication systems.
 - 4 (U) The hostile SIGINT threat.
 - $\frac{5}{4}$ (U) Techniques and proper countermeasures to use when confronted with communications deception and jamming.
 - $\underline{6}$ (U) Procedures for Over-the-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) of COMSEC devices in accordance with reference a.

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- (2) (U) During Deployment
- (a) (U) Responsible personnel will provide physical security to all classified communications equipment and materials.
- (b) (U) Responsible personnel will maintain continuous accountability of all COMSEC material IAW prescribed service directives.
- (c) (U) Personnel will use only approved storage facilities for COMSEC material.
- (d) (U) Personnel will destroy all COMSEC materials IAW prescribed service procedures.

4. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL

- a. (U) Maximum use will be made of secure telephones for all telephone conversations, including unclassified conversations.
- b. (U) COMSEC material from the Intertheater COMSEC Package (ICP) will be used to support joint requirements. Effective editions/segments and HJ times will be promulgated, via classified message, by USSOUTHCOM/SCJ6-OC upon receipt of an alert order.
- c. (U) Basic deployment load for ICP material is current month plus three (3) reserve editions. Basic Deployment Load of non-ICP material is current one (1) plus one (1) reserve edition. Material will accompany units deploying. Reserve editions will be returned to stock/depot if not used/implemented by controlling authority.
- d. (U) Cryptographic violations, losses, etc. will be reported by immediate message to (ACTION) USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ6-O// and INFO JCS ICP ITEM MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL// (controlling authority for the ICP Package) and service cryptographic agencies, as appropriate, for evaluation and resolution. Reports should be identified as INTERIM/FINAL, as appropriate.
- e. (C) The following cryptographic aids and keying material will be used to support subject CONPLAN:
 - (1) LC) AKAI-18 (CONFIDENTIAL), Joint Call Sign Directory.
 - (2) (2) AKAC-176 (SECRET), Operations Code (*).
 - (3) LC) AKAC-1553 (SECRET), Dryad Numeral Cipher/Authentication System.
 - (4) (4) USKAT-215 (KY-65/75) SECRET/GENSER.

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- (5) LET USKAT-1594 (TOP SECRET/GENSER-VOICE/DATA), KY-57/58.
- (6) LET USKAT-53560 (128 BIT GENERIC KEY FOR OTAR)
- (7) LEY USKAT-1019 (SECRET/GENSER-VOICE/DATA), KY-57/58.
- (8) LC) USKAK/Y-7242 (TOP SECRET/GENSER), KW-7.
- (9) LET USKAK-8499 (SECRET/GENSER), KY-8/28/38.
- (10) Let AKAA-106 (TOP SECRET), SECURE VOICE TOP SECRET Authentication System.
- f. (U) Positive Action. The following guidelines apply to:
- (1) (U) Nonsecure Telephone and Radio Communications. (Use only when secure phones or radio systems are not available).
 - (a) (U) Maintain strict communications security discipline.
 - (b) (U) Restrict number and length of telephone and radio calls.
 - (c) (U) Maximize the use of approved authentication tables. The called station makes the initial challenge when authentication is mandatory.
 - (d) (U) Encode/encipher all sensitive/classified information for transmission using an approved operations code.
 - (e) (U) Review COMSEC operating instructions for manual cipher systems.
 - (f) (U) Advise others present of an open circuit or uncradled phone in order to prevent acoustical coupling of background conversations onto nonsecure paths.
- (2) (U) Secure Communications Links. Use whenever possible, but as a minimum use, for the following:
 - (a) (U) Passing EEFI.
 - (b) (U) Passing any classified information.
 - (3) (U) Physical security for crypto equipment and materials.
 - (4) (U) Transmission of sensitive but unclassified information.

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Encourage the encoding/encryption of unclassified information if it:

- (a) (U) Reveals tactical training or the readiness or efficiency of units.
- (b) (U) Contains information regarding identity, location, movement, or changes in strength of units.
 - (c) (U) Reveals changes in unit organization or mission.
- (d) (U) Reveals the introduction of new equipment which changes capabilities.
- (e) (U) Discloses shortages or deficiencies which impair the efficiency or readiness of a unit.—
 - (f) (U) Reveals actions which indicate operational intent or activity.
- (g) (U) Reveals the classification of a classified operation, program, or project.
- (h) (U) Refers to logistical requirements for significant installations.

g. (U) Prohibited Actions

- (1) (U) DO NOT discuss classified or sensitive information via nonsecure communications means or "talk around the subject."
- (2) (U) DO NOT use "homemade" call signs, codes, ciphers, or authentication systems or make modifications to approved systems.

5. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. (U) <u>Security</u>. Only those codes, ciphers, or authentication systems provided by approved production agencies will be used.
- b. (U) Physical Security. Commanders at all echelons holding COMSEC material will prepare and maintain current detailed emergency destruction, evacuation, and disaster plans. Periodic training will be conducted to insure that personnel responsible for executing these plans are familiar with their assigned duties. Emergency plans must be executable as well as practicable.
- c. (U) <u>COMSEC Equipment in Mobile Configuration</u>. The following guidelines, concerning the use of specified COMSEC equipments in mobile configuration (ground vehicles, aircraft, ships, or manpack), in forward area and air assault

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operations are designed for planning purposes and are to be used in conjunction with applicable service directives. The guidelines apply to TSEC/KW-7, TSEC/KW-26, TSEC/KY-8, TSEC/KY-28, TSEC/KY-38, TSEC/KG-27, TSEC/KY-70, TSEC/KY-65, TSEC/KG-13. TSEC/KG-30 series, TSEC/KY-57/58 (VINSON), and TSEC/KG-80 series. This equipment is UNCLASSIFIED for external viewing regardless of the keying condition. Internal viewing of the unkeyed equipment is CONFIDENTIAL and keyed equipment assumes the same overall classification of the key element.

- (1) (U) Operators or users must have a clearance at least as high as the level of classified traffic to be passed.
- (2) (U) Personnel assigned to guard vehicles, ships, or aircraft containing COMSEC equipment do not require clearances or formal crypto authorization. Personnel assigned to operate equipment who do not have access to keying material do not require formal crypto authorization.
- (3) (U) COMSEC equipment may be used in the immediate presence and by Allied personnel; however, they do not have the authority to examine keying material, support documents or the classified interior of the equipment.

TAB

A Authentication and Operations Codes (U)

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) AUTHENTICATION AND OPERATIONS CODES (U)

- 1. (ℓ) The following authentication and operations codes will be used to interface HQ USSOUTHCOM with supporting and subordinate commands.
 - a. LET Operations Code: AKAC-176 (SECRET.):
 - b. LET Dryad Authentication Code: AKAC-1553 (SECRET).
- 2. (U) Operations Codes (OPSCODE) consist of 3-letter groups which translate to a particular letter, number, word or phrase. They are used to provide short-term protection to quantitative portions (who, what, when, where or why) of otherwise unencrypted tactical messages. The more a particular OPSCODE is used, the less protection it affords, because the interspersed plain language tends to reveal the nature of the encrypted meaning. OPSCODES will be used when it is imperative that classified information be passed and no secure means is available for transmission.
- 3. (U) An Authentication System is a COMSEC aid having key variables and a rule that allow two communications parties to demonstrate that they are friendly to one another. There are two methods of authentication in general use at the tactical level; challenge reply authentication and transmission authentication. The operational distinction between the two is that challenge reply requires two-way communications, whereas transmission authentication does not. The Dryad Authentication System (AKAC-1553) is capable of either. Secure authentication prevents an enemy from posing as a friendly station and intruding into communications nets to disrupt or confuse operations. While each transmission could be authenticated, it is inpractical and would overburden the communications system. Authentication must be accomplished, however, in any of the following situations:
 - a. (U) When entering or reentering a net.
 - b. (U) When any station suspects imitative deception on the circuit.
- c. (U) When challenged or requested to authenticate. (Note: Radio silence will not be broken for the sole purpose of authentication).

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) PROTECTION (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS MOP 185, Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures, 2 December 1986.
 - b. JCS PUB 18, Operations Security, 15 December 1982.
 - c. USCINCSO Joint COMMO Plan, 1 June 1989.

1. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) <u>General</u>. C3-protection encompasses those measures taken to maintain the effectiveness of friendly C3 capabilities against actual or potential hostile countermeasures. The overall objective is to ensure that vital C3 systems are provided necessary protection so that each commander can accomplish the assigned mission despite the enemy's efforts to disrupt, deceive or destroy these capabilities.

b. (U) Enemy

- (1) (U) See Intelligence Annex of basic plan.
- (2) (U) Hostile Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) and physical destruction of friendly C3 can be expected. Threats include:
 - (a) (U) Conventional weapons;
 - (b) (U) Special Operations Forces (SOF), Terrorist Actions;
 - (c) (U) Active EW (Jamming);
 - (d) (U) Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and SIGINT operations, Direction Finding (DF) and Related Electronic Identification Techniques.

c. (U) Friendly

- (1) (U) See Annex K.
- (2) (U) The Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) provides MIJI analysis, when requested.

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(3) (U) ELECTRONIC COMPATIBILITY ANALYSIS CENTER (ECAC) provides compatibility analysis of friendly systems, when requested.

2. (C) MISSION. Execute all measures to detect, identify and negate the effects of hostile exploitation, disruption, and/or destruction efforts directed at our C3 capability. Survival of our C3 will be enhanced by effective use of anti-jam features, intelligence support, OPSEC and COMSEC procedures.

3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) Concept of Operations
- (1) (U) C3-protection efforts will be a continuous process at all command levels.
- (2) (2) Effective C3-protection requires close staff coordination among key planners for OPSEC, deception, PSYOP, intelligence and electronic warfare.
- (3) (U) Proper OPSEC and COMSEC procedures must be understood and appropriately applied in all phases of the CONPLAN.
- (4) (\mathcal{E}) Military deception efforts must be coordinated across appropriate disciplines and echelons.
- (5) (U) Particular attention at all command levels will be given to ensure physical security and survivability of friendly command and control capabilities.
- (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) Offensive actions necessary to negate hostile exploitation must be within the prescribed Rules of Engagement (ROE). Such measures may include direct physical attack of enemy sensors, weapons systems, deception activities and ECM to disrupt or deceive enemy electronic systems.
- (7) (2) Jamming and destructive measures for C3-protection will-not be conducted prior to the commencement of hostilities unless specifically directed by USCINCSO.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) <u>COMMANDER IN CHIEF. US SOUTHERN COMMAND (USCINCSO)</u>. Responsible for overall C3-protection readiness and mission accomplishment. This

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- (a) (U) Providing for the development, review, and approval of doctrine and tactics in support of C3-protection.
- (b) (U) Ensuring that C3-protection concepts and tactics are tested in exercises against realistic objectives.
- (c) (U) Identifying resource requirements necessary to support C3-protection strategy to JCS.
- (d) (U) Reviewing planning to ensure that actions supporting ${\tt C3-protection}$ do not cause other nations to conclude that hostilities are intended.
- (e) (U) Identifying to higher authority the intelligence data base and ESM requirements to support C3-protection.
- (f) (e) Sanitizing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and acquiring necessary clearances in instances where sanitization is not feasible.
- (g) \mathcal{H}) Requesting national sensors to determine effectiveness of operations in support of C3-protection strategy.
- (2) (U) <u>COMPONENT/SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS</u>. Responsible for C3-protection readiness at operational level with emphasis on the following:
 - (a) (U) Incorporating C3-protection into the CONPLAN and implementing it in accordance with paragraph 3.a of this Appendix.
 - (b) (U) Developing and evaluating tactics in support of C3-protection as an integral part of warfighting capabilities.
 - (c) (U) Identifying intelligence requirements in support of C3-protection to include collection by national sensors.
 - (d) (U) Ensuring subordinates have a thorough understanding of C3-protection and the tactical advantages that can be derived from its use.
 - (e) (U) Ensuring C3-protection is a standing objective in all major exercises and providing for proficiency training in support of this plan.
 - (f) (U) Identifying C3-protection resource deficiencies to USCINCSO.
 - (g) (e) Assessing the vulnerability of friendly C3 nodes within their area of responsibility and identifying specific measures to protect such facilities.

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- (h) (e) Ensuring that exercise scenarios replicate conditions closely approximating the counter-C3 capabilities of potential enemies to ensure achievement of the highest possible state of combat readiness.
- (i) (U) Ensuring peacetime actions in support of C3-protection do not, cause other nations to conclude that hostilities are intended.
- (j) (U) Planning for air, ground and naval support as appropriate, for C3-protection operations.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

- (1) (U) Each command level will keep its headquarters informed of the C3-protection situation using appropriate environmental status reports and MIJI reports. Timely reporting of hostile counter-C3 activity and situational awareness at all command levels is imperative during execution of the CONPLAN.
 - (2) (U) OPSEC measures will be IAW Annex L.
 - (3) (U) EW actions will be IAW Annex C, Appendix 3.
- (4) (4) Military deception operations in support of C3-protection will be IAW Annex C, Appendix 7 (published separately).
- (5) (U) Psychological operations in support of C3-protection will be IAW Annex C, appendix 7 (published separately).
- (6) Let Intelligence information regarding enemy capabilities and intentions to disrupt friendly C3 will be exchanged directly through appropriate channels.
 - (7) (U) Each command will designate one C3-protection point of contact.
- (8) (8) SCI critical to the planning and execution of C3-protection measures, will, when approved by proper authority, be sanitized and released, as necessary, to support validated decision making requirements.
- (10) 40 All command operation centers will provide C3 status information to higher echelon.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. (U) Personnel. Not applicable.
- b. (U) Logistics. IAW Annex D.

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- c. (U) Reports. Not applicable.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL
- a. Let <u>Command and Control</u>. Commanders will provide, to USCINCSO, frequency lists of critical communications links restricted from friendly jamming.
 - b. (U) Execution. IAW basic plan.

Tab:

A - Definitions.

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 DEFINITIONS (U)

1, (U) PURPOSE. To provide relevant definitions.

2. (U) DEFINITION

- a. (U) <u>Command and Control (C2) (JCS PUB 1)</u>. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures that are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
- b. (U) <u>Command, Control, and Communications (C3) (DOD Directive 4600.4)</u>. The process of and the means for the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the commander's mission. C3 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures that are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the commander's mission. C3 capabilities will include resources to:
 - (1) (U) Obtain, report, communicate, process, analyze, synthesize, display, and disseminate information to support command planning and decision making.
 - (2) (U) Formulate alternative courses of action.
 - (3) (U) Make decisions.
 - (4) (U) Communicate orders to subordinates and receive the results of actions and the status of forces.
- c. (U) Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM) (DOD Directive 4600.4). The integrated use of operations security, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to deny information to influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C3 capabilities and to protect friendly C3 against such actions.
 - (1) (U) Counter-C3 (JCS MOP 185). That division of C3CM comprising measures taken to deny adversary commanders and other decision makers the ability to command and control their forces effectively.

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(2) (U) C3-Protection (JCS MOP 185). That division of C3CM comprising measures taken to maintain the effectiveness of friendly C3 despite both adversary and friendly counter-C3 actions.

d. (U) Jamming

- (1) (U) Acoustic Jamming (JCS PUB 1). The deliberate radiation or re-radiation of mechanical or electro-acoustic signals with the objectives of obliterating or obscuring signals that the enemy is attempting to receive and of deterring enemy weapon systems.
- (2) (U) Electromagnetic Jamming (JCS PUB 1). The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the objective of impairing the use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems being used by an enemy.
- e. (U) <u>Military Deception (JCS PUB 1)</u>. Actions executed to mislead foreign decision makers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives.
 - (1) (U) Electronic Deception (JCS PUB 1). The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to mislead an enemy in the interpretation or use of information received by his electronic systems. There are two categories of electronic deception:
 - (a) (U) Manipulative Electronic Deception (MED). The alteration or simulation of friendly electromagnetic radiations to accomplish deception.
 - (b) (U) Imitative Electronic Deception (IED). The introduction of radiations into enemy systems which imitate his own emissions.
 - (2) (U) Communications Cover and Deception (JCS MOP 116). A term that broadly identifies deception and cover activities in communications. Communications cover and deception encompasses the following activities:
 - (a) (U) Communications Deception. The deliberate transmission, retransmission, or alteration of communications in a manner intended to cause misleading interpretation of these communications.
 - (b) (U) Imitative Communications Deception. The introduction, by unauthorized parties, of signals or traffic--which imitate valid messages--into communications channels in order to deceive authorized users of the communications system.

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- (c) (U) Manipulative Communications Deception. The alteration or simulation of friendly communications patterns for the purpose of denying an enemy information that would be of value to him.
- f. (U) Operations Security (OPSEC) (JCS PUB 18). The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities.
- g. (U) <u>Flectronic Blocking</u>. Jamming which uses controlled power and is directed against target ESM/ELINT receivers to mask friendly emissions from foreign intercept and exploitation.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING (U)

REFERENCES: a. USCINCSO Joint COMMO Plan, dtd 1 June 1989

- 1. (U) <u>PURPOSE</u>. This Appendix describes joint command and control circuits/nets between USCINCSO, USMILGROUP/SAO commanders, and component commanders. It gives guidance and instructions concerning the installation, operation, and maintenance (IOM) of circuits/nets described in Tab A.
- 2. (U) EXECUTION. Communications systems will be planned and developed in close coordination with components, deploying forces, and agencies of the U.S. government interfacing with the system (i.e. State Department, Defense Communications Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, etc). Components will provide required communications support to USCINCSO, as directed.

3. (U) TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- a. (U) <u>USCINCSO</u>.
- (1) (U) Provide management and operational direction of the strategic communications system (see Tab B).
 - (2) (U) Coordinate with appropriate agencies for satellite access.
- (3) (U) Coordinate with JCS for deployment of JCS controlled communications assets.
- b. (U) <u>Defense Communications Agency</u>. See Annex K.
- c. (U) $\underline{\text{COMPONENTS}}$. Provide communications support to USCINCSO, as
- d. (U) <u>1109TH SIGNAL BRIGADE</u>. IOM the fixed station, strategic communication system.
- 4. (C) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION. The communications system desired for this CONPLAN requires voice, secure voice, secure data and alternate routing capabilities to allow USCINCSO to communicate with the NCA, Department of State, other government agencies, supporting CINCs, subordinate forces, and Allied forces to ensure successful command and control during execution.

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Tabs:
A - Joint TACSAT/HF Circuit List
B - Strategic System Configuration
C - NTR Network Diagram

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) JOINT TACSAT/HF CIRCUIT LIST (U)

References: a. USCINCSO Joint COMMO Plan, dtd 1 June 1989.

- 1. (U) <u>GENERAL</u>. This Appendix describes joint command and control circuits/nets between USCINCSO, JTF commanders, and component commanders. It gives guidance and instructions concerning the installation, operation and maintenance (IOM) of circuits/nets described.
 - 2. (C) FREQUENCIES. Contingency frequencies will be utilized as listed below during the initial phases when this plan is executed. Alphanumeric designators are used to designate the frequencies with the following legend. The asterisk indicates the numeric indicating the specific frequency. A* HF; B* VHF(FM); C* VHF(FM); D* UHF. These alphanumeric designators can be referred to over nonsecure circuits only if they are not associated with the frequency on the same circuit (see reference a). Contingency frequencies will not be used without prior approval of USCINCSO.
 - 3. (U) JOINT CIRCUIT LIST. The following joint nets will be established in accordance with reference a.
 - a. (8) <u>USCINCSO SAO C2 Net. (HF-SSB)</u>. The SAO Command and Control Net is a PARKHILL-secured, high frequency, single side band voice net linking USCINCSO, Security Assistance Offices, and certain selected subordinate commanders. This net is a backup to the single channel TASCSAT C2 net. Frequencies will be provided by USCINCSO.
 - (1) (5) Net participants: USCINCSO

USMILGROUP/SAOs

COMUSARSO (as required)
COMUSANAVSO (as required)
COMUSSOUTHAF (as required)
COMSOCSOUTH (as required)
AMEMBASSY (as required)

(2) (8) Keymat: USKAT-215

(3) (4) Classification Level: -SECRET

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(4) LET Tasks and Responsibilities: All commands will IOM their own equipment.

b. (5) <u>USCINCSO SAO C2 Net. (UHF-TACSAT)</u>. This net is a VINSON-secured, UHF-TACSAT, voice net linking USCINCSO, Security Assistance Offices, and certain selected subordinate commanders. This net will be continously monitored by USCINCSO. Frequencies will be provided by USCINCSO.

(1) (S) Net participants:

USCINCSO

USMILGROUPS/SAOs

COMUSARSO (as required)
COMUSARSO (as required)
COMUSSOUTHAF (as required)
COMSOCSOUTH (as required)
AMEMBASSY (as required)

(2) \(\S \) Keymat: USKAT-1019

(3) (C) Classification Level: SEGRET

(4) (4) Tasks and Responsibilities: Components will provide communications hardware and support as directed by USCINCSO.

c. \(\sigma \) USMILGROUP/SAO CDR'S C2 Net (UHF-TACSAT). This net is a VINSON-secured, UHF TACSAT voice/facsimile net. Frequencies will be provided by USCINCSO.

(1) (S) Net participants:

USMILGROUP/SAOs

DEPLOYED FORCES

AMEMBASSY (as required)
COMUSARSO (as required)
COMUSNAVSO (as required)
COMUSSOUTHAF (as required)
COMSOCSOUTH (as required)

(2) (8) Keymat: USKAT-1019

(3) (C) Classification Level: SECRET

(4) (8) Tasks and Responsibilities: Component headquarters of forces deploying to Host Nations will provide a communications liaison team to the SAO/MILGROUP.

d. 48) <u>USMILGROUP/SAO CDR's C2 Net (HF-SSB)</u>. This net is a PARKHILL-secured, HF voice/facsimile net. This net is a backup to the USMILGROUP/SAO CDR's TACSAT net. Frequencies will be provided by USCINCSO.

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(1) (8) Net participants: USMILGROUP/SAOs
DEPLOYED FORCES
AMEMBASSY (as required)
COMUSARSO (as required)
COMUSNAVSO (as required)
COMUSSOUTHAF (as required)
COMSOCSOUTH (as required)

- (2) (8) Keymat: USKAT-215
- (3) (C) Classification Level: _SECRET
- (4) (8) Tasks and Responsibilities: Component headquarters of forces deploying to Host Nations will provide a communications liaison team to the SAO/MILGROUP.

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- 1. (U) <u>GENERAL</u>. This appendix describes required strategic connectivity between the NCA, supporting government agencies, USCINCSO, USMILGPs, and American Embassies addressed in this CONPLAN.
- 2. (8) <u>CONNECTIVITY REQUIREMENTS</u>. To support the counternarcotics concept of operations, the following strategic communications connectivity is necessary for each country team affected:
 - DCS Connectivity
 - Secure Voice
 - Secure Data (See Tab C, Appendix 3)
 - Intelligence
 - Host Nation Interface.
 - JOTS/VIDS Network (NARCNET)

ATTACHMENTS:

- 1 Commercial Multichannel Satellite Connectivity2 Secure Voice Network Diagram
- 3 CN Data/Imagery Network4 Host Nation Interface Diagram

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
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ATTACHMENT 3 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) CN DATA/IMAGERY NETWORK (S)

CN DATA/IMAGERY NETWORK



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
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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

ATTACHMENT 4 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) HOST NATION INTERFACE DIAGRAM (S)

HOST NATION INTERFACE



AS REQUIRED (UHF SATCOM, VHF-FM, OR HF)

HF OR UHF SATCOM

AND ARE PROVIDED BY THE DEPLOYED FORCE

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HEADQUARTERS US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U).
NTR NETWORK DIAGRAM (6)

MILGP INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS NET

MILGP

REQUIRES

BASE STATION

REPEATERS

COMSEC

BATTERYS

CHARGERS

MAINTENANCE

FREQS

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING (U)

1. (U) <u>SITUATION</u>

- a. (U) General. This Appendix outlines UHF and SHF satellite requirements in support of the subject CONPLAN. Satellite communications can provide reliable, secure communications connectivity between the CINC, fighting forces and the National Command Authority (NCA). As such it is the preferred method of communications. All satellite communications will be backed up by HF radio to provide continuity of service in those cases where satellite communications does fail.
- b. (8) Threat. While satellite communications are encrypted for transmission security, they remain susceptible to interception by hostile forces. However, the most likely threat to satellite communications (in particular, strategic communications) is damage to, or destruction of, the satellite ground station or transmission site. Friendly actions to counter the threat include providing satellite access to more than one satellite, providing tactical backup to the strategic satellite communications system and providing the requisite security forces to the satellite earth stations and tactical backup sites.
- 2. 18) UHF SATELLITE REQUIREMENTS. This plan has requirements for four TACSAT channels (see Tab A and B for more detail). These TACSAT channels are required for:

USCINCSO SAO Command and Control Net

MILGP Commander's Command and Control Net

4. 48) JCS-CONTROLLED EQUIPMENT. JCS controlled equipment will be requested, as necessary, to support this CONPLAN.

Tabs:

A - UHF Network Diagram
B - HF Network Diagram

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
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MILGP CDR'S C2 NET



AZIMUTH: ELEVATION: DSCS SATELLITE: CLASS: Seoret Comsec: USKAT-1019

NOTE:

EACH MILGP HAS ITS OWN C2 NET

K-4-A-2 SECRET


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HEADQUARTERS US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U)

UHF NETWORK DIAGRAM (S)

USCINCSO SAO C2 NET UHF TACSAT



AZIMUTH: ELEWATION: DSCS SATELLITE:

CLASS: SECRET COMSEC: USKAT-1019

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
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HEADQUARTERS US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) HF RADIO NETWORK LIST (8)

USCINCSO SAO C2 NET

HF RADIO




CLASS: SECRET COMSEC: USKAT-215

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K-4-B-1 SECRET

MILGP CDR'S C2 NET HF RADIO



CLASS: SECRET
COMSEC: USKAT-215

NOTE: EACH MILGP HAS ITS OWN C2 NET

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

ANNEX L TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. JCS Pub 3-54, Operations Security.
 - b. USSOUTHCOM Regulation 380-14, Operations Security.
 - c. AFR 55-30, Operations Security.
 - d. AR 530-1, Operations Security.
 - e. OPNAVINST 3120.31A, Operations Security.
- 1. (S) <u>SITUATION</u>. This Annex is applicable to all activities of this CONPLAN. Mission effectiveness will be relative to the narcotraffickers capabilities and tactics. Effectiveness of narcotrafficker operations depends on their knowledge of Host Nation (HN) and US capabilities and intentions. The OPSEC process of denying the narcotraffickers this information by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning, staging, deployment, and operations is a command responsibility. Closely coordinated integration of OPSEC with cover and deception is needed at all command levels to provide the best security posture for counternarcotics activities.

2. (U) PLANNING GUIDANCE

- a. (e) OPSEC. OPSEC must be considered in all phases of operations conducted under this CONPLAN. US service members are currently constrained from accompanying HN forces on actual CN missions. This constraint highlights the importance of OPSEC training for HN military and police forces. US forces deploying to cooperating HNs must also be aware of good OPSEC practices as a part of personal and unit security.
- b. (C) Intelligence Threat. Narcotics traffickers throughout the ANDEAN RIDGE have subverted political, legal, and military leaders through the use of bribes and violence. It can be expected that they will have access to a substantial amount of HN intelligence and operational planning. It can also be assumed that the longer an operation is in the planning stage, the more likely it is to be compromised. See Annex B.

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c. (S) OPSEC Measures. All subordinate and supporting commanders will prepare an OPSEC plan in support of CN training, operations, exercises, and command and control. Additionally, they will conduct OPSEC surveys of CN training and HN CN exercises to identify possible OPSEC indicators within command and control, logistics, and personnel support procedures.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Appendices: None

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, USA Director, J3

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

ANNEX M TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY (MC&G) (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products, Part 1, Aerospace Products; Volume 1, Aeronautical Charts, Flight Information Publications and Related Products.
 - b. DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products; Part 2. Hydrographic Products.
 - c. DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products, Part 3. Topographic Products; Volume 1, Western Hemisphere, All Scales; Volume 4 (SECRET), Classified Maps and Related Products.
 - d. DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products, DMA Candidate Substitute Products Catalog, First Ed., October 1987.
 - e. DMAINST 8052.8, 22 May 1987, LATIN AMERICA Native Edition Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) Support to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
 - f. DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products, Part 7, Digital Data Products.
 - g. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 88-89, Annex G (SECRET), MC&G.
 - h. DMAINST 8660.1, 3 February 1987, Release, Distribution, Handling, and Storage of Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Digital Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Data.
 - i. DMAINST 8600.1, 5 September 1985, Administration of Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Automated Distribution Management System (DADMS).
 - j. DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products, Part 6, Vol 2, Ordering Procedures and Crisis Support.

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- k. DMAINST 8052.6, 15 June 1987, Crisis Support Procedures.
- 1. DMA Instruction 8600.5, 22 November 1977, MC&G Distribution Support Policy for Crisis/Contingency Situations.
- m. DMA Consolidated Air Target Materials Notices/Target Materials Bulletin (CATMN/TMB), Volumes I and II (SECRET).
- n. DOD DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products; Part 4 Target Material Products; Volume III (SECRET) Point Positioning Data Bases.

1. (U) SITUATION

- a. (U) <u>MC&G Requirements</u>. Requirements should be forwarded to USSOUTHCOM SCJ2 for coordination and validation. Additional MC&G requirements will be established by USSOUTHCOM or Supporting Commands, as they are developed.
- b. (U) Available Products. DMA maps and charts are available to support counternarcotics operations in CENTRAL AMERICA and the CARIBBEAN. There are large areas of SOUTH AMERICA already identified for counternarcotics activities that have no usable mapping coverage. In CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA, DMA may provide native addition maps as acceptable substitute products identified in reference d. These substitute products may be obtained at DMAOL, PANAMA. Available DMA MC&G products are as follows:
 - (1) (U) Aeronautical Products. Reference a.
 - (2) (U) Nautical Products. Reference b.
 - (3) (U) Topographic Products. Reference c.
 - c. (U) <u>Capabilities</u>. USSOUTHCOM has no organic MC&G capability.
 - d. (U) <u>Supporting Capabilities</u>. Reference g.
 - (1) (U) In-theater
 - (a) (U) DMA Combat Support Center, LATIN AMERICAN OFFICE (DMAOL) ALBROOK AFS, PANAMA, will stock and distribute MC&G products. DMAOL is the focal point for aeronautical information on CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICA/CARIBBEAN.
 - (b) (U) DMA Combat Support Center, LATIN AMERICA OFFICE, ALBROOK AFS, PANAMA, can procure additional native edition maps from LATIN AMERICAN national mapping institutes, via IAGS Project Chiefs in-country.

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- (c) (U) DMAIAGS has project representation in ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU and VENEZUELA. MC&G products and services can be obtained through these projects and the national mapping agencies.
- (2) (U) CONUS. Headquarters DMA, FAIRFAX, VA., and components.

e. (U) Assumptions

- (1) (U) DMA crisis support will be responsive to USSOUTHCOM and supporting command contingency MC&G requirements.
- (2) (U) In absence of standard map coverage in large areas of SOUTH AMERICA, substitute/interim products will be provided by DMA, using conventional and state-of-the-art technology to obtain the necessary imagery of the unmapped areas.
- (3) (U) Transportation will be available to deliver MC&G products to deployed units.
 - (4) (U) Tasked units will have planning and operational stocks available.
- 2. (U) MISSION. To provide MC&G products and services in direct support of planning and operations conducted IAW this CONPLAN.

3. (U) EXECUTION

a. (U) Concept of MC&G Operations

(1) (U) General

- (a) (U) USSOUTHCOM is developing detailed requirements for MC&G support to this CONPLAN. General MC&G requirements include broad-area, small-scale coverage of the CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICA/CARIBBEAN region and specific large- and medium-scale requirements being developed to support counternarcotic operations in specific areas already identified. The MC&G Officer in SCJ2 is the command focal point for all MC&G matters.
- (b) (U) The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) will provide necessary maps, charts, and other MC&G products and services, as required. DMA may provide a substitute MC&G product, usually a native edition map, when a DMA map is not available. Interim products, such as LANDSAT, enhanced with synethic aperture radar (SAR) imagery to depict relief, for 1:100,000 scale topo maps of unmapped areas, will be provided before final standard DMA topo maps can be produced.

- (c) (U) USSOUTHCOM will establish an operational stock of appropriate map/charts to support the USSOUTHCOM staff and component commands. Supporting commands should establish appropriate MC&G stocks to support operational planning.
- (2) (U) Deployment. Not applicable.
- (3) (U) Employment. Not applicable.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) <u>DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY</u>

- (a) (U) Provide MC&G_products and services in direct support of planning and operations conducted IAW this CONPLAN.
- (b) (U) Notify SCJ2 of any difficulty in providing required MC&G support IAW this CONPLAN.
- (c) (U) Provide a survey team for geodetic/topographic surveys on request.

(2) (U) DMA COMBAT SUPPORT CENTER LATIN AMERICA OFFICE.

- (a) (U) Maintain operational stocks of MC&G products IAW levels to be established by SCJ2.
- (b) (U) Provide automatic resupply of MC&G products when base point levels are reached.
- (c) (U) Notify SCJ2 of any difficulty providing MC&G products support required by this plan.

(3) (U) Component Commands

- (a) (U) Be prepared to identify requirements (including those of augmenting forces) for maps, charts and related MC&G products and services needed to support counternarcotic operations and general operational planning conducted IAW this CONPLAN. Upon initiation of operational planning, provide requirements for maps and charts to SCJ2 by product type, geographic area coverage and quantity.
 - (b) (U) Request from DMAOL needed maps and charts.
- (4) (U) Augmenting Forces and Supporting Commands

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- (a) (U) Determine requirements for maps, charts and related MC&G products and services needed to support all planned operations conducted IAW this CONPLAN, and advise SCJ2.
- (b) (U) Establish appropriate operational stocks of maps and charts to support counternarcotic operations and general operational planning conducted IAW this CONPLAN.
- (c) (U) Requisition needed maps and charts from DMA and provide necessary transportation arrangements.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

- (1) (U) Keep SCJ2 informed of required MC&G products to support operations IAW this CONPLAN, and any difficulty in obtaining needed MC&G support.
- (2) (U) Submit any requirement for DMA special support to SCJ2 with an information copy to HQ DMA/PR.
- (3) (U) Be cautious of non-standard grids, such as a Lambert Grid, on native edition maps that may be provided by DMA as substitute products.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. (U) Supply and Storage

- (1) (U) MC&G stockage and distribution will be provided in accordance with DMA procedures (See reference i).
- (2) (U) The DMAOL is the in-theater map and chart storage/resupply facility.
- b. (U) <u>Transportation</u>. Preplanned transportation arrangements are not required by USSOUTHCOM and its components. Supporting Commands will coordinate any special transportation requirements.
- c. (U) <u>Support</u>. MC&G production and related services will be provided from CONUS DMA facilities or in-theater capabilities, upon request by SCJ2.
- d. (U) Reports. Notify SCJ2 of any difficulty obtaining required MC&G support for operations under this plan.

5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. (U) <u>Priorities</u>. To be established by USSOUTHCOM and Supporting Commands, as necessary.

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- b. (U) Command Relationships. See Annex J.
- c. (U) Command and Control. Coordinate MC&G requirements and map requisitions via most expeditious means, in compliance with applicable security? regulations and operational security precautions.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

APPENDICES:

1. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Requirements List

Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Transportation Requirements: Not Used.
 Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Reports: Not Used.

MICHAEL M. SCHNEIDER Brigadier General, USA

Director, J2

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HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND APO MIAMI 34003-0201

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX M TO USCINCSO CONPLAN 6300-90 (U) MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY (MC&G) REQUIREMENTS LIST (U)

1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) This appendix identifies MC&G products required for the planning and execution of this CONPLAN. Supporting commands may use this requirement list in preparing their MC&G Annexes to supporting plans.
- b. (U) Map requirements are stated regardless if a Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) product exists or not.

2. (U) MC&G REQUIREMENTS

- a. (U) Aeronautical Charts and Related Products (see reference a to Annex M for catalog index of these products). Charts are listed by sheet number.
 - (1) (U) Global Navigation Charts (GNC):

9 18 24

(2) (U) Jet Navigation Charts (JNC):

46	77	104
47	78	105
61	91	117
62	92	118

(3) (U) Operational Navigation Charts (ONC):

H-22	L-25	N-27
H-23	L-26	N-28
H-24	L-27	P-26
H-25	L-28	P-27
J-23	M-24	P-28
J-24	M-25	P-29
J-25	M-26	Q-26
J-26	M-27	Q-27
J-27	M-28	Q-28
K-25	M-29	R-22
K-26	N-25	R-23
K-27	N-26	R-24

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S-21 T-18 U-17

(4) <u>LC/NOFORN</u>) Tactical Pilotage Charts (TPC):

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H-22 A, B, C
                        N-25 A, B, C, D
                        N-26 A, B, C, D
H-23 A, B, C, D
                       - N-27 A, B, C,
H-24 A, B
H-25 A, C, D
                        N-28 A, B,
                        P-26 A, B, C,
J-24 A, B, C, D
                        P-27 A, B, C,
J-25 A, B, C, D
J-26 A, B, C, D
                        P-28 A, B,
                        Q-26 B,
J-27 A, C, D
K-25 A, B, C
                        Q-27 A, B, C,
K-26 A, B, C, D
                        Q-28 A, B, C,
K-27 A, B, C, D
                        R-23 A, B, C,
L-26 A, B, C, D
                        R-24 A, B, C, D
L-27 A, B, C, D
                        S-21, A, B, C, D
                        T-18 A, B, D
L-28 A, B, C, D
M-25 A, B, C,
              D
M-28 A, C, D
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(5) (C/NOFORN) Joint Operations Graphics - Air (JOG-A) (Series 1501-A)

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NA 17-8, 12, 15, 16
NA 18-1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 15
NA 22-2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15
NB 17-2, 3, 4
NB 18-1, 5, 6, 9, 13, 15
NB 20-4
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NB 22-9, 13, 14
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ND 20-4, 8, 16
ND 21-9
NE 15-3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
NE 16-1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15
NE 17-2, 3, 8
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NE 20-5, 6, 11, 15
NF 16-6, 7, 8, 10, 11
NF 17-5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16
NF 18-1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15
NF 19-9
SA 17-3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16
SA 22-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
SA 23-1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12
SB 17-2, 3, 7, 11, 12, 16
SC 17-4, 8
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SE 19-1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15
SE 22-4
SE 23-1
SF 23-8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
SG 21-6, 7
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- (6) (U) Flight Information Publications (FLIP): CARIBBEAN/CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICAN package.
- b. (U) Nautical Charts and Related Publications (see reference b to Annex M for catalog index of these products).
 - (1) (U) Coastal Charts: All available charts for Region #2, CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA.
 - (2) (U) Harbor and Approach Charts: All available charts for Region #2, CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA.
 - (3) (U) Combat Charts: Requirement to be identified to DMA, by USSOUTHCOM or USCINCLANT upon indication of a specific operational situation that could require combat charts.
 - c. (U) Topographic Maps and Related Products:
- (1) (U) Joint Operations Graphics Ground (JOG G) Series 1501: All available coverage of CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICAN areas. Additional specific operational area requirements TBD.

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- (2) (U) 1:50,000 scale topographic maps: All available coverage of CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA. Native edition maps of 1:50,000 or 1:100,000 may be substituted. Additional specific operational area requirements TBD.
- (3) (U) City Graphics: All available coverage of CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA. Additional requirements for City Graphics TDB.
- d. (C/NF) Specific MC&G Products. (See Reference c to annex M for catalog index) NOTE: Items with an \star are not produced by DMA at this time.
 - (1) (U) Gazetteers

ARGENTINA
BELIZE
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR
FRENCH GUYANA
GUATEMALA

GUYANA
HONDURAS
MEXICO
NICARAGUA
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
SURINAME
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA

- (2) (U) DOD Evasion Charts (EVC) 1:250,000 Operational areas TBD.
- (3) (U) The Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) operational stock will be provided by Defense Mapping Agency in quantities and locations to be identified. DMA will stock suitable native edition maps and charts as acceptable substitute if no DMA product exists. CAUTION: Some native edition products will use local datums and grids.

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- c. 487 Provide surveillance of narcotrafficker personnel movements, naval and air staging bases, and major shipping points. See Annex B.
- d. (5) Support targeting of narcotrafficker personnel and installations.
- e. 187 Provide SIGINT of Narcotics communications nodes. See Annex C.

3. (U) EXECUTION

- a. (U) Concept of Operations
 - (1) (2) Upon receipt of JCS Warning/Alert Order, USSOUTHCOM will direct the activation of selected satellite communication nets to support COMCNTF consistent with the overall concept of operations. In-place ground terminals will be supplemented with—deployable ground terminals as required.
 - (2) (2) Weather and intelligence support will be provided through appropriate common user and joint systems.

b. (U) Space Activities

- (1) LST <u>Communication</u>. Space communication support consists of six UHF (single-channel) TACSAT channels for command and control and 36 (multi-channel) SHF channels for DCS entry. Refer to Annex K.
- (2) (U) <u>Environmental</u>. Space environmental support consists of weather satellite imagery from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) System. Satellite systems will be the only reliable means of obtaining environmental data on areas controlled by opposing forces. Refer to Annex H.
- (3) (U) <u>Navigation</u>. Global Positioning System (GPS) terminals will be utilized, if available, by air, land, and sea assets.
- (4) (U) <u>Surveillance</u>. Due to limited in-theater assets, satellite-based intelligence on narcotrafficker personnel locations, movements, communications, and on naval and air assets will be extremely critical. Refer to Annex B and Annex C.
- c. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities.
 - (1) (U) COMMANDER, COUNTERNARCOTICS TASK FORCE (COMCNTF).
 - (a) (U) Validate and obtain satellite access for TACSAT systems.

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- (b) 48) Coordinate the use of national overhead systems to exploit narcotraffickers communications nodes. See Annex C.
- (2) (U) <u>COMMANDER</u>, <u>US SOUTHERN AIR FORCE (COMUSSOUTHAF)</u>, will provide necessary support for the Howard AFB weather station, which receives imagery direct from GOES and relays the imagery to the USSOUTHCOM Forecast Unit.
- 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Annexes B, H, and K.
- 5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Annex J and K.

MAXWELL R. THURMAN General, USA Commander in Chief

Appendices: None

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG Brigadier General, USA Director, J3

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